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MY FATTIER AND MOTHER 
spoyclta 
The vholo Thesis is divided into tbre* partse 
In the first part th* view of Platole fororunnere on 
the natur* of the human goul vad its Imcwtality we 
disoussed very briefly* 
Th* surv*y shows that Plato's pr*deoooaore tr*at tho 
Vbol* problem In coxinection with the Universe relying an 
vague and unreliable mythaq rolklore and popular boliere* 
1'21* natur* of tho humm soul mid its immort&lity I& 
also =mined In the **eend parts as it is represented In the 
Platcmale dialogues and In the third onop as it to portwayed 
In the Pau]L: Lu* Spistles e 
In the second part it is stated that Plato conceives the 
human soul as a pure spiritual prIziciples a rational distimet 
entityq the source of lire, in fact life itseirl though it Is 
uneroatedg nevertheless it is a "process", albeit not a 
physical on*@ being Intermediate between the Formis and the 
Universe * 
plate vj4nrq the soul as nimpl* and unoaoqpoxmdodo The 
so-called *parts* are, not real or distinct parts or separate 
oloomts of the soujL ot an I tb*y are simply spiritual 
facultl". transitory and temporary mmul tationag owing 
th*Ir smisteme to the moull's connection with thO b0ldY9 WhIsh 
- 
to the prisonhouse or the aoulq a hindrance to it, an 
IMPOdIment to the higber activities or the soul and on the 
whole the source or evil and corruPtIOne Finally he 
r0gards the soul In g-enerals and hence# the individual soul In 
particular as being inherently immortal and deathlosso 
ThO thUld part d*alo with th* PSYChOllog: LC&l tOrlm4l GOulv 
spirlt# boftq with the trichotmW or =OR and the roe oction 
bodys 
Soulg not a very Impox-tant torup denotes for Ste Paul 
tb, * vital primiploy tb* prineWe of aninal and human lifo 
lnvolvftg a state or consciounriesse of VVLIL mid feelinge 
Spirit Is doecribed as tbo ruling Inner power of our 
entire hum= ezigtomm, it ig the gouroo of humm 
cortselousness and intellicewmes the seat of f*e]LLng and willi 
furthor it is the God-conscious eliment in mene 
The body Is the temple of the Holy SpIrItl it can be 
trwiarorvmd and re" i- 10 It to accear, ibU to God or evil e 
Sto Paul's trichotemic pasaago (le Thesso 5-23) Is a 
rhotorle-. 11twgical sentmw* and is ooncerned with the 
preservation and maxictifloation of the, wholeg of the entire 
'Mo resurrection boo must be thought of not w 
Id*ntioal with or statilar to our physlaal and *artbly on*# 
qw 3ý 
but as an Inhorent organic continuum, @ a psycho-physic 
orgenismo a lunifted. person, the entire sang fit " suitable, 
for the n*ws, glorious and perfect life In the Kingdom or God, 
which in otAr day w* call the individual & the personality* the 
solfe the "X"* 
The resurrection of b*liovers is an set and gift or 
God througb our rimen Lord and Saviour Josue Christ* 
7h* conclusion is that we, cannot speak lightly ab&ut 
&IWLIarities or parallelism 
great thinkers on the theov, 
lsmort&3LLtyo Thor* is no 
either In : Ldoas# languagog 
or pbroooologyo The diffs 
and real. 
a In anY form between the two 
of the bulman soul and its 
affinity wLatsoaver between then 
form# content, POInta of doctrineg 
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The aim of this work is to study the Platonic 
I 
and Pauline theory of the hunan soul and its 
ir, mortality and to detect possible similarities* 
Our study is exegetical and historical rather 
than speculative. 
The material is drawn in Plato from authentic 
works alone; In St. Paul likewise from the 
undoubted works, with only occasional references to 
Ephesidns, the Pastorals and Hebrews. 
The translations in Plato are taken from the 
Loeb Classical Libraryl Cornford, Hackforth and 
others; the Pauline from the RSV. 
PART I 
PRE-PLATOINTIC BAC. ýUfOUND: Plato's forerunners 
on the nature of human soul and its 
'immortaiity. 
HOIAE 
It is extremely difficult, I think, to form a clear 
Picture of, or to define Drecisely3 the Homneric psyche in 
our modern sense as t'Homer has no one word to characterize 
the mind or the soul"' and "he has an unusually large 
psychological vocabulary".. 
2 
In the fiost place, 'the Hotneric psyche means breath, 
3 breath-life., breathlixel something airy or ghostlike. 
1. B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, Oxford (1953) P-8- See calso E. P. Dodds, The GreeKs and the Irrational, , University of California Press-7-9-517 PP-15., 25., n-95. 
2. J. E. Burnet., "Soullf, ERE, XI (1920) P-738; E. Bohde, Psyche, London (19507-P. 5. 
3. E. Rohae)_Psychel P-5; J. Burnet, "Soul". ERE, XI 
(192 0)p. 73b; Idem., "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul? '., Essays and Addresses, London (1029) P. 142; 
H. G. Liddell and E. Sgott, Greek-English 
Lexicon, Oxford ý1897 ) P-1760; A. "OXT) 
. 1. u rpil' 
a CA EjLx6vq 
9 C. T6poC Athens (1951) p. 8,104; F Un iff, A Lexicon&the Homeric 
Glasgow (1924) p. 424. 
2. 
Its meaningis better explained by Professor Page, who very 
discerningly says: ttPsyche., for i4hich Ighostl is a much 
better word than Isoull, is not to be thought of as a 
spiritual essence or inmate of the body, or as the sum of 
its intellectual and emotional faculties. It is very like 
uhat we might call a Ighostttt. 
l 
Further, this psyche has neither any comiectio-n with 
the living body nor any L-itr,, llectual or emotional function 
whatever. Its only recorded association with the body 
which we find in the Homeric poems is t6 leave it. 
2 Thus 
the soul may leave the body temporarily when it faints or 
swoons3 or it escapes through the teeth (mouth)4; it 
escapes through Ilthe striczen woundt'. 
5 
Since the psyche holds the above mentioned function 
toward the living man it natumlly follows that the body 
seems to be far more important and more e-, --sential than the 
soul. In this respect, W. Capelle observes "all the 
D. Page, The Homeric Odyssey, Oxford. (1955) p. 22; 
Similarly S. D. F. Salmond in his book, The Christian 
Doctrine and r-nmortalit , Edinburgh 
(1895) p. 121., 
writes: "The (ýuXý is more a physical thing than a 
mental; material rather than immaterial; apprehensible 
yet shadowy. It Is the bond or principle of animal 
life, something more than breath but less than mind or 
spirit". 
2. See also E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational) P-15. 
3.11. V 696-V. 
4.11. IX 408-9. 
5. Ll - XIV 518-9; -1-1 - 
XTI 505., 856; Il. XXII 362, 
3. 
activities, mental or other of the human personality, such 
as feeling, thought, volition., exertion, are regarded as 
being possible only so long as body and soul are united; 
in fact they are in the strictest sense functions of the 
body. p6voc., v6oc, pýTor, PouXý Ovp6c 
also are bodily faculties or powers, and although they can 
assert themselvos only with nsyche, at once the "second ego" 
of man and the principle of his -animal life remains within 
him, yet they are in no sense evolved from the inherent 
capacities of the soul which has absolutely no share in 
the waking activities of man". 1 
But where does the re"-l living man lie, or which one of 
I the two component factors constitutes the complete Person- 
ality or ego? In this matter Homer is self-contradictory. 
According to a number of Dassages he contrasts with the 
body: 'land sent forth to Hades many valiant souls of 
warriors, and made themselves ( abvour, pt. 
2 Also "For the 
whole night long hath the spirit of hanless Patroclus stood 
over me., weeping and wailing, and gave me charge concerning 
each thing and was wondrously like his very self, 13 
Er O&HCXOV ab-Cw ) or with the soul, "until 
1. W. Cuppelle, "Body"., ERE., 11 (1909) P-769. 
2. Il. IY 3-4, trans. A. T. Murray) Homer, the Iliad, Vol-ly 
London (1937) P-3 in LCL; also D B. Monrol Homer, 
Iliad, Books I-XIII., Oxford (1894 ) p. 248, who rightly 
translates "their bodies" and re-narks, p. LXX, T)"-ra. 46: 
hence in Il. 14 to distinguish the bo(ýy as the actual 
person from the soul or life". 
3- 
-Ll- 
XXIII, 104-62 trans. ibid. Vol. II., London (1934)P-503. 
4. 
such time as I myself ( AAC Q& ) be hidden in 
Hadestf. 1 
The answer might be exrressed as follows: - 
For Homer, neither the psyche-alone nor the body 
itself is the living man or real personality or ego, but 
the union or fusion of both. 2 
We must mention here that some scholars hold different 
views from those of Rohde% ; they suggest that Homer 
regards the Thymos ( ou46c) as a third distinct entity in 
living3 man and then he uses it in a sense of psyche and 
4 Instead of this ý. )ord. Gomperz traces "a two-soul theory" 
in Homer ana suggests that the word thymos may be taken as 
a second soul in addition to the soul. 5 
Il. XXIII) 244, trans. A. T. Lurray, Homer, the Iliad, 
see also in Il. XI, 262 XIV 4% 01.11, P-513; -3, -7, XV 251-2. 
2. See also E. Eohde, Psyche, -o. 6; "both the visible man (the body and its faculties) and the in-dwelling ps-yche 
could be described as the Man's 'self'. According to 
the Homeric view, human beings exist twice over; once 
as our outward and visible shape and again as an invisible timaget which only gains its freedom In death. 
This, and nothing else., is the psyche". 
3. S. G. F. Brandon, Man and his Destinv in the Great Religio 
Manchester (1962) on p. 160 n-5., and especially sne in Professor R. B. Onians, The Origin of thp FuroDean Thought., Cz: 4mbridge (1ýýI) pp. 23 -40ý 44-61) 66-74,79-`3Y 93-iOOy 103-12, where there is a v. Tide vC-Ariety of 
refere, ices. 
4. W. Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosonhers, 
Oxford (1ý4-7) PP-74-bO, 82. 
5. J. H. Gomperz, Green Thinkers, London (1901) V01. J3 p. 249; 
and in E. Rohdels. Psyche, PP-50-1 n. 58. 
5. 
We can hardly accept and sunDort the contention that 
thymos stands instead of soul in Homeric pocms, in spite 
of the fact that the above scholars etymologically, 
linguistically and urith skill and profundity., have exranded 
and elaborated this. The fact reuains that thyrlos in 
Homer "is neither the soul nor (as in Plato) a ? part of the 
soullff. It may be defined roughly and generally as the 
organ of feelingl or as "the generator of motion or 
agitation while mind ( vo-ur, 
imagestl,, 2 
) is the cause of Ideas and 
Rohde, who rejects and refutes at length the Gomperz 
"two-soul" theory, explains this statement much more clearly 
when he says: "Again and again the thymos (Oup6r, ) is 
clearly referred to as a mental faculty of the living body; 
either thinking or willing or merely feeling. ( Outlm, VON, 
)f 8F--LcraL, -y-WacL Oull ilpape OuOv, -Duii"y T) ý, 
Jxox6aaro 
, ýUpý y 
It is the seat of the emotioris, (ýt 6 voý. -, - 
gXapc, ýuj16v) and. belongs to the body of the living C) 
man, and especially enclosed in the yP6vEC In the 
face of this, it is impossible to rcgard it as something 
1. E. R. Dodds, The Gree-&s and the Irrational, p. 16. 
2. B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, p. 8. 
6. 
independent of the body. Once indeed, R 131)l the 
T) thy, mos (45upk ) is spoken of instead of soul 
((ýuXý ) as 
that which goes down to Hades, but this can only be an 
error or an oversight ...... 112 and elsewhere: 
"In the 
Line H 131 we really then do have thymos (Oupk ) instead 
of soul ((ýuXý ) either as the result of a misunderstanding 
of the real meaning of the two words or merely through an 
oversight. But never (and thIsIs the most essential 
point) do we have a case in Homer of the oDposite exchange 
of significance, i. e. of soul (Wý ) used in the sense of 
thymos (Ouýtk ) etc. as meaning the mental power and its 
activity in the living and -,, raking man". 
3 
Now let us turn our attention to see what Homer has to 
say about the soul's i=ortality. 
Homer writes that the soul after death leaves the body 
4 
and derarts to Hades, a place which is nothing else than a 
gloomy, shadowy and inaccessible land. 
These souls in Hades are nothing more than mere images 
The H 131 comes from 
, 
Homer, Iliad. E. Fohde is very 
unsystematic and inconsistent in his mode of quoting 
from ancient authorities. According to his 
translator., in spite of the fact that his translator 
has made an*effort, as he says in his translator's note 
(E. Rohde, Psyche, XV, p. ) to reduce the number of 
inconsistencies and give references where possible to 
modern editions. 
2. E. Rohde, Psyche, P-50 n-58. 
3. E. Rohde, ibid. p. 390 n. 2. 
4. Il- XXII 362-3; also XX 294) XIII 415, ý XXIV 246; Od. X 560j XI 65. 
7. 
or phantoms or shades of the living man. 
' 11 powerless 
headsl, 2 without wits3 and therefore destitute of 
4 consciousness and intclligence. A fine description of 
the Homeric souls in Hades is given by Apollodorus in 
his work on the Gods: Homer "assumes that the souls 
resemble the images appearing in mirrors and arising in 
water., which are made in our likeness and imitate our 
movements, but have no solid substance to be grasped or 
touched". 5 
While the souls lie unconscious and witless in Hades, 
a few favoured ones indeed enjoy a harpier fate (e. g. 
Tireslas who by favour of Persephone retained his 
consciousness in Hades (. 2d. X 493 ff), Menelaus and 
Radamanthus in Elysium (gd. IV 561 ff)., Hercules (Od. XI 
6oo). 6 
It is far beyond our main purpose to discuss the above 
instances in detali for they are exceptions and are regarded 
The locus classicus is 11. XXIII 1031 104; also see 66 ff, 99 ff; and In J. Burnet., "Soul"., ERE, XI (1920) 
P-738 n. 2. 
2. Od. XI 29. 
Il. XXIII 104. 
Od. XI 476. 
5. Ap. Stob. Eel. I p. 420, quoted in J. Burnet f'Soul" FRE 
OP-cit- ýPý-738-9 and Idem, Socratic Doctrine of the 
Soul in his Essays and Addresses, p. 142; and E. Rohde, 
Psyche, PP-7,44., n. 6. 
E. Zeller, Pre-Socratic PhilosoD . I) p. 124. 
8. 
by many critics and scholars and especially the Nekyia of 
the Odyssey as interpolations of the later Deriod. 1 
After this rapid and very brief survey, it becomes 
crystal clear that we cannot ascribe to the Homeric ýoems 
any consciousness of immortality after death; if we should 
do that we wouid be very properly faulted by E. Fohde and 
J. Adam2 for the simple reason that life after death becomes 
so pale and empty that it is not far from non-existent3 and 
the so-called existence of the shades is more of words than 
a reality. "It contains no element of value that men 
should look forward to itit. 4 
More about it may be seen in Professor D. Page's book, 
The Homeric Odyssey., Oxford (1955) and esnecially 
1" 011.1 -ý pp. 21-52, "Odysseus and th&Underworld1t 
where he points out that there was once -;, n indenendent 
poem which was inserted to Odysseus later. 
2. E. Rohde, Psyche., p. 9; J. Adam, The Religious Teachers 
-of 
Greece, Eainburgh (1923) P-5b. 
M. P. Nilsson, A Histor of Greek Religiony Oxford (1925) 
P-138. 




There is no real comparison between the airy ghost, the 
so-called Homeric psyche, and that entirely new and 
revolutionary idea of the Orphic Soul which is divine and of 
celestial origin. The soul for Orphics "is a rarticula 
divinae aurae, a particle of the pure empyrean substance or 
aethertf. 1 it is., as Empedocles has it: "an exile from 
heaven and a wanuerer". 
2 
Further, we can draw a far clearer nicture of the 
Dionysiac descent ((ýivinity) and immortality of the soul 
from the content of the following Orphic Plates: III am a 
chi16 of Earth and starry Heaven; but my race is of 
Hcavenfl; III am the Son of Earth and starry Heaven". and,, 
"For I also avow that I am of your blessed race". 3 
J. Adam., The Religious Teachers of Greece, p. 99; see 
also S. D. F. Saimond, Christian Doctrine of Ignortality, 
P-135. 
2. Emped. Frag. 115; in fl. Diels ed. by IJ. Kranz Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratikes (1951) Erster Biand, P. 357. 
See also flippol. Ref. VII 29. 
"ÖCCýLOVaC T6C dýUXdr, XýyWV ga>CpaCWVar O'TL F-t(YL'V 
ä'MVaTOU XCC [tCLXPOUC 4&)' LV-aLw-vac; ` Plot. Enn. IV-8.1 
EýincöoxXýr, Tý ELn(Zv äýtapTavoýcatg v6g. ýýv-, '0 cd *, ýý - (P u my 6 r, E'ivaL 
*ra~Lr, 
1)Xa~Lr, Xa( aýT6C1 f\ Y E. 
-A so 
in F. IL Cornford., From Religion to Philosor 
N. y. (1957) p. 179 n. 3. 
J. Harrison, Prolego. mcl2-- to the Study of the Greek 
Reilgion., N. Y. (1957) P-575 (arpendix G. Murray) 660-74-; also 1W. K. C. Guthrie, Orpheus and the Greeks, London (19522) P-173. 
10. 
"The body of all men is subject to all-powcrful deathý 
but alive there yet remains an image of the living man; 
for that alone is from the gods. 
It sleeps when the limbs are active, but to them that 
sleep in many a dream it reveL. Ieth an award of joy or 
sorrow drawing nearlt. 1 
This i=ortal soul is sharply distinguished from the 
Titanic element, the body, which is regarded by the Orphics , 
as a prison house, as a grave or tomb. Here are their own 
words according to Plato and Philolaus which here I sicaDly 
mention, reserving comment to a later and more appropriate 
place. 
'? Some say that the body is the tomb of the 
soul., as if the soul in thls present life were buried; but 
I think it most likely that the name was given by the 
followers of Orpheus, with the idea that the soul is under- 
going whatever penalty it has incurred and is enclosed in 
the body as in a sort of prison house for safe keepingil. 
2 
"The ancient theologians and seers beer Iritness that 
for certain purposes of punishment, the soul is yoked 
together vith the body and buried in it as in a tomb". 
3 
1. Pindar Frag. 131., quoted in F..,,, I. Cornford, Greek 
Religious Thought, London (1950) p. 64. 
2. Crat. 400 BC, trans. F. I. I. Cornford, Greek Religious 
Thoug Lt IP- 74. 






Opening his paragraph on Heraclitean theory of the 
soul., Q. Huonder observes that: IfTho. doctrine of the soul 
according to Heraclitus stands in closest relation to his 
doctrine of the logos. As the outflow of the Divine logo 
is the human soui gifted with the reason. The soul has 
its own law (logos, which increases itself, i. e. grows 
according to its needs)"' and, in saying so., it seems to me 
he is not far from the truth., as logos is the centre and 
source of' all things. Logos, in the enigmatic, oracular 
and i)icturesque expression of Heraclitus, contains 
everything in himself (everything are contained to him and 
whatever talces place. -. comes from him and it Is directed by 
him). V 
But let us examine a little moro closely and very 
briefly whcit has been said by Heraclitus himself about the 
logos and In relation, of course, to the human soul. 
In the first place) logos is the , n, op &CCýWov,, 
2 
Q. Huonder., Gott und Seele im Lichte der Grie 
Philosophie, Munchen (1954) P. 85. 
Fr. B 30 in DK 13 P-158. 
12. 
ever-living fire, xindied in measure and quenched in 
measure. ' This ever-living fire, is the one made up of 
all things and ail things issue from the one2 and 
transforms itself into sea, earth. 3 These transformations 
4 take place through strife and war, through this universal 
and creative force, or as Heraclitus again calls it, 11the 
way up and downfl. 
5 In this continuous motion and change 
the soul also participates, becomes death, water, earth 
and vice-versa. 
6 
Secondly, the logos is conceived by Heraclitus as a 
rational entity, as wisdom, thought and intelligence7 urho2 
on the one hand, steers the course of all things and is 
called Zeus or God8 and on the other hand, as divine law9 
who feeds the human law, he prevails as much as he will and 
suffices for ail things. 
Without any further discussion and hesitation it may 
1. Fr. B 30 in DK , I, P-158. 
2. Fr. 59, fr. 22 in J. Burnet., Early Greek Philosop 
pp-137ý, 13 5. 
3. Fr. 21,, 22 in J. Burnet, ibi d. P-135. 
4. Fr. 44, fr. 62 in J. Burnet, ibid) PP-136,137. 
5. Fr. 60 in D. K, I, p. 164. 
6. Fr. B 36 in DK, 1) P-159. 
7. Fr. 19, 28, gi a-c, all in J. Burnet, ibid. DP-134. ý 135, 139. 
8. Fr. 36., 65 in J. Burnet, ibid. PP-1362 138. 
9. Fr. 91b in J. Burnet, ibid. P-139. 
13. 
well be said from the foregoing that: 
1. Heraclitus still remains in the IonEm ground and 
expresses his ideas in a corporealistic, hylozoistic and to 
a great extent, pantheistic way; nonetheless, he endows 
his Logos - ever-living f ire.,, with intelligence and wisdom, 
which are to be regarded as valuable and of great 
importance. 
2. The human soul is a -, ortion of the ever-living Fire, 
divine Law and Logos, 
l but it is not a separated and 
distinct entity or personality. Notions., such as selfhood, 
consciousness and immortality are comDletely foreign to his 
theology. 
3. HeracUtus mentions something about the life beyond 
when he says: IfThere a-wC,. its men when they die such things 
as they look not for nor dr6am of" and '! Souls smell in 
2 HadesIt. 
But these fragments do not produce anything new, as 
they contradict the notion of "the way up and down". The 
soul does not survive as a permcnent individual or ego after 
Fr. B 115 in M, I, P-176; see also J. Burnot, Greek 
Philosophy, P-59; G. Viastos "on Heraclitus" in 
Werican Journal of Philology, 76 (1955) P-438 ff; 
and Kirk and Raven , The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 20,208,215. 
2. F r. 27 and 99 in D-K, I, P-1r; 7; comp. 31so with fr. 62, 63 in E. Zeller, Pre-Socra'tic Philo,, on II) nP-85-87; 
trans. J. Burnet, &-rly Greek Philosorhy, p. 136'. fr. 3b 
and 141 fr. 122, as it is obvious Burnet follows the 
arran, ýement of the fragiiients of Bywater's IIp. xcmpl. --ryII 
Gdition and not that of Dicls and -Kranz. 
14, 
death. This again does not mean utter annihilation) but 
change into another element according to Philo. 
1 The 
only sense of immortslity which we can conceive is that 
which is closely connected with the Way up and Lown theory. 
This point has been wor-'. -: ed out very well by J. Ithurriague, 
whom I quote: "We have been led to the belief that 
Heraciitus could not in any sense entertain the concept of 
individual immortality; his doctrine of eternal change 
precludes any such conclusion and contains no real basis on 
which to found belief in metemDsychosis. For him., the 
soul, a mere sp. nric from the universal fire., exists from all 
eternity. The obscure formulae in which he wraps his 
concepts have managed to lead certain expositors astroy; 
they signify, however, nothing other than the series of new 
transformations which a-mCIn undergoes after death. In 
Places) Heraclitus says quite exrlicitly, that the soul becomes 
water; now, since the essence of the soul is fire, such a 
metamorphosis cý; n only mean extinction (literally I'der-i-th"). 
Consequently, the immortality of the soul can be understood 
only in terms of an unce. -sing cycle of renewals, 
1.11. Philo, De Aet. Aundi, 21 (77.8 Cohn-Reiter on fr. 36). 
Odva, uov ob vjv ctc, 6-nav &vaLpcaLv bvoýmWv, Wd TT')v 
EtC. E'TEPOV a'TOLXF--LOV pumpoXfM 11 
in ýv. K. Guthrie., A History of Greek Ph-ilosop 
PP-463 n. 2 and 4bO n. l. 
'5. 
f1renouvellementsil, from death to life and from life to 
deCath". 1 
PP. La Croyance do Platon, pp. 120-1; sce also E. Rohde, 
Psyche, pp. 3bd, 370Y 59-4 n. 19; J. Adam, The Religious 
-Teachers of 
Greece, p. 239; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's 
Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosor . pp. 297-7-n. 29; Kirk and Raven, The Pre-SocraticPhilosophcrs., p. 210; W. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosonhy I rp. 479 -`0 - lWhile J. Burnet, Greek Phiiosonhy, p. 63., admits that 
"there are certainly fragments that seem to assert the immortality of the individual soul; but when we 
examine them, we see they cannot bear this intcr- 
pretation. Soul is only immortal so far as it is 
part of the over-living fire whicb is the life of the 
world. Seeing that the soul of every man is in 
constant flux lik(-ýý his body, what . -ieaning can immortality have? 11 Oddly enough, he checks Rohde, who "refused to 
admit that HerLclitus believed the soul survived death" 
and adds,, "Strictly sT. )eaking, It is no doubt an. 
inconsistency; but I believe with Zeller and Diels that 
it is one of a kind we may well admit. The first 
argument which Plato uses to establish the doctrine of imortaiity 'in the Phaedo is just the fieraclitean 
parallelism of life and death with sleeping and waking". J. Burnet., Early Greek Philosophy, P-154 n. 2., ro not both Burnet's views contradict each other and rerresent him as being in two minds? 
- 16:. *-.... 
4. PYTHAGORAS AND PYTHAGOREANS 
Nobody can expect clarity about the soul's origin, 
-nature and Lamortality in the 'Pythagoreans, because of the 
lacX of authentic evidences and of the ambiguity of the 
existing passages, more particularly for the faMous theory 
of Itsoul-harmoniall which has aroused endless discussion 
and argument amon,,, the scholars. 
Nevertheless, something must be said about it in 
general: 
5 Alexander Polyhistorts account we read, the "soul 
is a torn-off fragment of aither and the hot and the cold; 
it is not coterminous with life, and it is immortal 
beckause that from which it has been detached is immortall'. 1 
Further., mother passagc2 says that the huLman soul before 
Diog. Laert. VIII, 24 ff. in DK) I) pp. 448-950; trans. 
W-, 'ý-C. Guthrie., A. History of Grcok Philosoph . Cambridge (1962) Vol. j., p. 202- Regarding immortality of the 
Soul comp. PorDhyrius Vit. Pythag 1-8-11 19 (D. K., 14 8a): 
iinpwTov pýv 6c, 6-DdvaTov, clvaL YTýL TT)V (ýUXýV"; 
See also in G. S. Kirk ý2nd J. E. Raven, Thr-Pre-Socratic 
Philosophers,, Cambridge (1962) p. 223; Cornford, From Philosophy to Religion, p. 201 n. 1; B. Eussell, A History of Wc-stern-Philosor)h , London, P. 51 n. l. 
2. Ap, iýax. Tyr. 16., 2.1., 287R: qtd. in E. Rohde., Psyche, 
p. 98 n. 49: 
.... xc: 
t ydp abT')v ((ýUX'V) TEPLN Iq"%CLV 6CZPOI' Counp. 
, IapB, XCXou -nEpC RvOcyopc(ou BCou 14,63: "h Wý 
np6 To"v Tw-6c a6ýMTL tV6CO-T)VUL? ndXaL nOTý LPIWC ... "I 
ibid. 14., 63: llabT6c Tc 
L*YCY\)WCY)tF- T06r, 7LPOTF-POUC, ýaUTOU 
prouc, "; ibid. 28) 134: LyCvwaxe TT')v ýauTot ýuXýv, TIc. 
ýv xcx( nUcv F-tr, T6 CTýW[Ia CtCYCXT)X60CL, '106r, TEE RPOT6POUr, 
ab, rýr, pCour, " ail quoted in Prof. A. 1.0' LX LTETE 16OU , 
'ýIaTop(a T-T)C tnoXýc Týc KaLVýC ALaOýWQC, un S, 
7- 
17. 
entering the human body pre-existed. ' 
In addition to these views, Aristotle ennumerates 
some other aspects of the human soul held by the 
Pythagoreans., saying: 
"The theory held by the Pythagoreans seems to have 
the same purport; for some of them said that the soul is 
the motes in the air, others it is what moves them. They 
spoke of ýaotes because they are evidcntly continual motion) 
even when there is a complete calm". 
' 
This notion that the soul is either the motes in the 
air or that which moves them must be regardedIts a real 
PoDular belief which has already been partially mlevated 
2 to a philosophical standing", and that "belongs to the 
early and unwittingly corporeallst generation which 
thought th--t units were extended in snace". 
) On this 
point I found nost interesting C-nd quite illumincting, what 
H. Cherniss-s,.. Lys "-nd I quote below: 
llýrist Ale _0 imiuiý. It" . 
2,16 ;. rls !, in. G ýS,. rirki.: and J. r. - -fi,. vcn Tiie t'-Irc--S-)cr-ý, tjc Phil-, s --)!? hers, CL, -, TF-it*l-. rc* (1-957) -to-'261; DK p. 416 2. 
2. E. Rohde, 
-Psyche, p. 
396 n. 4o. 
G. S. Kirk &nd J. E. Raven, ibid. p. 262. 
18. 
"The 'identification' of a soul "-nd the motes is 
obscure,, unless it refer to an old superstition rather 
than a philosophical doctrine (Cf. Zeller-Nestle, op. cit-I, 
P-561 n. 3) and in that case each speck of dust was 
probably considered to be a soul, so that Aristotle's soul 
impiies complications which did not exist. But the 'other? 
Pythagoreans who identified the soul with the Power that 
moves these motes, if they really existed, must have been 
very late, for their theory implies cas truly immaterial soul 
which is simply ýý motor force; such a theory, since 
fundamentally it has nothing to do with the motes, must 
have been an accommodation of the earlier surerstitition to the 
more highly developed psychical theories of lator times". 
' 
Another Pythagorean view, according to Aristotle again, 
is that the soul has no esoterical organic connection or 
"relutionship" with the body; it is not what may be called 
the personality of the individual visible man; "any soul 
H. Cherniss, Aristotlets Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore (10135) 
p. 29i n: 6'-, - 1W.,, s-C. Guthrie, A Historv of Groek PhIlosonhy, Vol. I, Cambridge (1ý62) P-3072 on the 
other hand, notes that the first form sounds "more 
primitive"I, and thrt second one "a refi--iemE, -nt on it in 
a spiritual directiont'. 
lg. 
may dwell in any body". ' 
But the most contraversial and T)uzzling of all 
theories, as I mentioned before, or as L. robin likes to 
call it "a subJect of scandal and horror to pious 
PythagoreansT1.2 was, and still is, the so-called "soul- 
harmoniall which hs been handed down to us and concerning 
which there are many opinions for and against. 
According to this theory, the soul "is -3. kind of 
attunement; for attunement is a blending and composing of 
opposites, and the body is constituted of opnosites" (the 
translation is from Kirk and Raven, The Pro-Socratic 
Philosophers, p. 261). 3 
The first reactionary voice and onpositLon came from 
Simias, who clearly observed that: I'Now if thr- soul really 
is a Aind of attunement, plainly when our body is unduly 
relaxed or tautened by sicziness or some other trouble, the 
1. Aristotle de Anima A3,407 B 20; in G. S. Kirk and J. E. 
Raven, The Prc-Socrutic Philosonbeýrs., T-,. 261; DK p. 462; 
and E. Eohde., Psyche, PP-375,396 n-37. 
2. L. Robin, Greeic Thought, ýondon (1928) p. 69. 
3. Arist. de ILnima, A3.407B 20; see also in CEol. VII 5 
13 o 618) Diog. Laert. VIII 2, all in DK p-462; G. S. 
Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosorber , p. 261; E. Zeller, Týe Pre-Socratic Philosophyy P. 476: 
116L6 noXXo( T(Mv aoyMv oL ýttv 
&PPOvLCLN) F-tvcL 
t $F OL 6ý EXFL\) &ppo\j(a\)II. One may aiso find the same references in E. 14. SimsOn., 
Der Beigriff der Seele, bei Plato, Leirzig (1869) 
PP-13-17) who says: "The soul is united to the body by 
means of number and harmony, indeed the soul is itself 
a harxonyýfl P. 15. 
20. 
soul, for its divine nature., is bound forthwith to be 
destroyed just as much as any other attunement or 
adjustment i-n musical notes., for instance, or in a 
craftsinan's product .......... So see what answer you 
can find for us to this argument, which insists that the 
soul, being a blending of the bodily coqstituent, is the 
first thing to perish in what is called death". 
' 
In other words, Simias regards the "soul-harino-iiall 
doctrine as inconsistent with thc, immortality of the soul, 
its transmigration and in general, the onposite of any 
kind of its existence after death. 
An urdent sui)-porter of this view is Professor J. Burnet, 
who not only shares this opinion but strongly strosses it. 
2 
Wilamowitz too "was inclined to think that Philolaus 
denied the I=ortaiity of the soul that it was an 
attunement of the bodily parts, though he could not 
quite make up his mindl,. 
3 
1. Phaedo, 5 C-L, 92 A-D; trans. R. Hackforth, Plato's 
PUMP, Owbridge (1955) D-98- 
2. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philoso_nhv_, Lonc'on (19584)1 
pp. 295-b; J. Burnet, Greek Philosonhy, London (1961), 
pp. 92-93, where he characteristically remarks "on the 
other hand, nothing can be more inconsistent with 
earlier Pythagorean view of the soul as something that 
existed before the body. This doctrine, on the 
contrary, makes the soul a mere function of the body, 
and leaves no room for the bclief of immortality". 
3. U. Von 'Wilamoý4itz, doellendorff, Platon, Berlin (1919) 
III P. 90. 
21. 
It is -far beyond our main scone to Plumb thr, whole 
matter and discuss it thoroughly. All we may do is to 
repeat the words of the late Prof. Cornford on the one 
hand., that the Pythagoreans and esý, ecially "'Philolaus held 
both that the soul is, in some sense, b harmony and that it 
is immortal". 91 and on the other hand., those of Prof. 
Guthrie 
who writes as a conclusion in his remarkable_History of 
Greek Phiiosop (dhere he devotes a whole paragraph to this 
inatter in a most able account) as follows: 
"Two different notions of soul, then existed in 
contemporary belief, the psyche which tvanished like smoket 
at death, and which medical writers (including no doubt some 
sceptical and therefore heretical Pythagoreans) rationalized 
into a harmonia of the physical opposites that made up the 
body; and the more mysterious dai-mon in man, immortal, 
suffering transmigration through many bodies, but in its 
pure essence divine. This too could be called psyche, as 
it was by thought, and both also survived in the curious 
combination of mathcmatical nhilosonhy and religious 
F.,, A. Cornford.. 'Mysticism and science in Pythagorean 
Tradition'? in The ClassicU-l Ounrterly, Vol. XVI (1922) 
p. 146. 
22. 
mysticism which made, up Pythagoreanism". 
Cambridge, Vol. I., P-319. Other scholars express 
more or less similar or slightly different views on 
the matter, such as: F. M. Cornford, ttMiystery Religions 
and Pre-Socratic Philosooýyll in the Cambridge Ancient 
History, IV, (1926) PP-548-9, and his From Religion to 
Philosophy, p. 213; also E. Rohde, Psyche, FD. 377,400, 
ns 52 5ý) 54) 55; E. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philoson 
pp: 479-7 ; H. Cherniss', Aristotlets Criticism of_21ý-*_7 
Socratic Philosophy 
., P-323; 
G. S. Kirk and J. E. Eaven, 





5. EMPEDOCLES OF ACRAGAS 
As we proceed in Empedocles, we observe that from the 
first he holds two widely different and incompatible views 
of the nature and the immortality of the soul. 
On nature, he says that the physical basis of 
consciousness Is in the blood., 
1 
which blood again arises 
from four elements. 2 Here Empedocles ex-, resses himself in 
a purely materialistic way., as a 'Ithorough materialtstO 
and leaves no room for immortality. 
On the othor hand, in the Purifications, and 
particularly in the Fr. 11-5, Empedocles ex-ressly states 
that he is calling the soul daemon, a fugitive and a 
wanderer from the gods. 
Between these two views, there is an apparent 
discrel., ancy and contradiction. But is this discrepancy 
irreconcilable? The answer, I think, lies in this: 
1. Fr-105 in DX, I) P-350, Porphyrylp St-)b. Anth. I, 49y 53; 
and in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic 
PhilosoDhers3 PP-344,357. 
2. Fr. 98 in DK, Iy P-346; comp. also with fr. 109) D-K., ibid. 
P-351; Arist. idetar ., B41 1000b; and in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, ibid. PP-3353 343 and 357. See also 
Aristotle, de Anima, A4,40b a. 13. 
3. W. Guthrie, A History-of Greek Philosop D-318. 
4. Fr-115; see also Hi-ppolvtus Ref. VII, 29; Plut. de 
-exilig 
17 607C; in'G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, ibid., 
PP-35ý2-3p 356. 
24. 
that he tried to bring together all the cosmological- 
-,,, h -IcL. 1 th57ori. es (Anaximander., Parmenides,, etc. ) of his j . A- 
predessors with'their theological conclusions and to 
reconcile them, but he failed to achi, 3ve this. He speaks 
with two different voices. 
2 E. Ftohdel F. 2. Cornford, G. S. Kirk Cand J. E. Eaven 
attempted harmonisation. They believed themsel. ves to have 
effecgea this quite successfully and convincingly. 
456 E. Zeller, J. Burnet, and J. Adam took ex.. ctly the 
OT)posite view C,:, nd they reached the incontestable 
conclusion that his co-Qmologico-religious teachings are 
not only contradictory but irreconcible. 
1. Psyche) I)P-3332-3. 
2. From Religion to Philosorhy, pp. 224-42. 
3. The Pre-Socratic Philosonhers3 PP-3 9-60. 
4. Pre-Socratic PhiloSOT,, hy., II, pp. 176-7* 
5- Eariy Greok Phiiosoohv, p. 250. 




Whatever trouble, disagreement and dispute 
Anaxagoras has caused among scholars, 
' the fact remains 
that for the first time in tho history of Greek 
philosophy., he introduced and contributed so. mcthing of, 2ý, 
great importance and significance; the principle Mind 
W-0-US) 
But how does Anaxagoras conceive the mpaning of Mind? 
It is true to say that he regards the Nous as something 
2 
material, corporeal and occupying s-ace) but these are 
not his last words. He further characterizes Nous as 
"infinite and self-ruled, ; ýý is mixed with nothing but is 
all alone by itself ..... it has all knowledge about 
everything and the greatest Power; and minds and controls 
all things, both greater and smaller, that have life ...... 
24ind arranged them ailit. 3 
1. G. S. Kirk Lnd J. E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosorhers, 
P. 367; also J. 2. Ecaven, "The Basis of Anaxagoras' 
Cosmology". Classical C-uartorly, IV (1954) -ý-. 123; 
G. Vlastos t'The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras", 3 CA 
Philosophical Revie , 59 (1950) n-31 ff. 
2. Fr. 12 in DK3 11 (1952) PP-37-39. 
3. Fr. 12 in M, ibid.; comp. Crat 1.413C; Aristotle de ,1 
Anima, A2.405 a 153 PhYs- 5 2-2Y5-61 b 24 and in DX, ibid. 
p. 20; trans. G. S. Xirk and J. E. Raven, Pre-SocrrLtic Philosor)hers) IIP-372-3. 
i-4;. iI 
26. 
Is it not an indication that he would imagine or 
conceive of it as an immarient, transcendent, sT)iritual, 
omnipotent and Intelligent Deity or God? 
Unfortunately, he did not develol) and elaborate such 
an idea and he left it for his Posterity to do so, holding 
for himself the same notion as his predecessors. ýffiile 
he introduced something of immense value, that is.., a 
sPiritual and intellectual principle, nevertheless "he 
fails to understand fully the essential difference between 
that principle and the matter which it forms or sets in 
E. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosoohy, Vol. II, T) 349; and 
J. Adam., The Religious--Tec4chers of Greece, D: 263, do 
not find it difficult to idnn. tify Nous with God., 
although there is no mention at all of the word God or 
Gods in Anaxagorast fragments. Later writers m0lintain 
this view: Aat 1) 7,5 (D 299): 
"6 U A. yna[V 6C CCG*Tý'XCL XCLT'bpXdr, T6 CY611CLTCL9 VOTUIC, 
6c' aýTd 6Lc%6c[vnccv Oco-u xat TdC YCV6aCLC TW-V O'XWV 
ýnOCMCICCV"; 7., 15 (D 302)"'A. VO-UV XOCIIOTEOL6v -z6v Gc6v". 
V91-- Eur. fr. iOlS ' 116 Vouq ydp hj1W-V taTL tv 
ýxda, uy. Gc6C". Tro ad ý84 (64.2); Ia:,. i1-l. Protr. 8 Phil,. ýr" de Piet. C. 4 ap. 66 G (D 532): 
"Gc6v ycyovývaLTc ..... xaf voZv 6LaxocY4ýaaLll. (VgJ-. B12) Cic. do nat. d. 1,11) 26 (D 532) ... qua sentire possit, fugere intellegentlae nostree vim et ratione, n videtur"; CiC. Aca-d-, ' Pr. 11 37., 118 (D 119): 
.3 
'IA 
--i-lateria, ij infinitaci sed ex ea ocirticula, similes intev seminutas; eas primur, 'l confusas 'oostca. in ordinem Ldductas i: ierite divinall qtd. in. D. K. T)p ig-20; C 0:. n T) . also Sext. bILAh. IX, 6: Stob. Ecl. 1. ý6; The ! Jist. O"Lt. XXVI, 31ý, C in E. Zeller) 
-Pre--,, )cl.! -: 
tic Philoson. 




It is needless to attempt any clear account of the 
individual soul, solfhood, consciousness., immortality and 
self-existence in Anaxagoras, as he 'Infest pas Parvenu "a 
la conception d1une ame individuelle, vivant d1une vie 
eternellett2 and as Aristotle says'of Anaxagoras that he 
does not speak clearly about Mind and soul3. He seems to 
regard themýýuý-ýas different aspects of the same nature. 4 
1. F. Conleston, A History of PhilosoT)hy, London (1961) 
Vol. I, p-70. For more on this noint see J. E. Raven, 
IlThe Basis of Anaxagoras'Coswology". Classical 
Cuarterly (1954) Vol. IV, 'P-134; G. S. Kirk and J. E. 
Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosorhers, V-374; J. Adam, 
The Religious Teachers of Grcece, -rT). 261-264;, E. 
Zeiler, Pre-Socratic PhUosorhy, II, PP-346-349; R. K. 
Gaye, The Platonic Concel)tion of Immortalit . p. 13; F-Ii. Cornford, From fiý, ligion to Philosop , 1). 154; W. Jaeger., The Theology of the Early Greek 
-PhtjýcýQpby. 2 PP-160-162; -P-Leon, "The Hompiomeries of Anaxcagoras". 
. 
911assic -141; J. Burnet, LLI_yj XXI (1927) DD 4 ai_Luar rl . 133 Early Grepk Philosophy., p. 268, and Greek Philosonhy, 
PP. Y9-bO, holds the opposite view. - 
2. J. Ithurriague., La Croyance de Platon, p. 123- 
3. De Anima., A2,404 b. 1; and in DK,.. T). 29;:. -. E. 
Zeller,;. j 
Pre-Socratid Philosophy, II, P-364'n'*51 6,. p,. 347. n. 2; 
E. Rohde v See also Cherniss, .,. 
Pýsche, jp..? AýO., n. 11.5ý 
Aristotle's Crittcism of Pre-Socratic Philosor 
pp. 291-2 and 295-6. 
4. De Anima.,. 405 a-13. On the contrary, Plato soems to' 
suggest- that. AnaxjgQr', as uses- b6tli as identical and 
interchangeable. ' Crat. 400 A: 11 ... HUC UQ\j U-wv 
dxxwv &ndvuwv y6aLv ob nw-ce6F-Lc. 'Avaýay6pa vo"uv xuC 
o0v cT\)aL TIV 6Laxoapo-uuav xa( 9xouaavII; 
also in E. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosonhy, II, P-345 
n. 1; E. Rohde, Psyche, p. 410 n. 115. 
28. 
The following remarks of Rohde are quite to the point 
and worth quoting: "Anaxagoras could not sreak of the 
continued exi-stence of individual., Self-existent Isoulst 
after the dissolution of the material concretions in which 
moving and animating I soul-f orce I had once livedIt. ... For 
him the individual, the personality conscious of itself 
and of the outer world, can be nothing but a manifestation 
of the universal, whether the latter is regarded as fixed 
and at rest., or as a livinG process that untiringly 
6evelops itself, recruits itself, and reconstructs itself 
in ever renewed creations. The only rermanent, 
unchanging reality is the universal, the esscqtial -and 
fundamentally real nature which ap-ppars in all individual 
things, speaks out of their mouth, and in reality, only 
works and lives, in them. The individual human soul has 
its identity with the universal that re-rosents itself in 
it. The individual forms of "ar-nearancet' having no 
inderendence of their own. 9 cannot normunently abide"* 
1 
However this may be,, it is said that for Anaxagoras5 
soul is moving force2 and has two forms, the moving and 
1. E. Rohde., Psyche) P-388; sce . -lso J. Adam., The Religious Teachers of Greece., p. 264. 
2. Aristotle, Do Anim"-, A 2,404 a 25; also in DK p. 29; 
E. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosop II., P-. 364. 
29. 
the Imoviingl and also that-the particular consciousness 
2 ceases to exist when the soul leaves the body. 
Psell. d. omnif. doctr. 15 in DK, I, D. 29; and in 
K. Freeman) Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosoph-Qrs, 
A 101 a, Oxford (1946) p. 274 n. g. 




It could h- ced that 
Introduced the notion of the human soul, of the true 
self, 
' 
with what he openly said to his follow citizens of 
Athens about the soulls care and ýts perfection: ..... 
. wr, 
, O)C ýuXT)r, oTEwr, 6r, &p(cm) eiaraO 
but - us leom 
., 
at any rate, this assertion does nn. -. .;. -ever, '. 
saying that Socrates was more concerned with the moral 
asrect of the soul and its perfection than with the 
rational and philosophical exDosition of the soul's 
doctrine as a whole, which great achievement belongs to his 
disciple, Plato. The words of E. W. Simson also confirm 
this: "As we consider now the psychology of Socrates, ae 
shall find it comi)rehensible by his forthcoming interest 
in ethics that there is with him no developed doctrine 
concerning the nature of the soul ...... 
J. Burnet., ItThe Socratic Doctrine of the Soul"., Essays 
and Addresses, Lonaon (1929) pp, 126-62, and more 
particularly for our case, PP-1 7-61; Idem, Early 
Greek Philosophy., p. 84; Idem,, "Soul", ERE, Vol. XI, 
pp. 671 a-nd 741; his art1cle "Philosor-hyll in The 
Legacy of Greece (ed. by Sir R. Livingstone) Oxford 
(1957) P-76; also in A. M. ArmstronS, An Introduction 
to Ancient Philosophy, London (1959 p. 29; V. De Magalhaes-Vilhena, La Probleme de Socrate., Paris (1952) 
PP-51., 52 n. l. 
2. Apol. 29E. 30A; also Xen. Mem. 12 "1', caUTTjv pip 
E obx tp-noUýeLv "ýLV .... TýV TýC 4)UX-T)C LnL4e%ELaV 
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But a scientific instruction and development in his 
thoughts about the soul -and its nature is, as we have said, 
not available??. 
' 
Concerning the destiny of the. soul in the 11-e ,. Itcr 
death he says: IfFor the state of death is one of two 
things; either it is virtually nothingness, so that the 
dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as -eople 
say, a change and migration of the soul from this to 
another place". 
2 
As his very own words stand, they express an 
uncertainty, ignorance m-d caution. However, I should 
not like to imagine for a moment that Socrates nrofesses 
the nihilist or even the ag-lostic view. I think his views 
about the perfectlon of our souls3: Moreover, thp soul of 
man., which more than all else that is human, n-rtakes of 
the divine, reigns manifestly within us, and yet is itself 
unseentf4. It ..... no evil co-. n comp, to a good man Pither in 
1. Der begriff der Seele bei Plato (1889) rn. 20) 21; also 
in A. E. Taylor, Socrates, Edinburgh (1ý33) T). 139: 
"The Socratic doct3zine, we must note, is neither 
psychology, in our sense of the word, nor Psycho- 
physics. It tells us nothing on the question of what 
the soul isý except that it is in us, whatever it is in 
virtuelf. 
2. Plato Apol 40C 6-11, trns. II. N. Fcwler, Plato, Apolog 
1 London 7ý38) p. 141., in LCL; ibid. 29A. 
RI 
Plato A-pol. 29E, 30A. B. 
4. Xen. Mem. IV., 3, t 14. cf 4. Cyro . VIIIY 7) 9. trans. E. C. IMarchanty Xenophon Memorabilia and Oeconomicus., London (2-MMIJI) (1923ý., P-307 in LCL. 
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life or after death, and God does not neglect himtl. l 
"I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to 
the better lot*is knoim to none but God". 
2 "... and so 
why should I not be justly accounted blessed and enjoy an 
immortality of fame? ". 3 in an appropriate manner combined 
and interpreted help us to assume that Socrates was a firm 
and strong believer in the hereafter, and "for his Part., 
accerted one of the alternatives as his uersonal belief; 
and this alternative Is not the Homeric idea of a shadowy 
existence in Ln unsubstantial Hades, nor the utter 
annihilation in death, but a real life,., in blessedness., 
under the nrotection of the godsty. 4 
Apol. 41D; trans. H. N. Fowler, Op. cit. D. 145 in LCL. 
2. Apgl. 42A; trans. ibid. 
3. Trans. W. Miller, Xenorhon-Cyronaedia, London (MCMXIV) 
(1914) Vol. II, p. 427 in LCL. - 
4. E. Ehnmark, "Socrates and the immortality of the soul" 
: Ln Eranos, Vol. XLIV (44) (1946) P. 122. Other 
interestIng points in pp. 108,116 117,1192 120ý 121) 
122. Also &A TaYlor,. Elato (Th2e-Man and his Work), London (1960) P: 138 n. 2. "The caution should not be 
understood to mean that Socrates doubts the fact of immortality. His firm belief in that is the 
assumption of the Phaedo and is really Tzesupposed by Apolog. 40C-4lCff. Also somo other schoiars hold 
moderate views: E. Zeller., Socrates and the-Socratic School, London (1,968) pp. 14ý-51 - 1., 3., 4% 5; B. Jowett., The Works of Plato., Vol- 3.,. N.. Y. (Apol. ) 
P-99; J. J. ' Forbes Socrates, Edinburgh (19Q5). 
, pp. 232-5.9 62 7; R'. K. Gaye., The Platonic'Conception of Immortality., pp. 14-5; B. Russell, History of Western PhLl oso phy.,... P, 109. 
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CINCLUSION 
From what has been said so far, and by contrasting 
and comparing Plato's teachings with those of his 
"p, redecessors concerning the human soul and its fate in the 
hereafter, we may draw the conclusion that there is a vCast 
difference between them. 
lost of his forerunners do not tackle this burning 
problem as a separate one at all, and when they do deal with 
It, they treat it in connection with th,,, universe and in a 
mythical ana quite incomplete way. 
' 
Ploto knows his precursors and refers to their 
teachings, but he touches first the psychologico- 
eschatological nroblem and metanhysics in general as a 
whole in a ýA diff'c-'r"-rlt wVa 
For mocLerate views on Orphico-Pythagoric influence on 
Plato one, avoiding of course the extreme and 
exaggerated view of V. D. Macchioro From Orrheus to 
Paul, London (1930) P-176) that: 11ýlatols nhilosoT, hy 
ar-ears to be 1,, urified and enlarged Orphism". could 
reýer to the following scholars: H. C. Moor 0, Paga IdP-as of Immortality during the-Early Roman Emnire, 
Caxbrid. g_e__Uqlb) pp. 14-15,62- 11 E. Smyth, Conce-,, tions 
of Immortality., pp. 274-51 2ý2-y; 
GutH Hi ý'. _ýLr T Q _1heus and 
Groek Religion., rp. 242-4; J. Adam, The Relig-17-o-us Teachers of Greece, DP. 113-4; J. Ithurriague, La Croyance do Platon, pp. 148-9. 
Their views might be summarized as follows: Plato gave to the Orphico-Pythagoric notion "about soul and its immortality a reusoning and nhilosorhic blasis. 
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He first develops the theory of the soul and its life after 
death philosophically, he examines it in ca dialogue forýa r'nd 
searches every possible asrect in a dialectical and imagin- 
ative fashion. He succeeds in many ways; even when he 
fails, at least he ventures to -'ut problems -and logical 
questions for further speculative elaboration by his 
successors. His predecessors, as I have said, exrressed 
themseives obscurely and relied on vague and unreliable 
myths, folklore and ropular and mythical beliefs, without 
any effort to elaborate and ex-lain them logically. 
'i. ý4azes use. of the,, -l in a hi., self, usus : -, yths,.. but. he*% 
1,, gicLI ir, y. l n 
1. The difference which Cicero discerns between the 
Pythagorean and the Platonic treatment of the a* uestion 
seems to be quite aT, rlicable here. He writes: 
"They scarce ever gave any reason for their opinion) 
but what could be explained by numbers and characters. 
It is renorted of Plato, that he came into Italy, to 
acquaint himself with the Pythagoreans; and that when 
there, he learned from them all the tenets of the 
Pythagoreans; that he not only was of the same oninion 
with Pythagoras) concerning the immortality of the soul, 
but he brought reasons in surport of it". Cic. Tusc. 
DiS7.1 I) XVII. Tvns-. ed. by W. H. '23; 
See -Uso Gaye, The Platonic. p1j" 
alld its COIriexion w. -A-h the Theory-of I(, fýas, Lo.. q(ý: )n (190-4) f). 16-n". 1. He qurc)tes the. rassage-: -an- Latin. 
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PART II 
PLATO ON THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL f-', ID ITS 
DMORTALITY 
SOME INTRODUCTORY REIIARKS: 
(a) PlIato's Theology 
(b) What is Man? 
(c) A general defln`i'ýEon of the human soul. 
(a) Pla,, ', ots Theology. 
It appears necessary, and Indeed unavoidable, to 
preface the second Part with a few general remarks about 
Plato's theology, as this is closely connected with It, 
notwithstanding tho fact that Plato himself exrressly 
admits that '? The maker and father of this universe it is a 
hard tsask to find, and having found him, it would be 
impossible to dcclare him to all mankind". 
' And It 
becomes even more diffIcult by reason of Plato's very wide 
application of the term God (Ock ). As M. Dies says, 
many things are called "God" or divine. The Demiurge is 
Tim. 2SC3-5; trans. F. d. cornford Plato's Cosmology, 
The Tiracus Of Plato,. Lon-don (1956ý p. 22; comp. with 
is St. John 1.1d: 
Oc6v ob6cCc Mpaxcv n6noTc, ýIOVOYEVT')C Gc6c 6 6v 
ctc T6v x6Xnov To-U naTp6c, txc-LvoC ýýT)yýaauoll; 
John of Dam. De fide Orthod, MGP. 94,800B. ý 
llýTccLpov oN T'6 OcZov xat &xaTdXljnTov xaC To"uTo 
g6vov abTo-u xaTaXT)nT6v, fi &nCLPCa XL'&xa-raXij(ý(u". 
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a Theos, so is the created Universe (Tim. 40E), and the 
possible rlurality of good souls in Laws X; the adjective 
Divine (OcZoc ) Is commonly arrlied to the forms, and if 
the redding at Tim. 37CY a shrine brought into being for 
the eternal gods, is to be Kept, the forms which are 
com-i)rised in the intelligible living creature are actually 
called Gods. 
' 
However coinDlicated and perplexed it is, we shall 
endeavour to nresent a clecar iicture of it, as briefly as 
i. )ossible, ind es! ýecially of the identification of God with 
the idea of Good, which caused so much argumentation and 
disputation among the Platonic scholCars, and on which a 
great deal of ink was used un. 
It ýnust be noted from the beginning that 
the following 
brief survey does not imnly an exhaustive or complete 
7enetration of the entire subject; such a venture would 
require detailed examination of all the Platonic -assages 
and careful study of all the availeble sources) and would 
cover many hundreds of pages. 
But first let us see what is Platols concention of God. 
M. Dies., Antour de Platon, Paris (1927), 11) P. 555; see 
also is R. C. Hackforth., "Plato's TheismIl. in the 
Ciassical L,, uarterly., (1936) voi. XXX, n. 4; see also 
K. F. Doherty_, t'God and the Good in Platoll, in New 
ScOlasticism, xxx (1956) p. 441. 
37. 
Some scholars have recently arnroached the Droblem 
of Deity from a natural and ontological roint of view and 
have sunported the opinion that the soul is a source of 
movement and consequently, God. 1 Indeed, we meet such 
assertions in his di., -:?. 
logues, where he exrressly st%ates that 
11soul is identical with the rrime origin and motion of what 
is, has been and shall be,, and of all that is orrosite to 
these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the 
cause of all change and motion in all things ...... lt 
has 
been proved most sufficiently that the soul is of all 
things, the oldest, since it is the first princirle of 
J. B. ý, `Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Platots Dialogues, 
Ca4ibrldge -(17q-42)-pp. il2-115; R. D os., "Plato's 
MetaphysicsIt in Journal of Philosophy (1935) XXXII, 
P-562, he says (15haedrus 245e) 11 ... we thus -nosit a 
principle of inherent spontaneity, a self-initiating 
motion, and this is the ,: syche and ultimately God". 
H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of' Plato and-the 
Academy., Vol .1 
(1944) 7)p. 606-7 (AF*o. eiTd-Ei--X-IT-*, ý 
urnet., Grec-I.. Philosor . ? )T) 3-ý-3-7; mainly see F. Solmsen. ' Platols Theology (1ý42ý wh"o I'denends 
largely on the Tenth Book of the Laws". (E. Frank in 
his r(, view, in Amcrict-An Journal of Philolog , Vol. 4 XVI (1945) P-93) and who in a modified way remarks - P-113) "The aspects of the Physical world which give it its 
ontological status and dignity are Movement (traced to a 
Perfect prototype), Life, Order, Design, Rationality. 
When focusing on the first two; Plato thinks of the 
divine -rinciple as Soul (which in order to bring about 
the other three, must ally itself to Mind). On the 
other hand, when he is rrimarily concerned with the 
rational order-aind structure of the Cosmos., Plato (like 
Anaxagoras) conceives of the Delty in terms of Mind. 
This is the situation in Timaeus P. 162. The 
concept of a divine World-6oul "-s the fountain of 
movements and as the intelligent Power controlling the 
world of Becoming is the cornerstone of the whole new 
system'?. 
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motion". ' And I'All soul is immortal and this is 
also the source and beginning of motion for all other 
things which have motion,, 02 
While other interpreters are quite content with the 
equation of Soul to Deity, the late Prof. Taylor goes 
further in identifying God with Creator and Best soul. 3 
This identification is characterised by Solmsen vs 
I Lcws., X., 896A7-10, Bl-4; trans. R. G. Bury, Plato, 
Laws, Lonuon (1926) 11) P-337 in LCL. 
2. Phaedrus, 245C; trans. Ft. Hackforth, . Plato's Phaedrus, 
Cambridge U952) o-, ). 63-4. I shL11 give my attention 
to the apparent contradiction between generated or 
ungenerated and Timaeus, Laws cýnd the Phaedrus later. 
3. A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford., 
1926) pp.. b2, also 64,77 ff; Idem. Plato, The Laws, ý1960) 
pp. LIII, LIV3 292; Idem. Plato, the Man and his 
Work, London (1960) pp. 442-45) 490-93; Idem. critical 
note on F. Solmsen, Plato's Theology, in Mind (1943) 
LIIJ We inust bear in mind, although Taylor is 
in favour of this identification, nevertheless, A 
Commentary on Platots Timaeus,, -r. 678, he does not 
ininimise the difficulties of the wholc matter. F. Solmsen., PlCtoIs Theologv, T). 121 n. 43, seems to suggest that Bovet and Demos are of the same orinion as Taylor., 
when he writes: "Bovet (Ch. II, n. 27) looks in Timaeus for confirmation of his theory that the Platonic 
definition of God would be lun dieu est ame T., arfattet (P-152 f). Demos, on the other hand, The Ph'ilosonh 
of Plato., London (1939) np. 99-125, relies as far as I 




One may observe here that the late Prof. Cornford not 
only does not hold such a view as those above-mentioned., 
e 
regarding the Deflurge not as a religious figure (Deity), 
2 but as a symbol, a mythical one. Even he finds it 
difficult to identify the visible Universe with the 
Demiurge and prefers "to hold back from this or any other 
conclusion and confines his attention to the world VýJth 
Its body and soul and the reason they contain". 3 
On the other hand, H. Cherniss, contrasting and 
combining various Platonic rassages, quite 'ýiainly says 
"Moreover, the work of the Demiurge is the work of Mind 
( voZc, ) (Timaeus 47E3-4) and Mind (vOur, ) can exist only 
in Soul (46D5-6., 30B3; cf. Philebus 30C9-10; Sonhist 
1. F. Solmsen, plato's Theology., P-113Y particularly n. 121 n. 43. It must be stated that R. flackforth, "Plato's 
Theism", in Classical Cuýrterl (1936) 30.9 r. 6, also rejects this idea. "however, whether we believe this 
or not, it is certainly not the case that Laws X 
asserts the doctrine of One God., viz. the Best Soul". 
2. F. IU. Cornford,, Plato's Cosmology, London (1937) nn-34) 35. - 37., 38,1977- - 
F. L. Cornford, ibid. D-39. 
40. 
249A), so that the Demiurge must be a soul. 
' 
Needless to say,, we are not at all ready to acce-, t 
the inferences of Prof. Grube, who, without any difficulty, 
identifies the World Soul-with the Demiurge 
2 
or of Theiler, 
who also equ(-. tes the Demiurge "with the ReCA, son in the World 
I Soulit. 
3 for the simple reason that in Plato's eyes World 
Soul is nothing more than a mixture of absolute and 
4 corporeal beings. 
INhere-as all the abovo-mentioned Platonic critics 
insisted on the fact that Plato's God was equal to Demiurge 
or Best Soul, Prof. Hacsforth, on the other hand, took 
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Acadom Vol. Ip 
timore 11944) D.? 25- See also some other 
references ...... for it is Soul that is the yinciple 
of all motion and 'arrangement' and so the artificer 
of evurythiq whether ? natural' or 'artificial'" (cf. 
Laws, 8)2A. 896A-D; Phaedrus 245D 246B 6-7) or. cit. 
pp. 251p 603p 605, esrecially 
907. - )God., therofore., 
must be "soul having vo% or "enlightened soul'' 
(Laws 897B: TKA ....... voZv npoaXapoZaa 
cf. Timaeus 46 E4: pcT& vot. 
2. G. I. I. Grube, Platols Though , London 
(1935) rX0. See 
also in H. Cherniss op. cit. 603 and F. Solmsen op, cit. 
p. 12l n. 43- A diversity of a-ý, T)roachment is found in 
W. Jaeger's Paedeia as well, Vol. II, p. 415,39a, but 
for that later. 
3. Iý. Theiler., Zur Geschichto, der telpologischen 
Ihaturbetrachtung, ý. 72., "als Verdo-, -jelung der Weltseele 
o.. 9.. als HinausrroJektion Gleichsam ihser Kunstlerisch 
wirz. enaen Seite" qtd. in F. M. Cornford op. cit. r. 197 
and H. Cherniss oD. cit. !,. 6. )3. 
4. Tim. 35A. 
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exactly the opposite view, in a brief but very 
suggestive and interesting article, and tried to Point 
out: (a) that Mind is an ultimate rrincinle, inde-endently 
existrant and an entirely sc-, arate entity from the soul., and 
(b) that 11di-rid ( vo-uc. ) -and IMind alone" is identified with 
God, not the soul or even the Bcst Soul. -L 
To dismiss Prof. Rackforth's assertion, we have to 
turn to Plato himself. 
., 
Plato sneaks quite clearly -and As a matter of* fact 
emphatically on this issue. H, ý writes that Nous - 
"Inteiligence, cannot be -,: resent in anything arart from the 
soupt. 
2 It cannot exist (--A. 7art from thp soul. 
"Surely 
reason and mind could never come into being without soulT1 .3 
In other words, here it is rerfectly oxnlicit that 
Nous is neither an ultimate orinciple, nor an entity distinct 
from the soul and identified with God. It is simnly, 
according to Piato, a secondary associate of the Soul, 
"Just the soul's abAity (cf. Republic 508E) to "see the 
I. R. H4c4forth, "Piatols Tho-ismIl. in Classical 
Quarterly, (1936) 30., T)-7; Idcm. Plato's Phnedrus, 
P-71. 
2. Tim. 30b3., trans. F. U. 
n-33. 
3. Phiiebus 30 10; also 
Aristoticis CI-iticism 
J. B. Sxemp,, The Theor 
2L! 292.2s., Cambridge 
Cornford, PlCatots CosmologYy 
I 
Soph. 249k. See also H. Cherniss, 
of Plato and the Academy, P. 425; 
of Motion in Plato's later 
(1942) D. 112. 
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ideas or the state in the soul (i. e. v6ijaLC 6 15., Re, ) - 
511D, Tim. 52A) proauced by sight of them". 
' It is, as 
Taylor rightly called it., "Its vehicleii2 or it is 
11thinkable as a function of the immortal Part of the soull' 
an intellectual function. Generally sroaInftng, Hackforth's 
whole attempt to establish the fact that the Platonic Deity 
is Nous,, attractive as it is, "is rerhans rather too 
Aristoto, lian"-. 4 
It would be of great Intcrest and henefit to add a few 
oore words about Jaeger's attitude and arnroach towards the 
Platonic theological T, roblem, although the late Prof. Jaeger C) 
did not write any single work on this subject as he did on 
H. Cherniss, ibid. p. 607. 
2. A. E. Taylor, critical notice of F. Solmsen, Plato's 
Theology, in Mind, LII (1943) n-. 181. 
3. J. H. M. ýývl. Loenen., Do Nous in het Systeem Van Ple. tols 
Philosor, hic., Dissertatie Universiteit van Amsterd=, (1951) Jasonners Universiteitsners, Amsterdam, rP. 55, 56Y 57j 58ý, 269 and 270. This is a very informative 
ana intcresting terminological, philological and 
philosoý. ýhical investigation of the vo-ur, -(ýuXlj "the develorment of the teleological cxT, lai-iation of' naturc and its r1lace in the system"; also R. C. Lo' e 1111ind in Platonism",, in Philosonhical Revicw., 3 (1926) 
I)p. 201-20., "discusses Mind in its relation to movement., but rather as we now understand the matter than as Plato understood it". (F. Solmsen on. cit. -7ý. 96 n. 25). 
4. J. B. Skem: )., OP- Cit- P-i13 and Hý Cherniss o7). cit. 
TD. 6oS. 
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"the Theology of the Early Greek Philoso7oherst'. 
Nevertheless, he drew our attention to the f,, ct that 
Platol. s Ilprim%-. ry aT)proach to the problem was the Socratic 
and not the pre-Socratic onet'. that is to say he 
approached it from an ethical Cand moral angle, admitting 
at the satae time the diversity of aspects and forms of the 
Divine in Plato. ' 
ý, s to We must now turn our attention to what Plato h. 
say about the Idea of Good2 and to see whether the,. 
following mathematical equation, so to speak, The IDEA OF 
GOOD = GOD is proved true or not. 
As to the first point, Plato describes it in the 
first rlace as the source of knowledge (science) and truth3 
and of the very being (essence)4' as the "causa essandi and 
causa cognoscendi of all that isii5 and secondly that it is 
not the same thing as being, that is to say the good 
itself is not essence, but even beyond being, surpassing 
1. W. Jaeger, Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture, 
Oxford (1944) Vol. 2. p. 415 n-39b. 
2. Rep. 505A 2 11 11h -coU &y(xoot) t, 5&x PýyLaTOV 460T)pail. 
3. Rep. 508E 3-4. 
4. Rep. 509B 5-8. 
5. R. F. A. Hoernle, Studies In Philosop London (1952) 
p. 290. 
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it in dignity and power. 
1 
Next we come to consider the vexed question, whether 
God can be Identified with the Idea of Good or not. 
Both theories may claim the support of eminent and 
distinguished scholars who profess them with quite strong 
views and arguments. 
Amongst those interpreters who are in favour of the 
identifteation are E. Zeller and T. Adam. Both, as 
great lovers and scholars of Plato, refer to various 
passages of Plato's dialogues, and. particularly to 
Philebus 22B 6-10, C 1-3: "1 remember a theory ... about 
pleasure and intelligence,, to the effect that neither of 
them is the good, but something else, different from either 
and better than both ... it couldn't continue to be 
identical with the good, could it? t', 
2 
and point out very 
strongly that the Demiurge is identical and equivalent to 
1. Rep. 509B 8-10. While Plato thinks of the Form of the 
Good so highly, others either complain against it as 
obscure and a source of. material for comic poets: 
Auoy. AaýpTLoc 111 27 ýn K. A. rcwpyo6xT), IIXdTwvoc 
rIoX LcF- Ca, Athens (11ýý3 ) p. 463; also V. Goldschmidt, 
La Religion de Platon, P ; gris (1949) P-172 "Dbjp chez 
les anciens 2 ltobscurite du 'Bien de Platont etait 
proverbiale et fournissait une matiýre a plaisanteries 
abondamuent exploitee par les poetes comiques (n. l. 
Diog. Laest., 111,26-27); or they write: ttthe 
emptiness of the Platonic Idea or Form of the Good" (K. P. Popper The Open Society and its Enemies, Plato, 
Vol. I (1963ý (paperback) np. 274-5 n-32. See also G. Grote., Plato and the other Companions of Socrates, London (16972) Vol. III, pp. 241-2. - 
2. Trans. h. flacifforth, Platots Examination of Pleasure, Cambridge (1945) P-30. 
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the Idez of Good. ' 
E. Zeller,, Plato and the Older 
.. 
tc 
J. Adam, The Republic of Plat , Cambridge 63 01-IIY PP-50-51,171 and Idem., The Religious 
Teachers of Greece, pp. 442-8 ffý This notion, that 
the Idea of Good is equivalr; nt, to God, is surported 
also by many others, vith variations, of course, such 
as: B. Jowett, The Works of Plato, N. Y. p. 128; 
E. Frank., It in American Journal 
of Philology, Vol. LXV1 (1945)-PP-23-6; P. Trutiger, 
Les 'jAythes de Platon, 111, ris 
(1930); R. 'Auguier, Les 
Sens du Mot OcToc, chez Platon, Paris (1930) PP-130-2; 
K. I A 06T 'H pt t6eMv Ocwpfa Tot) r1XdTwvoC, 
Ath; nsy? 190ý)ý'p. il'fl W. F. R. Hardie A Study in Plato. 
Oxford (1936) i)P. 155-6; R. L. Nettle'ship, Lectures on 
the Lerpublic of Plato, London (1963) pp. 232-3y- R. C. 
Loage., Platols Theor; ý of Ethics (1928) pn. 171 466 and -- E- 'AvTWV LabO up jq -L 502 n. 14; -Y)ýE -P-(6L0V-- 
IaTop-tar, Ty 
, 
C, )LXOaOQ(a Athens (1905) TZýioc A pp. 228-9; 
W. Jaeger, Paideia., The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol. 
II, Oxford (1944) pp-. -2-33-5ff and 414-6 n. 39b, 40,44; 
E. Hoffmann, Die griechische philosorhie bis Platon 
(1951) Heidelberg., pp. 162 and 175; L. Robin, Platon, 
Paris (1935)' pp. 248-52; M. Dies, Autour de Platon, 
P'P. 550-1,553-5; A. J. Festugiere, Contemnlotion et_y-jo 
contempiative selon Platon, Paris (1950) F-26-4-5) 
265-6; Victor Goldschmidt, La Religion de Platon, 
Paris (1949) pp-17-62, where he believes that he has 
been able to presup ose throughout his thesis (and 
es-ecially pp-17-M what Mgr. Dies, Festugiere., 
M. Moreau and Jaeger internret in different ways: 
11ber)uis., les travaux de Mgr. Dies, du R. P. Festugiere, 
de 14. Moreau, de IA. Jaeger, llont renforcee (tout en 
ltinterrretant dans des sons differents) ot nous avons 
cru pouvoir la supposer tout au long notre expose"; 
W. Temple,. Plato and Christianity, London (1916) 
pp. 28-30; Vorn V. Von 'ailamowitz-14oellendorff, Plato 
Berlin (1919) pp. 633., 685-6; K. F. Doherty, God cand the Good in the New Scholasticism, pp. 459-60, where one 
might find some references in other scholars. We 
need hardly mention here that determined effort was 
made in ancient times (Cp. Philo, De Op. 1,11und. IV 19; 
Albinus, Epit. IX 1.3; Plutarch, EDit. ly 3; Stobacus 
Ecl. 1,10,16; Galen Hist-. 
--Phil. 
25; Hi-opolytus, 
Ref. Omn. Haer. 1.19; Thoodoret, Graec. Affect. Cup. 
IV " 49 etc. 
). and in recent years (Jackson,, "Plato's 
Later Theory of Ideas". J. P. IIY 324; Ritter Die 
Kerngedanken aer Platonischen PhilosoDhie, 3213; 
46. 
This identification has been challenged by many 
equally prominent scholars and critics of Plato on the 
ground that the idea of Good is not a soul, or a nersonal 
being at all. On the contrary it is the suDreme form of 
all the forms and the cause and source of knowledge 
(Contd. ) Archer-11ind, Commentary on Timaeus, P-95 n. 10, 
all qtd. by A. N. Rich., "The Platonic Ideas as the .' thou, ghts of Godli, in Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica 
batara, Series IV, Vol. VII., Lugduni (1954) p. 123 n. 2, 
4., of making the idea de" !. endent u-non God as a thought 
resiaent in his mind. It will take us too far to 
point out quite the opposite. Nonetheless, the 
following words of A. N. M. Rich, ibid., I should think., 
are to a great extent a disapproval to it: '? To 
disprove it is, however, a comnaratively simple matter, 
for reference to the Platonic Dialogues makes it 
imm. ediately clear that any concrete evidence in favour 
of this inter, ýretation is completely lacking. Plato 
never describes the Ideas either as the thoughts of God 
or as the content of God's mind. " 
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(science), truth and being. 
' 
I share the above stand-point., with some reservations 
as to what Plato himself meant by both of them: (God - Good). 
In view of Plato's reluctance and hesitation in 
describing and defining exactly his Deity (Tim. 28C, Ren. 
506D-E, Second Epistle, 312E, Seventh Epistle 341C-D), of 
the clash of opinions of his scholars and critics and of 
this very rapid and brief survey, it would not only be a 
hard and unsuccessful task in some ways, but also a 
venturous one, to draw any definite conclusion on Plato's 
theology in general unless Deus ex machina iijýtervenes or 
Plato himself gives us another immortal dialogue, in order 
Chief sunporters of this theory, each with his own way 
of interpreting, are: J. Burnet, Greek Philosorhy., 
p '536 P. Shorey, Wbat Plato Said., Chicago (1933) p., -7., 
T). 231; Idem. Republic of Plato, pp. 102 n. a; Idem. 
"The Idea of Good in Platots Eerublic", Univ. of 
Chicago, Studies in Classical Philolog (1895) p. 239. Shorey in his criticism, I gather, is going too far 
unjustifiably, see ibid. pp. 26-7 n. 4; A. E. Taylor, 
Plato, the Man and his Work, pp. 232 and 288; P. E. Moore, The Religion of Plato (1921) Princeton, T'n-312 ff; G. M. A. Grube., Plato's Though , London (1935) 
. )p. 168-9; R. Demos., The Philoso-hy of Plato., London (1939) p. 123; J. B. Skemp, o- , 0-cit. P-115; F. 
Solmsen, 
op. cit. PP-721 92 and mOre emphatically in 192 and 195 n. 49; H. Cherniss, op. cit. np. 604,606; E. Gilson., God and Philosoghy, U. S. A. (1959) np. 26-28; G. C. Field,, The Philosophy of Plato, London 1949 p. 61; D. Ross, Piatots Theory of It. eas, Oxford 
R90 
np. 4-3-44; F. Copleston, A History-of Philoso-nhy, London (1961) 
pp. 191 ff; A. H. Armstrong., An Introduction to Ancient 
Philosophy, London (1959) : )-39; J. A. Stewart,, Platols Doctrine of Ideas, Oxford (1909) P-59; H. Raeder, Platonts Philosonhsche Entwickelung., Leipzig (1905) 
pp. 3bl-2. Anart from the above references, one may find some more, in the brief but interesting article by K. F. Doherty., God and the Good in Plato., XXX (1956) 
po. 441 ff. - 
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to solve the riddle., things 'which are improbable,, even 
impossible and mere empty words and wishes. At any rate 
I should be more inclined, with Prof. bodr-s, "to exrlain 
Plato's lack of clarity on this subject by the cleavage 
between his mythical or religious thinking and his 
dialectical or phi! oSOT, )hical thinking,, and the fact thlat. 
the former was not bound, or not bound in the sa-me degree 
as the iatter., by the requirement of logical consistency. 
Our confusion about Plato's God is., I think, an instance. 
His rhilosophical thinking about the nature of goodness and 
the truth led him to uosit an Absolute, which is the form 
of the Good. This Absolute is hardly a nossible object of 
worship, and he nowhere in fact, calls it or any of the 
Forms., a God. His religious feeling, on the other hand, 
created the figure of 
' 
qdg. 
omnipotent) Father - God,, father and maker of God and men 
and of the world itself. If we try to identify the two, 
in the ho-pe that they will add ur to the equivalent of' One 
Christian Deity we make, as I think, nonsense. I incline 
to see in him the highest Goif. of Platols -inersonal faith, 
whom we meet also ra t the end of the sixth letter (323D), 
and whom I should suDrose plato sreaks of in the singular 
without further exTdanation. Plato then, if I am right 
in my general view, admits two types of belief or two 
levels of truth,, which we may call resnectively truth of 
religion and truth of reason. The former are, as such., 
indemonstrable, and he does not claim for tbom moro than 
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a probubility that this or something like it (PhacdP. 114D, 
82n) is true. I find nothing surT)rising in this: Most 
men, including, I susnect, most philosoT)hers, believe in 
practice a good many things which'they are incapablc of 
proving. But since Plato preferred to convince his 
readers by reasoning, if possible, rather than by emotive 
eloquence, he continually tried to transpose his 
relidious bcliofs from the mythical to the philosorhical 
ievel, thus transforming them into truths of reason". 
' 
E. R. Doads, TIPlato and the Irrational", in the Journal 
of Hellenic Studies (1945) pp. 231 24; Idem. ýhe 
Grecks and the IrrLational, Berkeley and Los Angeles 
(1963) pp. 221 and 232 n. 67- I quote his words in full, 
because of their importance and because they hardly 
admit of summary. See also similar notions: J. A. 
Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, Oxford. (1909) 
pp. 101-2; K. F. Doherty., t'God and the Good" in the New 
Scolasticism, pp. 459-60. It is, however, worth 
mentioning hat A. E. Taylor, Plato. the Man and his Worx, 
p. 289, s,, ý, uanks -bout "Good - Christian God ...... ens realissimumll, while Ernst Hoffm(-: jn. Griechische Philosonhie bis Platonj Heidelberg (1951) P-175, is 
neither -, --: rei, -ared to Identify nor to reject it. He nevertheless remarks that Plato, as a philosopher, 
never gives a result in his Dialogues, but always 
shows a way which will lead to a result. 11 ...... Was Platon in Seinen Dialogen als Philosophie gibt, ist 
niemals ein resultat., sondern ist immer ein ýJeg., der 
zum Resultat, hinfuhren will 
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(b) What is Man? 
What then is man? Anyone who would take nains to 
go through the Platonic dialogues would receive some 
answers to this question, such as: t1the name 'man' 
indicates that the other animals do not examine or 
consider or looK up at any of the things tliat they see .... 
but man looks up at and considers that which he has seen. 
Therefore of ail the animals man alone is rightly called 
man, because he looks up at what he has seen". 
' In 
addition, man is described as a play-thing of the Gods or 
even a toy for God, 2 as the most God-fea-ring of all living 
cr, 6atures3 or as God possessions4 etc. 
But this is not the true, the real definition of man 
for Plato. For him, man is something more than that; he 
is something deeper and more significant; something of a 
higher and nobler nature, not a mere clay toy, but a 
reasoning, spiritual creature; something which does not 
perish or disappear. It is something immortal and divine. 
cratYllv 399C 1-7; trans. 
LCL2 comn. Rpletete, Dl--. tribe Ble- 1-14. 
qtd. 1 in Prof. q. A. EL&Voui ""-l-PLO'vLavLcrp6c, xaC &vOp(j)TELav6( Athens, (1962) r. 8., q. 1. 
2. Lawg; VII, 803C 4-5. 
3. Lawß X. 902B5- 
4. Phaedo 62B6- Statesman 271E6-7. 2 
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Plato., then, not only conceives man as immortalY but he 
quite clearly declares in the Laws that man's true self 
(the real man) resides in the divine and immortal part, 
that the real self of each of us is the immortal soul. 
The same notion may be found somewhat elaborated in the 
Apocrypha, Alcibiades or in another writer 
2 
who echoes 
Plato's views and emphatically rejects the idea that man 
is neither the body alone nor the body and soul together 
( cruva4y6, ccpov ) but the immortal soul in itself. 
3 
Laws XII U-C C vaL [VOUV 959A8, Bl-5: "T)Ilwv F-M-Ycr"') TO- ' 
ýýcbv-cq hpw\) E'xaauo\) 0'\j-uL0r, ) T) p voV. 
Comp. Eth. Nic. 128b34-35,1777b3O, 1178al-2 
also in F. T. A. Cornford "The division of the Soul" in 
The Hibbert Journal, XXVIII (1929-30) p. 209(n, l; 
J. Burnet., The Ethics of Aristotle, London 1 00) 
p. 423 on 1168bY5--, among other comments adds It .... we are not entitled to say that this is Aristotlets own 
view, but it certainly was Platols1f; P. Shorey,. Hbat 
Plato Said, Chicago (1933) p. 654'n. on Alcib. I 1. -, '(, C3. 
2. It is not for us to decide about the authenticity of 
this dialogue. It will take us far beyond our main 
scope if we do so; we simply note here that in 
favour of Plato's authorship are Grote, Hermann. 
Friedlander ) J. 'Adam and others, and against it., A. E. Taylor, Plato, P. 522-3. 
3. Alcib. I 129E9-130A-C 11 .,. 
8T Lh ýVXT') cILVOPWTEOC; 00000-0 
, 
[LOL 6OXCT FEXCLV. 61 LXUVMC Axiochus 36ý 
'p CX -Y E 17' b aT LV , T6 
bTEOXEL(POýV GM )6Cr, 6v xaC hoyov, o%c t 11 
IýLc Lc, ydp tapýv (ý X ID1 mnodorus comMeritagy avgRwyfý 
sI 








(. 1956) Pp. 127-133,202) 1-115. 
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It must also be said that "the standing Academic 
definition of man is a soul using a body". 1or as Plato 
himself has it., a "composite structure of soul and bodyý1.2 
But this does not affect our assumption that for Plato 
the true self is the soul., that is, the soul is the man. 
This statement is Droved true time and again in almost 
every Platonic dialogue. After all,, the soul's union 
with its body is a temporary one, the body is mortal, of 
the earth,, and in time passes away. The Soul on the 
contrary, is an immortal senior and T)crmanent entity. 3 
We maintain then that Plato regards man Individually as a 
soul,, that the true self, the real man, is soul. 
1. A. E. Taylor, Plato., 3). 27 n. l. 
2. Phaedrus 246C5; trans. R. Hackforth, Platols Phaedrus, 
P-70-* 
3. Phaedo 80D; Timaeus 34C; Laws 892A., 959A., 967D. 
103. 5 
(c) A General Definition of the Human Soul. 
Since we have alre, --dy accerted that the real man is 
soul, we must turn our attention to it and see in a very 
brief and general manner how T'lato speaks of the human 
soul, how he describes its oim nature. 
In the first place, the main characteristic of the 
soul, its essence, very idea, is self-motion. 
' 
Further, soul is the self mover and the source and 
first principle of motion for all other things that are 
moved., 2 the source ond origin of the life, "for a living 
thing controls its motion from within itself and initiates 
motion in its relation to the environment". 
3 In other 
words we could say soul is not only the source of life, or 
the c&use of it4 but the life itself, soul and life are 
Phaedrus 245E2-4: II6c, 5av&Tov 66 TEcyaapevov 'uo-u bcP'ýau'VO-u 
XLVOUPeVOU, T) obcy(av -rF- )ta( X6yov TOZ)TOV (X? JT(SV TLr. I)X r 
11 IC ON aTCFXVVCTTaL" j Uwws\' 896Al-3; comp. also with Aristotle, de Anima 
A2 403b2O-28 and in V. Goldschmidt, La Religion de 
Platon, Paris (1959) P-51, where he observes: "Th 
soul, according to the unanimous observations of the 
ancients, gives animation to the movement and 
sensation of that which lives". 
2. Phaedrus, 245C6-9: "---- ý16vov 6ý -z6 ab-u6 xtvoZv ... &Xxd 
HUCL TOZLC WOLC 8aa %LvcZTaL TOZTO Rnyý XaC &PXý XLVýaCWC1191 
Laws 895B2-4; Laws 896A7-9- 
3. Phaedrus 245C7-10. 
4. Cratyl. 399DIl-12 and El-2: TOVC- TýV Oxý\j 
I- 6VOpdaaVTaC ... a'L'TLO'J 
LOTL TO-U QIjV CtUTW, TýV TO-U 
&vanVCTV 6ývapLV napCXOV Xa( &VUYI'UXOV"; 
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one and the same thing. ' 
Furthermore, the soui is characterised by 'Plato as 
divine, indestructibie of a single form, accessible to 
thought and changeless, ever constant and abiding true to 
itself. 2 ihimortal, 3 without birth, ungenerated. 4 and the 
like. 
Realising that it is not enough merely to set out the 
various references to the soul as they occur in the 
Dialogues - since Piatols theory of the soul is not rigidly 
uniform\and occasionally is even contradictory - we nrorose 
to treat the whole subject under the following headings, 
Rei). 353D7-9: IITC ö'ae T6 Z, ýv; dýUxýC ylaogcv r) T) cpyov 
ElVa L LCYTU Y 
2. Phaedo 80B1 W F- L vonTw -3: 'u l"v 15ECw x(-YC &eavdTw xa' 
xat liovoF-L6ý xci[ 68LaXý, uw nat h( (baaý, rwG xaT6 TabTd 
F'-'Xov-uL bgoL6TaTov EivaL ý), uX'v". T) 
3. Phaedo 80B1 It 
.9 
105E6, lo6Eq: "&-Ddva-vov apa (ýuXýo 
Phaedrus 245C5: "OXII Tcaaa Wvauor_ý' - or if ibid. 246Al: "tC &v6yxT)C. ---- &O(Ivauov av E Ln" Republic 608D3: "--- O'T L 6,5&v(xTor- kL03V h (ýuXf*) ; ca( 
oWnoTc &n6XXuTaL"!, 
Renublic 611B9: 11 ... 8TL Pb) -UOC\)I)V &, 5dVa'UOV (ýUXý11. 




1. Tho Origin of the soul: generated or 
ungenerated? 
-. 2. The Division of the soul 
Soul - body: their relationship 
4. The Inunortality of the Soul. 
The Origin of 
- 
the Soul: generated or ungencrated? 
The soul is described in the TimC-. eus as follows: - 
The De. niurge, the divine craftsman who made the cosmos 
and the gods, took the same bowl wherein he had mixed and 
blended the World Soul, poured into it what was left of the 
former ingredients of the World Soul's comnosition (same - 
other, being - existence)l, mingling it somewhat after the 
same manner, yet not as pure as before but coming second 
Timaeus 35A-B. To this obscure passage "intelligent 
accounts" are given by the following scholars: A. E. 
Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford (1928) 
(1962) pp. 106-36; P. Shorey., "The Timaeus of Pl"-toll, 
American Journal of Philolog .X 
(1889) w). 531-54; 
Idem: "Recent interretations of the Timacus", 
Classical Philolog . XXIII 
(1928) n-352; G.. MI. A. Grube, 
I'The Com,. osition of the World-Soul in Timaeus 3 A-BII) 
Classical Philology, XXVII (1932) n. 81; Idem. Plato's 
Though . London (1935) pp. 142-3; F. M. Cornford, Platots Cosmology (The Timaeus of Platol London (1937) 
C-1956) -PP-59-66. Also in Procli Diadochi, in Platonis 
Timaeum commentzj. ria, ed. by E. Diehl Lipsiae, ICMIV, 
p. 156-. I 
156 
and third in purity. 1 An(f when he had comnounded the 
whoic he divided it into souls equal in number with the 
2 stars and aistributed them each soul to its scveral star. 
Besiaes this rcassage in the Ti-nacus., Plato, charging 
everyone as ignorant and knowing nothing of the origin3 Cý 
repeatedly sýtates in the Laws that soul has been produced 
first,, came first, she is the first born of all things and 
Comp. Phiiebus 30, h; Rene Schaerer, Dieu, Ithomme-et la 
vie d-lapres Platon, Neucha. tel (1944) : r.. 42 agrees 
also that the human soul retains d small 
ýuantity 
of 
nure principle but that this rrincirle, however, is now 
ousted by the Other,, wbercas in the cosmic soul, on the 
contrary, it w&s that which involved it. Further, 
ibid. n. 42 n. l,, he illustrates the difference of the 
ingredientst quantity as follows: 
"La formule de l1ame cosmique est: - 
Mem + Autre + IMeme + Autre ý22) 
coile de 11'ame humaine est: 
Autre + /Meme t Autre k22 
F. Soliasen, Plato's Theolog . Now York 
(1942) P-93) is 
of the opinion that the individual souls are either 
parts of the Universal Soul or at least of the same 
stuff. E. W. Simson, Ler Begriff der Seele, r-85Y 
reviewing what Plato in Timaeus writes about the soul's formation, discovors in a gcneral way that the ground 
of the origin of the human soul is the same as that of 
the World-Soul and that its origin occurred in the same 
, manner as the Worid-Soul. 
Timaeus 4lD4-E2. 
3. Laws 892A4. 
4. ýUXý 6L tVnp6TOLC YEYCVT)p6Vn ... 
li ý -npcapu-r6pav AcTav a6gauoq .. 99 
(ýUxý Trov &R(i\)'UWV nPeapuTaYTT); YEVOgC'V-Q &PXý XLVýaCWC T) 
q)uXT)v g6v npoT6pav ycyovývaL (56gaTOC hp-LV 
'V YC'VECYLV &7t6VTWV 
... (ýUXT) CTV(XL OXTý)v tXE'Yogcv, 6q npcap6, raTov TE XaC 
OCL6TaTov bYTLV ... ýuxý Te d)C, 
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prior to body. 1 
Onels task of internreting the soul's origin would be 
easier and less complicated if' Plato himself either had 
not taKen the diametrically oprosite -: 4nd contradictory view 
in the Phaedrus'that the soul is &yc'vT)TOC absolutely 
2 
without beginning, uncreated and ungenerated, or if he had 
not declared that soul is ýan incomposite being, something 
which, since it has no constituent parts, as the body hasj 
will not be liable to dissolution or death, 63 it is 
related to the eternal forms and there is a great affinity 





aiso Timaeus 34C4-5: 
2. Ph, -edrus 245C6-246A2: IlTu',,, ý nUcra &OdvaToc. ... TOUTO TE%71 
nac &W XLVýacwc, apxý U hyývljTov, Lý &pxýc ydp 
&vayx? l nUv T6 yLyv6Vcvov y(yvcaOaL, abTýv pT)6'ýý ýv6c ... 
f' XXOTL ClVaL -c6 ab-u6 ýavr6 ; CLVOZ\J " (ýUX'V; PT) a T) T) 
&VdY7CT)C &YC'VT)T6v -cc ; cc,. C &OdvaTov OXTý) 6v clcv". 
Phaedo 78C1-4: ,.... i; uyx(ivF- L 
8v &ý6\jouuov, 
Tou'To p6wo 
'RpoaýXe 4 [tý Tt(ICYv, \. C L Ta-UTa .. 0. 
" 
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between them., ' while, soui is said to exist italwa. 7st, 2 or 
"for all timell. 3 
The apparent or real discre, lancy between the above- 
mentioned oassages has disquieted all the Platonic scholars 
(ancient4 and modern) and has forced them to give it a 
considerable amount of thought. 
With regard to Timaeus' theory of the creation of the 
human soul, I think we may justifiably T-, ass it over end 
leave it out for the simnle reason that Plato himself warns 
us not to take his account of the creation, and consequently 
of the soul's com, ),: )sition as well., scriously - -,, u nied do. la 
1. Phaedo 79B8-12: 11 ... 611OL6, ucpov 
ULpa (ýuXý (j6jAaTo(; 
p ibid. Ml-, ý: llbTav 66 *yc COTLV TM at5CT 
Ctb, ul RcLolab'zl cyxoTt-, olXuraL ctr, T6 ; caocLp6\i -cc T) T) T) . 
týXF L _T FL 
XUL' &F-L' '()\) &O(i\)a'rOV ... xaC' 
ý)c, auyycvýr, oýcya abuo-u &cC 
ýICT' tXC NOU TE Y L'Y\)F-'Ua 0. 
2. Ileno 86A-B "5-T)%OV *y6p 8TL T6v ndvTa Xp6vov 
VV COT LV 1r) Ob% E"(YT LV U'VO PWTCOr, " . 
3. Re'ý, ublic 611iii ff .... , 
it 6ýkov o', uL &va-y)cT) &cC b\j elvaL. 
4. We may note herein passing that Plutarch first tried to 
reconcile the relevant statements in the Phaedrus and 
L&ws about the soul's origin with a litoral inter- 
. ý-retati-an of 
the, Titaeus, without success, of course, 
as his exposition i. -) entirely illogical and untenable, 
in ", I-IF-p( uý(; ýv TLIla(W 1i'UXOYOV1GLC. "q or "Do 
animae procreatione in Timaeo., 1016C-D, 5-15 in 
Plutarchi 1111oralia, Vol. Vj, fasc. 1 (ed. by C. Hubert and 
H. Drexler, Lipslae in Eadibus B. C. Teubucri WCMLIX, 
P-153; see also in R. MA. Jones, The Platonism of 
Plutarchý PP-81-85; A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on 
Plqtols--Timaeusý PP-117-8; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's 
Criticism of Plato ana the Academ . D. 426 n-360. 
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lettre. He claims., through Timaeust mouth that his 
exposition is neither a logical premise nor a scientific- 
ally accurate statement, but a 4ZOOC a mere 
myth, a probable tale, and as such claims no further 
investigation. ' 
The late Prof. R. Hackforth, despite Plato's warning, 
refers to 34C4 and seems to suggest that in Timaeus, Plato 
would have kept in mind a soul uncreated and nrior to the 
Timaeus 29Dl-3. Scholars supporting the mythical 
exposition are E. Zeller, Plato and "he Older Academ 
New Y, ork (1902) p. 405 n-40; E. ' Rohde, Psyche, p. 479 
n. 18; G. Grubey Plato's Though y p. 142; F. M. - Cornfordy Platots Cosmology, pp. 28-32; F. Solmsen, 
Plato's Theology, . PP-108-9; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's 
Critidism of' Plato, pp. 426 n. 359,430-31; A. E. 
Taylor, ' Commentary on lato's Timaeusy P-73; Idem. 
Plato, pp. '440-1 gives somewhat different view; Ernst 
Howald in his paper 11eikos logost' Hermes 57 (1922) 
pp. 63-79, seems to make considerable exaggerations and 
in F. Solmsen I ibid. p. 120 n-32; R. Hackforth, "Platols Cosmology (Ti=aeus 27D ff)" Classical 
Quarterly, N. S. Ix (1259) p. 21; * E. W. Simsony Der 
Begriff der Seeley P-d5- It may be noted on the other 
hand that G. Vlastos, T'Theýdisorderly motion", 
Classical Guarterly I XXIII'(1939) pp. 71-83, arguing for a literal interpretation of the pre-cosmical 
disorderly motion, supports the view that the 
inconsistencies are "symptomatic of the contradiction 
inherent in Plato's donceTition of yeveUK" and P. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, Paris (1930) P-173 ff, di. -Ptinguishes two sensesof the myth or story; see also F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology., PP-31-32 n. l. 
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body., or to use someone elsets words., he "still retains a 
basic appreciation of the really uncreated status and 
priority of the soult'. 
1 IfThe words YCVeaEL UPOTC'pa 
must, however, be interpreted in accordance with the 
general scheme of the creation myth in which an analysis of 
factors in the universe is ý--lresented in the guise of a 
cosmogonyll. 2 
Next, HackfQrth) again in an article published shortly 
after his death, maintains that Plato in the Timaeus is 
still holding a view about the soul similar in some degree 
to that of Orphics, Pythagoreans and even Phaedo, that is, a 
soul divine or semi-divine, wholly spiritual and rational 
and 11rartly discriminated from Mind or heason". 
3 
Reasonable though H-ackforthts exrosition seems, It 
-, se. does not Drove his cCA Plato's statement of ctxk pZOoc 
I think is the answer to the soul's creation. 
We must not, therefore, worry about Timacust theory 
and may ignore it altogether. 
1. H. D. Rankin, Plato and the Individual., p. 28. 
2. R. Hackforth, Platols Phaedrus, Cambridge (1952) p. 62; 
also In H. D. Rankin, ibid. D. 28 n., 1. 
3. R. Hackforth, "Plato's Cosmogony (Timaeus 27D ff)tlin 
Classical ýIuarterly, N. S. IX (1959) p. 21; E. Rohde, 
Psyche, p. 479 n. ld., remarks: I'The creation of the 
soul in Timaeus is only intended to represent the 
origin of the spiritual from the 6111ILoupy6c not the coming into being of the soul in timelt. 
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Nevertheless, the greatest difficultyp as I have 
already said, lies between the Laws, where Plato 
categorically declares soul as: 892C4 first born 
(Lv npW'ToLC 
896Cl-2 prior to body 
(7tpoTepav ycyov6vaL a6ýtawr, ) 967ID67 
11the soul is oldest of all things that Dartake of 
generation" (trans. R. G. Bury', Plato, Laws,, II., P-563 In 
LCL). (npcap6TaTov &Ttdvrwv oka yovT)r, VeTe 
CXT)ycv) 
and in Phaedrus 245C6-246A2 in which we read soul as 
uncreated, ungenerated ( &y6voTov). 
Now in view of this ai*lrarent conflict between the two 
dialogues, any linguistic and literary attempt to remove 
the difficulties and find a satisf",, ctory solution is going, 
I incline to'think., to fall completely. 
Plato's commentators intervene at this -point and each 
one separately offers his oým resn, ective solution of this 
apparent antithesis. 
Since Prof. Cherniss' reconcillatory effort is clear, 
well-founded and succeeds in many ways., it woijld be better, 
I believe, to allow the scholar himself to develop his 
arguments . 
Lnd defend his case with his own words: 
I'The scope of the argument in the Laws is determined by the 
thesis which it is meant to refute, namely that fire, water, 
earth and anir are npw-Ta and that soul is Lx ý06Twv 
VaTepov (891C). To refute them he need say 
nothing as to whether soul is absolutely without beginning., 
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but has only to prove that it is -npeapuTepav a6paToC ........ 
.0.0.. In other words, Plato 
does Tiot oxy-licitly draw 
the concl. ision here that the soul is absolutely without 
beginning simply because that point is suTerfluous to his 
present arguýaent and like a skilled debater, he confines 
himself' both In assumption and rroof to the minimum 
necessary for establishing his case". 
1 He goes on to say 
that 11there --re clear indications in the course of the 
argument that he has not abandoned the rosition of the 
Phaedrus. In 894E-895B, he argues first that moving 
ýly self-motion, as the ultimate things necessarily im, 
princi7le of their motion, and secondly that if all things 
should be assumed at rest., a first motion would have to be 
self-motion, for since there is no change in the thi,:,. gs at 
rest, change induced by something other. than self-motion 
(i. e. by a moved mover) could not be prior to this. 
H. Cherniss,, Aristotle's Criticis, -, j of Plzýto ancl the 
Acaaegy, p. 430-1 n-365; compare with Procli Diadochi 
in Pi:., tonis Timucufn commentarla, ed. by E. Diehl, 
Lipsiae., P11CMIV., Vol. 1j., 175DII-23 'n-117, whom Churniss 
foliows in his conclu6ing remarks: 
if It CaTL 66 Y6VCaLC ýn( cýc, (ývXýc o1bX h )cqv6 Xp6\)ov T) 
, 
(246A) (&y6vTj, uov y6p )caL' &V6XEOPOV IY6CL&CV ýV ýU(6PW 
Tijv (ýuXýv), &XX'h %aT'ObOL'aV ndpo6or, &Tc6 -rw-v voT)T-wv 
at, uCwv ........... 
EXXT) ýnC -c-T)r, ý-)uXýr, -yc\jcaLc, xuC 
&XXT) h LTEI co-U a6[taTor, pb) TtpoT6pa xaC npcapur6pa 
TEPWCXcaTýpa y6p tuTL TW- TCdVTWV 6T)JILOUPYrO. " 
63. 
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In this passage, which is simply aýr exr. ansion of Phaedrus 
245D7-F,, 21 the first part implies that ttgenerated self-motion" 
is a contradiction in terms, and the second that, If soul, 
as inotion., were t1generatedtI., not it but its generator 
would be self-motion and the &PXT) %LVT)CF_wr, RaGMV ......... 
That soul is called TCP6TT) 'YbJCaLr, does not at 
all imply that it ever did not exist or was ever 
tigenerated" in the sense of being t1now" after not having 
been Itbefore". The soul is, of course, a fIrroccss", 
though not a physical rrocess, being intermediate between 
the ideasand the -physical universe; it too is de; -; rndent 
upon the real being of the ideas, but the very fact that 
it is called np6TT) y6vcaLC of all things that are or 
have been or will be and of all their contraries (Laws 896A, 
899C6-7) shows that Plato did not here envisage any 
productiontt or t1creation" of it". 
1 I, - 
. 
The late Prof. Hacifforth also attearted two different 
ex-ilanations of the "puzzling" passages in the Laws. 
1. In an e-rlier article'. which he. later believed 'to 
have been wrong., though., " he thinks', "the main 
conclusions of his Paper may stand without ittt, ""- he 
I. H. Cherniss ...... piease see'at rage 62 n. l. 
2. R. Hackforth, Plato's Pliae-drus, Cambridge (1952) P. 67 
n-3. 
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suggests that the words 11 8aa YO\)-T)c. IIF-TC(X7IcPCv'1 
(Laws 967D) mean t1no more than Y6VECT LC oldest 
of all things that are generated" and that I'soul then 
is a YC'VCaLC or ycyov6c or 11rarticipates in 
birthl'. This ycyov6c, does not imnly any creation 
in time. They are simrly derivative existents 
de-oe, aaing on something more ultimate. 
2. Later, he holds that Plato rereats and ex, -ands in 
the Laws the theory of the self-moving soul, and as it 
is quite znCaltural, everyone would have ex-ected 
hiin to 
reaffirm its ungenerated nature. Unfortunately, he 
refrains from doing so and instood tries "to confute 
the atheistic materialists who make body rrior in 
origin to soul, he ado, -)ts their tomroral category and 
confines himself to demonstrating the reverse riority". 
2 
Next Rankin., taking up the roint, argues that it is 
aý,, -)arent from the Timc,, -. us (371D) - and this accords with 
Hackforth's oninion - that Plato recognized an inadequacy 
in the use of language employing ordinary time - concerts of 
R. Hackforth., 'Piutols Theism?,, Ciassical Cuarterly, XXX 
Ca, iibriage (1936) P. 5'ff. 
2. Idem. 
, 
Plato's Phaedrus, n. 67. It m-sy be) of interest to 
note that in his 1--osthumous article "Plato's Cosmogony", 
Classical (uLrterly N. S. IY- (1959) r. 213 he sees 
Phaedrus' ungenerated soul as "the necessary nre- 
sup-rosition of ail movements that occur in the Universe, 
coeval with the Universe". 
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cosmological ideas. The time divisions of the "temporal" 
world are seen as irrelevant to the 11 extra- temporal" and as 
the ? 'temporal" world is a created thing,, so also is its 
character of temporality, a flickering shadow of the endur- 
ing substance of eternity. In this context, only the 
present tense can have any force, and Das and future alike 
are meaningless. This is not to say that Plato never uses 
the ? 'irrelevant" tenses in writing of the timeless cosmos. 
He acknowledged that men were conditioned to thinking in 
such terms, and regarded it as a work of sunererogation to 
avoid tensed language completely. This "conditioning" was 
expressed in the idea that man and time were, as it were, 
twins - an idea inherent in much Greek writing, and found, 
particularly, in the Laws (721C). Time, in this system, 
exists alsongside a man, paralleling his oým age at each 
juncture, young when he is young, old when he is old, and 
born when he is born. This way of thinking smooths over 
the apparent contradiction in the Timaeus of saying that 
something which is ungenerated was "made" at a srecific 0 
moment, although that Itmoment" is really outside of time. 
In the same way, one can describe the soul as "older" than 
all other things'., or to say that something 11 ex tra- temporal Tt 
existed "before? ' time. If time is "born"., the extra- 
temporal already existed when time was born. According 
to the Timaeus, time (3? C) actually began., had a point of 
origin. It is in such terms that the extra-temnoral 
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soul can. itself be said 11to be born". 
' 
Idulier., on the other 
hana, is of the oninion that in -1 
the Laws, soul's creation has no n1ace, as in Timaeus, and 
the words itpo-cC"pa and nPF-aGuT6PU have by no 
mcc-ns a tewporal sense: ("Das ware im Timaios vielleicht 
möglich wo mindestnes die Seele geschaffen wird; in den 
Nomoi aber hat die Schohpfung keine Stelley2 and ...... 
Daher die Begriffe npoTEpa und npeapuTc, pa die 
in den Nomoi keinooc*"' falls zeitlichen sinn haben") 
In au(ýition to the above nicntioned -ýoints of view, some 
other scholars exrressed quite contrary opinions as to the 
soul's origin. VILstos, for instance, ad6uces some 
passages and claims that Plato had assumed the soul's 
creation, "but prudently, refrained from presenting it as 
a vroblem". 
4 In other words he claims, so to s-eak, that 
when he wrote the Laws Plato belOved the ýcul tD be crot . ýtod 
i. e. to have had a begiming. 
1. H. D. Rankin, Plato and the Individual., T),, ). 28-9. 
., 
Studen zuden Platonischen Nomoi, Munchen 2. G. I., luller -L (1951) (in Zetemata, monogra, -ýhien zur Klassischen 
Altertums Wissenschaft, fleft 3) r. 86. 
3. G. i'., Auller, ibid. 'ý-85 n. l. 
4. G. Vla:! stos, "The disorderly motion in the Timaios" 
Classical Quarterly, XXXIII (1939) P. -79 n. 2. and T). 82 n. 1; see also fl. Cherniss, Aristotle-is Criticism of 
Plato ang the Academy, p. 430 n. 36-5-. 
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Prof. Skemp for his , ý. zart, charges Plato's 
commentators with being slow to ack-nowledge that the soul 
is a created thing, "except 6L6aCXCL%[CLr, XdPL'O' 
and this, of course, in virtue of the a-pparent &VTL'yaaLC 
of Phaedrus and Laws. Further, in a footnote, he 
observes that Laws X sreaks of the OXý as YEYEV CV71 
at U092C; cf. 892A. 896A and at the "crucial" nassege 
XII 967D. 
1 
In conclusion, we may say this: - 
The key answer to the arrarcnt discrerancy lios not 
in the narrow grammatico-lexicological, or liter3l, 
exiýositiony but in the main -urrose of the Laws book X. 
Those who have already worked in this direction 
(Proclus, Cherniss., H. ac. -, forth and. Raný-, in) succeeded in 
many ways, while those who have aT)proached the rroblem 
differently have failed to rroduce results leading to a 
s"-tisfactory solution (G. Viastos and S. &emp). 
Lhile we must exclude any creation of the human soul 
in time as contrary to what Plato teachesi, we are obliged 
to endorse the view of Proclus, Cherniss, Hackforth and 
Rani: in as well founded and convincing, that the human soul 
J. B. Sxemp., The Theorv of' Iviotion in Pla-tols later Dialogues, Cambric)ge (1942) D. 112 n. l. 
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is a "process", not necessarily a -)hysical one, being 
Intermediate between the Forms and the Universe; the soul 
is a derivative existent', as the physical universe, 
denending on something more ultinate., more transcendent, 
indeed upon the real being of ideas. 
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THE DIVISION OF THE SOUL. 
The statement under consideratLon could be ex-ressed 
as foliows: 
Is the human soul simple, of' one form or kind 
(POVOELVr') uncouipounded (&Uv-DETOC T) ) -L or 
tri-vartite 
2 
and composite, or in other words, is soul a 
differentiated unity or a simpie unity or both, a one and 
many? 
The whole question, as it is uný. Frstood, is neither :., n 
easy one nor without its complexities. Since this is so, 
an6 if we wish to gain the cle"orest possible view, then we 
have to go round a ionger way. 3 
Thus our proposed investigation falls into the 
following sections: - 
Origin of the doctrine: Pythagorean or PiC-tonic? 
2. TripartItion of the Soul: 
a) in the Re-ublic 
b in the. Phaedrus 
c in the Timaeus 
d in the other dialogues. 
Conclusion: nroposed solution. 
1. Phaedo 78c,, -1-7.80BI-4; 
Renublic 6llBl-(q-. 
2. Cf Ee-.., ublic IV 4350) 435C-441; 611B-612A; also 
PERK, 25A)ff; Tim. 69C-72D. 
Republic 435D4-5. 
t- /o. 
1. Originof the doctrine: Pythagorean or Platonic? 
While Pythagoreans did not nroDound any clear 
statement about a tri-partitc soul,, nevertheless some 
modern scholars favour the notion, that tho origin of the 
doctrine of the threefold soul is Pythagorea: n r.,:,. th(-. r than 
Platonic. 
Burnet, for instanco, rcgarding the Ph. -edo 68C2, as 
imvdying the triT, artite division of the soul, rrcfers this 
"somewhat T)rimitive -psychoiogy" as being older than 
Socrates., for it stands in intimvte connection with the 
famous Pythagoroan apologue of' the three ILves - comnared 




sell ( x6p6or, ) 
(2) to comr, ete ( 66Ca (3) to buy and 
(Iambl. V. P. 58). Furthor, in sunport 
of his view, he quotes Poseidonius and I"amblichus, as 
saying that the doctrine of the throe rarts of the soul 
goes back to Pythagoras himself and that it originally was 
Pythagorean indeed and Piato himself 1rori. -m-d out and 
completed it. 
1 
J. Burnet Platots Phaedo Oxford (19': 9) n. on 68C2; 
Early Greez Philoson 98 cf. 296 n. 2; Idem I Glý, c M) ý, ý I rz I nn Gree& Philosophy, pp. 42 n. 2 and 177; A. E. Taylor,. A 
Commentary on Plato's Timeaus, pp. 497-8'and n 1ý Idem 
his n. 1 d, W. jTr, I Plato; - 
the iil-ci ., i(, Jý Study LnPj-ýto. Oxford (1936) P-138., --, re m -) -v in g In tne sa,. ie direction in mi-itaining the Pyth,!, gnrean ý)l ig i 
of' the doctrine; C. J. Clacsen, S-rývcb]-Lcleie doutung ,, Is triebiýcrý-if t Pi&to-nisclhen unci 
r- ir, 0 1., j;. i-qLch., p. 21. n. A, on thý- hand -rr%f'o -i gt 
the above scholars til-alt 'Ibestohe; i E! uf Pyt . h-- g ,, re. Isc 
nosprun, der Lreiteilung deýr SeE, Ie 6 
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In'an exceilent article, J. L. Stocks, following 
Burnet's line of thought, finds it unnocessary to search 
the records of Greek philosoi)hy for further detailed 
evidence of the, 1ý. rofouna and continued i: nfluonce of the 
uoctrine., and he is content to remark in conclusioti that 
all -orobabilities favour the truth of the tradition of its 
Pythaagorean origin. ' 
Cornford, on the other hand, remarks that he is not 
sure that the doctrine of the three lives irirliesa 
definite division of the soul into three., narts. He rather 
suggests that the natural imrression -, roduced' by this 
passage is that the three iives were a common. place, but no-- 
one had at least based the doctrine on a tri-c, artite 
psychology. ") Further, he argues that the tripartite 
psychology iras as Its final basis a social structure oldor 
than Pythagoras himseif and it does not matter at what date 
or in whose hands interpretation in terms of -psychology 
took place. 3 
1. J. L. Stockc,, "Plato anrý the 
Mind, XXIV (1915) London, 
2. F.,,,!. Cornford, "Psychology 
Re, public of Plato". The C 
p. 247 n. 2. 
3. F. I. Cornford, ibid, p. 247 
TriT, artite of the Soul", 
rp. 2095 210 an6 219. 
and Social Structure in the 
lassical (, uarto. rlv, VI (1912) 
n. 2. 
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The above view that the doctrine of the three rarts 
of the soul is rooted in, the Pythagoreans) has recently 
been challenged by two equally eminent scholars, Grube and 
Hac. &forth. 
Professor Grube, charging Burnet) Taylor and their 
the whole roint in giving such faulty foiiowers as missing 
explanation concerning the divine soul) writes that the 
difference lies in this: ? "Whereas the Phaedo (with the 
Pythagoreans) sl: ýcaks of three different tyres of' men, in 
the Re, )ublic and the Phaedrus these becomo three parts of 
the same soul". The passions of the philosorher in the 
Phaedo are not parts of his soul. 
Professor Hackforth also s. r)Qaks against it, ascribing 
with the late Piofessor W. Jaeger (-tiristotle) E. T. 19482, 
p. 96) the origin of the three tyj)es, of man to tho Academy 
rather than to Pythagoras and re. jects the suggestion that 
the F-0--public Iký 581, has its origin in Pythagoi-asand rules 
out Burnetfs implication of a tri, -)artite soul on Phaedo 
68C. 1-4 and in the whole dialogue as impossible and 
2 groundless. 
1. Grube Platols Thoughtj n. 1. 
2. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phag(ýo., P-56 n. l. Here 
Hackforth., n. 4, in supT)ort of his opinion, cites Frutiger, ilythes de Platon, rn-77 ff; G. Grube. 7 Plato's Thought, p. 1)3; E. F. Dodds, The Groeks and the Irrationals, T)-, ). 22ý f. 
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Grube and Hacicforth may be right as far as the aileged 
tripartite soul found by Burnet in the Phaedo, but not, I 
think, as regards the origin of the three ty-rýes of i-ilen 
which, according to Burnetts evicýences, seems to belong to 
an older gen-eration than that of Plato. 
2. The tri-oartition of the soul: 
(a) in the Renublic. 
Plato had ", iready shown that justice and a just 
society exist when each of its three classes keers to its 
own proier business, does not interfere with others works, 
and prorerly and rightiy performs its oum. 1 
"Since the quaiities of a community are those of the 
comp, onent individuals, we may expect to find the three 
corresnonding elements in the individual soul. All 
three will be nresent in every soul, but the strticture of 
society is basea on the fact that they are developed to 
1. I-,, -:, T)ublic 434C6-10. 
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different degrees in different types of character? '. 
' 
Plato, having accerited the tentative rro-nosition that 
the three -psychological kinds or forms correspond to the 
three orders of the city, proceeds now to consider, "from 
a common human experience., that of conflict in the mindtf, 2 
F. Id. Cornford, The Reriýblic of Plato, Oxford (1961) 
p. 126; also H. E. P. Lee., Plato The hrrublic (Penguin 
-9 and edition) 
(1955,1964) 182; Penublic 434D3 
, 435B3-8. On the jarallelism between state and soul 
and esreciaily on the-question "which is T, rior, the 
triT)artition of state or the trirartition of soul? ", 
which does not concern us directly. We may add, in 
passin6, of course, the following: F.. d. Cornford, 
IfPsychology ana social structure in the fienublic of 
Pia, to". Classical (1)arterl (1912) VII pn. 241-7-265., 
. iroves 
that the uivision of the state came fii -st 
rather than that of the soul; R. Hackforth, tfThe 
Modification of Plan in Plato's Repubiicli, Classical 
(,, uarterly (1913) VII, p. 265, on the contrary, rcrlying 
to Cornford's assertion, believes that "Plato to have 
had a triTartite psychology in his mind frora the 
beginning of Book II -a nsychology, indeed, which is 
, ýrior to the building up of the rolitical structurct'; R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Plzatols Ronublic, London 
(1964) PP-130-2, are of the same orinion as Hacitforth; 
C. J. Classen, Sprachliche dpiitung, etc., or. elt. iq). 22-23, argues, on the other hand, that the rroblcm 
worth solving is not where the tripartition first 
arrears, but where the larallel between state and soul has its origin. Generally on the question one may 
consult also E. G. Ballard, "Plato's movement from an 
ethics of the individual to a science of narticulars", Talane Stu6ies in Phiiosor, , Vol VI (Studies in Ethics) Tulanne University, New Orleans (i957) pp. 14,15-16 and 
more iýarticuiarly in the excellent article of the late H. W. B Josenh, "Plato's fie. -Iiublic: the comparison 
betweýn the' soul and the state", in Essays in Ancient 
and Modern 
_13hilosonhy, 
Oxford (1935) nr. ý! 2-121. 
2. G. I. A. Grube, Plato's Though , T). 130. 
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the question whether the three-I)arts" or better elements 
or faculties concerned are distinct or identical or the 
same or different? 
1 
Plato., to prove his case, aplies first the so-called 
Law of Contradiction, vid--. the general rrinciple "that the 
same thing can-not act in two orposite ways or be In two 
opposite states at the same time, with resnect to the same 
.2 The . art of 
itself, and in relation to the same object" 
better to illustrate this general ý, rincirle, he e. iscusses 
it at some iength by giving some examplos (standing man, 
moving his head and arms, etc., Re-ublic 4--ý6C9-11 and a neg- . ol 
top, spinning etc., 436D-E etc. ). But the mo., ýt outstond- 
Ing exami, -, le, which better fits and ex-nlains his 1. -, oint., is 
that of a thirsty man. 3 Every thirsty man desires to 
drink 4 but If there is something which holds him back -nd 
forbids him drink., this something, according to the law of 
contradiction, must be an element in the soul other than 
the thirsty impulse. 5 
Remblic 436B5-6. 
2. Ibid. 436B8-9 and 436E9-10; 
Rerublic of Plato, p. 12o". 
3. Cf. Republic 437B7-439D. 
4. Ibid. 439A9-4.39Bl. 
5. Ibid. 439B3-6. 
trans. F. ',:. Cornford, The 
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So far., Plato has pointed out that the elements in thf-- 
human soul are two, different and distinct of each other: 
I 
the rational %principle ( XoyLa-uLx6v )2 with whic'. -, 
the soultAanlLtShle 
'I%rlýr`ational 
appetite ( &XOY Lau6v-uc xu L' 
tInL, 5upr), uL%6v )3 f which is closely connected witliý 
pleasure and satisfaction. 
Plato next turns his attention to the "sririted" 
element in the soul. 
This spirited element ( Oup6c )4 manifested in 
indignation and anger, Is different from the desire or 
avretite and sometimes opposes it. 5 Further, the spirit, 
although akin to reason and its ally, 
6 
nevortheless is 
distinct froal it. 7 
The f(act that the sririt is not identical with the 
reason can be seen either in children or animals, who are 
full of passionate feelings from their very birth, but 
8 nVer become reasonable, or in the man described by 
Odysseus: "StriKes himself on the chest ond calls his 
1. Republic 439D4-5. 
2. Ibid. 439D5. 
3. Ibid. 439D6-8. 
4. Ibid. 439E3 
5. Ibid. 439E6-4,0D. 
6. Ibid. 440E5. 
7. Ibid. 440E8-lo - 441A1-6. 
8. Ibid. 441A7-10 - 441BI-3. 
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heart before to orc: er",, 
' 
where the one element rebukes 
another. 
Thus., Plato has established his case and arrived at 
the concisuion that there are the same three elements in 
the human soul as in the state. 
2 
In adaition, Piato ma., ýces use of his threefold 
distinction of the soul in two other occasions, in a rath(. --, 
summary fashion: (i) in the inter-iretation of the four 
virtues. Here wisdom is of the reason3 and courago of the 
s-, rr)irit., when s-Arit is subordinated and ideally under the 
control of the rational faculty) 4 while self-control and 
temperance exist, when ail these three elements not only are 
in full harmony amongst themscives - without any internal 
conflict whatsoever between the rational faculty and the 
other two, but when all are unanimously agreed that the 
reason should be the ruler and controller of the ar-etito 
through the agency of the siýirited,, 5 Ju-itice, finally, is a 
virtue which is concerned no longer with man's external 
1 Republic 441B4 - 441C1-3; Homer, . 
2Ldyss, 
_g_us, 
Book XX, 17; 
in W. lvv. Alerry, Oxford, ! ADCCCCI, p. 126 n. XXl 17 
p. 124 and in H. L. P. Lee, Plato, the heTlublic, r-193 n. l. 
2. Ibid. 4-, UC5-7- 
3. Ibid. 441E, 1-5. 
Ibid. 441E. 
Ibid. 442CIO-111, Dl. 
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sections, but with man's inward self. ' And (ii) in the 
discussion of )leasure. In Book IX he clearly states that 
each faculty (element) of the soul -not only has its own 
s7ecific pleasures., peculiar desires, but any one of the 
three may govern the soul. 
2 
Earlier, Plato has described the soul as constructed 
of three tý,, artstl or funtions. Now, in the course of the 
discussion of immortality in Book X he advances a now, 
extremely sketchy, and "rather suggested (612A)tt3 argument. 
He argues that we cannot think of the true nature of 
the soul as full of diversity and full of internal conflicts, ' 
as a composite substance5 for such a com,, )osite entity 
6 cannot easily be eternal. He adds besides that if we 
want to have as clear a picture as possible of the true 
nature of the soui, we must view her a-,, )art from the body. 7 
Rerublic, 443c9-10, D ff. 
2. Ibid 58oD6-8; also in 581C5- 
3. J. AuLm, The Republic of Plato , 
2) Vol. II Cýmbridgc (1963 
p. 427 n. on 612B v. 12. , . 
4. Ibid 6llBl-3- 
5. Ibid 611B5-6; COMP- cf. Ph, -, eclO - - 
78c; Plotinus, 
Enneades 1, 1,12, T)lotfn , o, -, i era, Tomus I, ed. by P. Henry et Homs R. Sch-dyzer, Paris (1951). 
6. Ibid 611B5- 
7. Ibid 6llBlO-C i-2 ff; Ph--cdo 82 E. 83D-E, 81C. 
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The apparent disagreement between the above- 
mentioned passages and of the IV and IX books, has been 
interpreted differentiy by various scholars, who, however, 
with a few exceptions, arrive at more or less the same 
conclusion. 
For P. Shorey, the question debated by psychologists 
since Aristotle's time (Eth. Nic. 1102a3l) to the present 
day is unimportant and of a secondary nature, and 
consequently it does not deserve detailed study and 
scientific deve. lopment; it is simply a matter of rhetoric, 
poetry and point of view. 
For some purposes we may describe the elements of the 
soul as distinct entities, for others, we may again treat 
them, not as separate "narts", but as mere aspects of the 
same thing. 
Plato himself was very concious of' this and on 
different occasions iays emphasis on the aspect which suits 
and serves his purpose better. 
Further, he sees no contradiction at all betwoon the 
Rorublic 436AB passage and X 611-12 and Phaedo 68C., 82C. 1 
P. Shorey, Plato, the Rerublic, N. Y. (1930) in LCL, Vol. 1, 
PP-380-1 n. d; Idem. Unity of Platols Though , np. 42-3; Idem. What Piato Said, the University of Chicago Press (1962)--p-. 5)T3- n. on 435BC, where he rereats the same 
observations In other words and gives references in 
differont diaiogues for non-co-itradiction. 
8o. 
Two other eminent scholars, E. Rohde and A. E. Taylor, 
one after the other, give the following explanation: 
E. Rohde, on the one hand, argues that the reason 
which forced Plato to abandon his conceptions of the 
natural trichotomy of the soul into parts., given in the 
Republic and still maintained in the Phnedrus., was "the 
consideration of its immortality and vocation to Inter- 
course with the Divine, immortal and everlasting ( OCTLOV 
xa( 606vaTov Xac &cc 6V ) tt. 
1 Emotions and passions 
are due to the communion of the soul with the body and this 
is proved by reason that if they "were indissolubly linked 
to the soul the latter could never escape from the cycle of 
rebirthsl, 2 and if only the XOYLaTL7t6v "as the only 
independently existing side of the soulit3 passes into 
judgment, then it would not be necessary really for the 
incomposite and uniform soul to attempt a new LvawpdTwaLC 
since this "process implies-materiality and desire". 4 
Taylor, on the other hand, similarly suggests that for 
the philosopher, who earnestly desires the supreme good, 
I 
1. E. Rohde., Psyche, p. 491 n. 29. 
2. Ibid. op. cit. p. 461 n. 29. 
3. Ibid. p. 481 n. 29. 
4. Ibid. p. 481 n. 29. 
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draws nearer and nearer to it every day and "makes progress 
towards the goal", towards his objective, such a theory of 
a tripartite division, of the human soul into distinct parts., 
is of little importance, incomprehensible in many ways and 
t1becomes increasingly impossible". ' 
Next J. Adam, regarding the "so-called lower partst' 
not of the nature of the soul, but "only incidontal to its 
association with body",, clings to a simple, uncompounded 
and JIOVOCL6ý soul. 
2 
The acute critc, Frutiger, applying the traditional 
interpretation, seems to deny on the one hand the 
simplicity of the soul'on the grotinds that (1) he uses the 
lengthy negative periphrases (T-T) &X1jOcaTdTQ y6acL 
instead of using the word 110VOC L671C (2) he takes the 
trouble to tell us that a composite thing can with 
difficulty be eternal and (3) the words ( L; vo-u h4T%j 
tydvT) h (ýUXT) ) allude not to Book IV but to 
Books VII and I. A'. On the other hand, he seems to favour a 
1. A. E. Taylor, Plato, Thc: -v. n his ý4jrk-, pp. 281-2 and n. 1 
J. Adam Plato's Republic, II, p. 426 on 611B v. 8; ibid. 
p. 427 on 611 v. 12; i-b-I"a. p. 428 on 611D V-30; ibid. 
p. 429'on 612A v-3- 
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differentiated unity, capable of immortality. 
1 
Professor W. -K. C. 
Guthrie, moreover, in a very brief 
paper discussing, among other aspects of the soul., also 
the passages Republic IV and X. infers that the soul, for 
Plato., in essence is still simple, and only appears 
composite as the result of its association with the body. 
2 
Frutiger's interpretation and atteMDt at reconciliation 
of the two passages of the R, -. public as indicating a 
differentiated unity soul, though it is ingenious and 
attractive and has some truth in it, nonetheless does not 
remove difficulties involved with it. For this reason, 
we favour the view of those who regard the tripartite 
theory of the Republic as leading towards a simple unity- 
soul. 3 
1. P. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, Paris (1930) P-93. 
It shculd be noted also that Dr. R. H. Hall, Plato and 
the Individuqlý PP-150-1, influencedby Frutiger, as it 
is obvious, insists that a careful analysis of the 
passage (x 611B-612A) will reveal that there is a 
fundamental consistency between it and the account in 
Book IV, if we regard both as presenting at least as 
probable an account of the soul as a complex or 
differentiated unity. 
2. W. K. C. Guthrie, tIPlatols views on the nature of the 
soul" in Recherches sur la tradition Platonicienno 
Entretiens sur l1antiQuitErclassigue, Tome III., 
Geneve (1955) pp. 6-7. 
More reasons for this view we shall give below in the 
general conclusion of the whole tripartite problem. 
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(b) in the Phaedrus. 
The soul's triplicity occurs also in the Phaedrus in 
an extremely sketchy account. Its image is described in 
a myth as foilows: 
The human soul is likened "to the union of powers in 
a team"l consisting of a winged charioteer and two winged 
steeds which he is attempting to drive. In the 
case of gods the driver and the two horses are all good 
and of noble breed, but in the case of other species, and 
most particularly with us men, it is not quite the same. 
The fact that the charioteer has. to arive and rule over two 
steeds of a different strain, one of noble stock and the 
other of ignoble, makes his task difficult indeed, not to 
say wearisome and unmanageable. 2 
This aliegory clearly implies that the charioteer 
stands for the reason, the horse of good stock for the 
spirited element. -and the horse of bad stock for the 
irrational appetite. 
A few pages later he makes use of this analogy in 
R. Hr-ackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p. 67; A. E. Taylor, 
Plato,, P-307 n. 1.5 comments on Phaedrus 246A6-7: 
as follows: 
Itforming a single living whole . ...... It is inserted in order to insist on the unity of the individual mind. 
We are to think of the driver and his horses as a 
single organism". 
2. Phaedrus cf 246A5-B4. 
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I 
order to eiucidate the conflict which is going on in the 
soul of the lover-charioteer. In this struggle., while 
the good horse which is the lover of honour and glory 
combined with modesty and temperance, needs no whip but is 
contolled by the word of command and by reason, its fellow, 
on the contrary, which is deaf, hot-blooded and the 
companion of insolence and wantonness, is conquered only 
with great effort and force, that is with whip and spur. 
1 
Now the new, the startling, point which Plato makes 
here is that he attributes the lower t1parts" to the 
discarnate soul as well. 
2 
We could pass over the tripartite theory of the 
discarnate soulfairly easily on the grounds that the whole 
setting of 246A-253C-254E is "a myth, and rigid exactitude 
of doctrine is not to be expected",, 
3 but since some critics 
dealt with the problem and exnress their own views on the 
issue, following one of the two courses, It is most 
desirable to recapitulate their statements. 
Taylor categorically rejects the idea about tripartite 
discarnate souls and even gods who are never embodied at 
1. Phapdrus, 253 -254E. 
2. Ibid. 24-6A-E, 24SC-249D. 
3. D. A. Rees, "BipLrtition of the soul in the early 
Academy", Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXVII (1) 
(1957) p. 112. 
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all. His reasons are that (1) such a doctrine would be 
at variance with the hints of the Republic and the express 
teaching of the Timaeus, and. (2) we are not allowed by any 
means to draw hard and fast lines on metaphysical theories 
from imaginary tales, from myths, 
' 
Wilamowitz observes that the picture of the 
charioteer of the soul with the two steeds - complicated as 
it is - is only devised for the condition of the soul in 
human life, when it is at its best. He further finds that 
the Divine soul in the Phaedrus is equally complex. 
2 
Hackforth argues that Plato wavers to tho end between 
two conceptions of the soul; the Orphic-Pythagorean notion 
of soul, divine and complete, free from all physical 
functions and the scientific conception of a soul as self- 
mover and source for other things too. 3 He. contrary to 
what A. E. Taylor and WilamowitZ4 said, goes on to say that 
the explicit statement of the Phaedrus about the triDart- 
ition of the human soul before and after its incarnation., 
1. A. E. Taylor., Plato, P-307. 
2. V. 0. Willainowitz, Plato , I., p. 467. 
3. G. E. L. Owen., "The place of the Timaeus in Platols 
dialogues", ClassicCal (garterl . 111.0. Vol. III (1953) P-95,, takes the view thatIthe contradiction in-Timaeus, 
Phaedrus,, 246A ff and Laws 897A is apparent and not 
real. tl Wc avoid the conclusion that Plato "wavered to the end" between these alternatives, if we set the Phaedrus after Timaeus. 
4. See pp. 84 and 85. 
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must be taken "as seriously meant". 
' 
Guthrie, devoting in his recent article a somewhat 
lengthy paragra-ph to the matter, poses a different 
solution. He points to Empedocles as a source for the 
complex eschatological system of Plato, in terms of which 
the soul is seen as essentially divine, but involved in a 
rcincarnational cycle -us a "punishment for sin" - although 
the nature of the sinfulness is left rather vague. The 
Phaedrus,, asserting that this "sin" has cost the soul its 
purity, goes on to describe how it spends ton thousand 
years circling the cycle of punishment., from which it 
cannot be released unless it succeeds in living the 
philosophic life for three incarnations in succession. 
The point is made, however, that a thousand years elapse 
between the start of one incarnation and that of the next, 
so that the greater part of the cycle is actually spent In 
a discarnate state. This makes it impossible to identify 
the soull. s t1impurity" entirely with its incarnate condition, 
and with that alone,, for during its "inter-incarnational" 
period It is still tainted with the stain of the t1sin" 
which imprisoned it within the circuits of the wheel. The 
concept of immortality thus assumes shape quite distinct 
from a more opposition between imprisonment of the soul 
within a body, and the soul released from the bodyts thrall; 
1. R. HacKforth, Plato's Phapdrus, P-76 n. 3. 
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the disability which binds the soul is from within, and the 
soul would never experience a bodily existence if it had 
not by prior sin incurred the punishment of incarnation. 
Here, immortality gains a moral meaning, and no longer 
implies mere durability. 
Guthrie does not acceDt the common statement that the 
psychology of the Phaedo denies the survival in the 
discarnate state of the lower parts of the soul -a 
survival which the. Phaedrus, per contra, asserts. He 
admits that the Phaedo declares these lower parts to be no 
true attribute of the soulls proper. nature, but proceeds to 
point out that we are then told Iltbat a soul that has given 
itself over to bodily desires and pleasures while in the 
body is, when it leaves it, still Permeated by the 
corporeal". This view is found again in the Gorgias., 
which considers the soul as something of a Picture of Dorian 
Gray, marked inescapably with the character of the life Icd 
in the body, a character which, however well it has been 
disguised by the body., becomes known beyond any pretence or 
concealment on death, and on the basis of which the soul is 
Judged. 
Guthrie therefore finds no contradiction between the 
statements of the Phaedo and Plato's other references to the 
matter. He finds it "particularly difficult to agree" with 
Hackforth's conclusion that "even 'pure' soul iso, uýjocjý, 5ý, (. 
and btu-DujiTrvLx6c, as well as XOYLanx6q Ity for he 
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sees the aim, of the philosophic life as being to attain 
beyond the reach of such taints, thus beyond the grin of 
the wheel_, and thus "like unto a god",, regaining the soul's 
original condition. 
Platols imagery is aimed at describing a state of a 
affairs which is known empirically - viz, that the nature 
of man is mixed, good and evil being both present. It is 
not intended to explain this fact, or to indicate the 
origin of the evil aamixture. It cannot, therefore, be 
adduced in evidence for suggesting that the content of the 
image - the chariot and its team of horses - necessarily 
implies anything about the nature of the souls of the gods 
themselves, and whether they are., like those of men, 
peccable. Plato, like Empedocles, is concerned with the 
effects of the condition of sinfulness, rather than with 
that conditions source. He finally remarks that Plato 
turned to a myth in order to illustrate better a religious 
truth which he passionately believed, "but of which noither 
he nor any other man can give a rational explanation". 
' 
1. -W... i. C. Guthrie, "Plato's views on tho nature of the 
soul" In Recherchos sur la. tradiong Platonicienne, in 
Entretiens sur l1antiquite classique, Tome III, 
pp. 10-14. 
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(c) In the Timaeus. 
Timaeusts account concerning the triplicity of the 
soul,, fascinating and fanciful as it is, runs in j-'ar'; - 
respects on the same lines as those of the Rer. ublic. 1 
Here Plato deciares that only the rational part - 
anima rationalis - was created by the Demiurge out of tho 
same ingredients as the world soul. 2 
This part is located in the head3 and alone enjoys the 
4 privilege of being immortal. 
Further, he speaKs of the mortal parts of the soul, 
together with the body itself., as made by the celestial 
gods. 
5 
Now., the apparent bipartition, immortal - divine - 
mortal, becomes tripartite by the analysis of the mortal 
OV-OTOZ ) in spirited and appetitive olement. 
6 
The spirited elemcnt on the one hand, is situated 
A. E. Taylor., A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p*496 n. or. 69C7, finds Timaeusts teaching of the threefold soul 
corresponding precisely t-D that of the Republic, witlý the difference, of course, that the inferior ti-ro rarts I are mortal and iocated in the body. 
2. Tiinaeus 4lD4-El; 69B8-cl-3; comp. also 34BC and 90A5-8. 
3. Ibid. 44D4-6; 45Al-2; 69D6-7, El. 
4. Ibid. 44D5-6; 45AI-2; 69C5-6; 69D5; 69D6; 90Al-9. 
5. Ibid. 42D6-El-4; 69C3-Dl. 
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1,13Y 10, prefers (is in favour 
all the way of). t bipartition: "olov x6 ýtcv u'xoyo\j 
abTýr, ClVaL, To 66 X6-yov E'Xov". 'Q 
go. 
between the midriff and the neck, that is, in the hear. t, 
l 
and the appetitive one is placed in the belly, viz. bolow 
the midriff. 
2 
Platols concluding remarks that what has becn said 
before is provisional and tentative and would be an 
accurate scientific statement if only a god would havo 
confirmed and proved it is, I am inclined to believe, of a 
greater significance and weight than the proceeding 
discussion about the immortal and mortal parts, which, aftor 
all, as has already been noted, is a mythical, popular 
doctrine, as the whole creation is, and belongs to the 
sphere of myth, probable account, rather than to the sphore 
of scientific truth. 
3 
So far, we have been dealing with the threefold theory 
of the human soul as it is set forth most fully in the 
Republic and Timaeus and mythically only in the imposing 
allegory of the Phaeurus. However that may be, we still 
feel something must be said also about the doctrine in the 
Phaedo., the Statesman and the Laws. 
In the Phaedo we cannot trace, I believe, a soults 
division., for Plato clearly speaks of a simple, uniform, 
1. Timaeus ýOA-L'6- 
2. Ibid. 70D7-El-3; the appetitive form belongs also to the 
trees, plants and seeds. Timaous 77AB. 
3. Ibid. 72D4-8; couip. also with PhaedruS 246AI-4 and 
Republic 435CD. 
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incomposite and immortal soul. 
' 
In the Statesiman a vague distinction of a divine and 
a human or animal elemont of the soul occurs. 
2 
Phaedo ý8cl and 8OBl-3; with regard to Phacdols 
teaching on the triplicity of the soul some scholars 
argue as follows: R. H. Ar-cher-Hind ( RX&uwvor, i5aCbwv) 
the Phaedo of Plato, London (* 18942) pp. XXXIII, XXXIV-V 
opposes the division of the soul in general and 
particularly here (in Phaedo) and is in favour all the 
way of a simple and uniform soul. He rejects the 
lower "parts" as different and adopts the milder 
expression "modes of the soul's activity"; Wilamowitz., 
Platon, 1, P-341, that Plato wanted to avoid over- 
loading his exposition; P. Shorey, The Unity of Platots 
Though . and W. &. C. Guthrie, ? 'Plato's views on the 
nature of the soul" in Recherches sur la tradione 
Piatonicienne, in Entretiens sur l1antiouite classique., 
p. 12, maintain that Phaedo, (79BCE ff) does not affirm 
that the soul is simple and uncompounded, but that the 
body is more akin to the composite, and the soul to the 
simple and unchanging; P. Frutiger, Mythes do Platon, 
P-77, on the other hand, holds that the soul was 
composed of three parts, of which one only was immortal. 
He would certainly no have given to this last the 
generic name of &UM nor passed in silence 
completely over th - other two 
(It 
...... ni passe les deux autres entri7rNement sous silencell); R. Hackforth, 
. 
Plato's Phaedo, 'pp. 11-12, notes that the simplicity -and incomposite nature of the soul is categorically 
asserted in the dialogue of the Phaedo. 
2.. Statesman 309Cl-3- J. B. Skemp, Plato's Statesman, 
London (1952) pp. 223 n. l. 229 n. 1 and 239, obser-ves that 
the tripartite psychology1js explicitly supplanted in 
the Politicus". He is followed by J. Gould, The 
Development of Plato's Ethics, Cambridge (19557-nP. 214-5; 
'd. E. L. Owen, Min . N. S. 62 (19 3). pi272 and J. Tate, Classical Review, N. S. 4 (1954 p16, reviewing Skempt, s 
book, speak against his assertion. 
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As far as the division of the. soul in the Laws is 
concerned., it couid be asserted right from the outset that 
Plato says nothing specific there; notwithstanding D. A. 
Rees and T. J. Saunders, the former referring mainly to 
Laws IX 863E-864A5 626E., 630A-B, 689A-E., 696c, 840B-C., 
Magna Moralia I, 1182A 213 ff. Protrerticus, Nic. Eth. IXI 
1168B28 - 1169A3) X, 1177B31 - 1178A3ý Nic. Fth. 1) 13) 
1102A26-28 and De Anima III 432Q24-26, claim that "the L, -ýws 
in fact suggest a bipartition of the soul more naturally 
than a tripartition, as is confirmed by IX, 863E-F64A111 and 
the latter, repeating the same passages again and adding 
some new ones (869E, 93A, 731ABj 717D, 770D and 783A) 
reaches the general conclusion that the soul in thelaws 
can be analysed into the three elements equivalent to thoso 
of the Republic, 
2 
One cannot, I should say, expect accuracy and rrecisior, 3 
1. D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the soul in the Early Academy" 
Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXVII W (1957) 112-18. 
2. T. J. Saunders, I'Soul and State In Plato's Laws". Erangs) 
Vol. LX (1962) PP-37-55i p. 41 (here). See also Rittor, 
. 
Platon, Vol. II, p. 451 where, by referring to I. 644C 
IX. d63B, notes that the Laws treats the soul as tripartite. Ritter does not succeed-in his argumpnt', 
as neither of the above passages proves his voint. (cf 
also in Reest op. cit. p. 112). 
3. This point seems to be admitted by both Rees op. cit. PP-113 and particularly 115, Saunders op. cit- PP-38 and 41. 
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from these general considerations and conclusions, in 
spite of the fact that both paT)ers are very informative, 
interesting and 'Ingenious, for the simple reason that in 
the Laws there is no one single clear statement about the 
threefold soul as in the other dialogues (Republic. Timaeus, 
Phaedrus). 
Coming to the end of our survey of "the problem of the 
tripartite soul? ' which., indeed., ? 'is amongst the thorniest 
of all Platonic problemslt)l and replying to the opening 
question, whether the soul is simple and incomposite or 
composite and compound, we may, now., gcnerally say (1) that 
the human soul is in its true nature incomposite, 
uncompounded and simple ( &ýVvOcToc xal POVOEL6ýC) 
and that the so-called lower two pC-: Arts or elements are not, 
by any means., distinct or real parts, but are, on the 
contrary, its temporary and transitory manifestations, 
mental aspects, activities and rhases, owing their own 
existence in its connection with the corporeality and they 
1. R. Hackforth, Platots Ph-aedrusy P-75. 
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last as long as the soul is related to the body. 
' 
Our -preference for a simple and uncomnounded soul with 
mental energies and activities, while it is connected with 
the body, is based on the following reasons: 
1. It elucidatesinore satisfactorily and throws 
enough light on the issues: soul's - body's relation and 
soulls immortality. 
2. Plato himself hardly uses a word donoting "part" 
in its true literary sense and material force. On the 
contrary, he employs such terms as C L6'0 in 435B2, Cl, 
A view of a simple and incomposite soul with montal, so 
to s-neak, ex-)ressions, impulses, spiritual functions, 
tendencies, faculties, modes, motions or phases, is 
strongly and consistently held by others: R. D. Archer- 
Hind, "On some difficulties in the Platonic r)sychology", 
Journal of Philology, Vol. X (1882) -np. 129-31; J. Adam, 
Renublic., II, p. 426 n. on 611B8; 427 on 611B12; p. 429 
on 612A3; J. L. Stock's "Plato and the trinartite of the 
Soul" Mind, XXIV (1915) n. 218; P. E. More, PIntonism 
(1917ý p. 123; U-V- Wilamovitz., Platon Berlin (1919 1., 
p. 470; C. Ritter, Platon, Munich(19163 I. pp. 22 -7; E. Zeller., Plato and the Older Academ , pp . 389-000; P. Shorey, Unity of Plato's Thought, r. 42; A. E. Taylor, 
The Mind of Plato (paperback) Michigan (1960) rn-RO. - 
83; 
F. U1. Cornford., "The Division of the Soul", in Hibbert 
Journal, XXVIII (1920-30) rp. 213-5; Idem. 
-The 
Poctrino 
of Eros, The Unwritten Philosop Cambrid e F7 
. 
71-; j au6 (1-)a-L9P0(t? iR WVOC ýI; J. eco6wpaxonouXou, cLaaywy'n 
xcCpcvo pý aX6%La) C)aTL6poc, ctaaywYý, &PXaTO XCLC Vý0 Athens (1948) p. 8; H. Gaus, 
Philos, ophischer Handkommentar zu don Dialogen Platos, 
Bern (19 2 1/1 p. 143; H. D. P. Lee, Plato, the henuýlic 
(PC W. k, nguiný p 184; K. C. Guthrie., "Platols viows on the 
nature of the soul', in 
, 
Recherches sur latraditione 
Platonicienne, in Entretiens sur l1antiquite cl_assique, 
pp. 18-19. 
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51 E2,, 439E2, y6v-o 441C4,443D5., in, a metaphorical and 
convenientl way, signifying forms or functions or 
principles of action., not as parts in the material sense. 
The word p6por, is used when the whole trinartite 
discussion comes to an end, and only once in 442B11 and B3, 
which cannot be translated literally "part" as it does not 
suit the context., meaning rather Ifelementt', Iffactor", etc. 
After all., we must bear in mind that Plato never develoned 
a preclse terminology. 2 
We would perhaps do well to remind ourselves of 
his warning that his accounts concerning the triT)artite 
soul are provisional and tentative and that scientific 
precision must not be expected. 
3 
4. It should be noted that Plato's main concern hore 
is evidently the ethical and political theory, not the 
psychology itself, as a special branch of science, or the 
scientific analysis of the mind. He found the tripartite 
division of the soul helpful and according to the 
N. R. Murphy The Internrotation of Plato's Rcrublic. 
Oxford (19407--p-. -33T-; also -in J. Gould, The Devcloný 
of Plato's Ethtcs, Cambridge (1955) D-151 n. 2. - 
2. H. W. B. Joseph., Essays Ancient ýand Modern, p. 48, romarks that "Plato is not i: ledantically rigid in his use of terms It. 
3. Timaeus 72D4-7; Phaedrus 246A3-6; 
zLio4jublic 435CD ff. 
96. 
circumstances, the context and discussion matter he adants 
the doctrine in each dialogue to suit his purpose. 1 
Finally, it might be said that it is held by somo 
2 scholars as a "popular, non-scientific" doctrine, a 
4 flmythicti3 one, "of little im-nortancell, and consequontly 
"too much reliance should not be placed115 on it. 
1. It should perhaps be observed here that the following 
scholars strongly emphasize that point: P. Shorcy, 
The Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 42-43 (168-169); Idem 
Plato's Republic, LCL) P-3el n. d; Idem What Plato Said, 
P-563 n. on 43BC; W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of 
Greek Culture, Vol. II, Oxford (1944) Dr-199 ff) 400 n. 6; A. E. Taylor., A Co-imientary on Plato's Timaeus, r. 496 n. 
on 69C7; G. Grote, Plato and other ComTanions of Socrates, London (1F9-7) Vol'. II, p. 160; C. Ritter, 
Platon, I, p. 227; ' P. Erutigger, Mythos de Platon, p. 81 
n. i; F. Copleston, A History f Philosoph , 1) D. 210. 
2. A. E. Taylor., A Coj,, -mentary on 
Plato's Timaeus, p. 497 n. 
on 69C7; Idem. Plato, p. 2'-Ii. 
P. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 96. 
4. R. C. Cross and A. E. Woozley, Plato's-Republic, p. 127. 
W. F. R. Hardie., A Study in Plato, T)-138- It should be borne in mind here that E. Zeller, Plato and the 01(lor Academ . p. 417 and R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedru p P-75 are of the opinion that the tripartite doctrine is 
unsolved in Platots mind. 
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10. SOUT4-BODY: THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
Corresponding to Plato's metaphysical dualisml is 
his psychological dualism. 
Thus Plato in the Phaodo maintains that the soul in 
every way resembies the invisible ( &(OLUc ), the 
immaterial and everlasting world., while tho body has much 
more affinity with the visible ( 6paT6v ) and bclongs 
to the material world. 
2 
With regard to the soul, we have sald above at length 
what was necessary and we need not renmt what has been 
noted there. 
Dealing here most ?, oarticularly with the question of 
the soul-body relationship., we Luay add, in passing, a note 
about the body itself, as it is described In Platonic 
dialogues. 
In the first place, it is scald that the body is zade up 
of four elements or xinds: - Earth, Firo, Wster and Air. 
3 
This body, because it belongs to the world of' senses and 
materiality, is very like it., viz... human, linblc to death 
and dissolution, manifold, unintelligent, changing and 
1. Phaedo 79A7-8. 
2. Ibid. 79B16-17- 




As far as the relation of the soul to the body is 
concerned, we have to note the following: - 
Whereas the soul gives to the -body the -power to 
breath, and is the cause of its living and its reviving 
force '2 the body, on the other 
hand, is represented 
in the Dialogues as its nrison-house 
or tomb (according to the Orphic Poets) In it, the soul 
is buried in the present life; it undergoes punishments for 
any misdeed, and in it it remains until the penalty is paid. 
3 
In addition, Plato writes that the body is the source 
of evil and exerts an evil influence upon the soul. To be 
more precise, and use his own words; the body and its 
appetites cause disturbance and confusion to the soul; 
they prevent its acquisition of truth and wisdom and its 
pursuit of true being. 
4 
Furthermore, the body and its appetites not only act 
as perpetual impediments to the higher activities of the 
soul, which they fill with passions, desires, fears, 
1. Phaedo 
, 
8OB3-5; Phaedo 106E5-6; Craty 399El-2; 
Axiochus 365E5. 
2. CratYl, 399D11-12, El-3; Phaedo 
* 
105C9-10, D1-5- 
3. Cratyl 40OB10; comp. also with Gorg. 493A3; Phaedo 82E., 91E8,92; Phapdrus C5-6; -Axiochus 365E5-366A. 
4. Phaedo 66A4-7., 66Cl-2,66D5-7) 79C. 
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imaginations of all sorts and foolishnoss, but they are also 
the real cause of war, discord and strife. 
' 
While Plato expressly attributes desires, 
passions, fears, wars and the like to the body and its 
aT, )petites_, 2 in the Philebus, where he develops the doctrine 
of the bodily pleasures and painS3 most fully, he quite 
openly denies this and characteristically remarks that 'fit 
is to the soul that all im7pulse and desire, and Indeed the 
1, determining principle of the whole creature., belong". ' 
One wonders whether we are faced with another real or 
apparent contradiction. 
The whole question has been taken up and worked out 
by a number of scholars, whose argumonts and deductiond 
are generally conclusive and quite convincing. 
Two points emerge from Hackforth's discussion of the 
1. Phaedo 66C2-8; Republic 6llCl-2,611D; Timaeus MB-87B 
and also 82AB. For a full discussion of' Timeaus., see 86B-87B section., which is not without its intracacies; 
see A. E. Taylor, A CommentarZ on Plato's Timeaus, Pn. 599 
ff and more specifically pp. 610-1b; F. M. Cornford, 
Platols Cosmology, T)P. 343-9. 
2. See p. 98. 
3. The above doctrine is exrounded also in Republic IX ý 583B-587c); Timaeus 64. A'-65B; Gorg. 479-3B-494ý; Pbaedo 
-OB3-C7,66c; A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Platols 
Timaeus, pp. 445-65, deals with this doctrine at some length; F. 11M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology., rp. 266-9, 
makes some very brief remarks as well. 
4. Philebus 301-3, trans. R. Hackforth) Plato's Examin- 
ation. of Pleasure (The Philebus) ) Cambridgo (1945ý7.67- 
1100. 
Philebus 3 B: - 
1. , Plato here wished to correct misconceptions which 
might have arisen with regard to the role which both 
soul and body play in Pleasure and desire. 
2. Aithough the 'Philebus spcaks of pleasure., pain and even 
desire as psychical events, 35D1-3 and 55B1-3, other 
passages of the same dialogue, 45A, 46B and cf 41C aný'. 
especially RoT,, ublic 584C (similarly Aristotle sjýcaks 
of bodily pleasures E. N. 1104b53 1154a. 8) cf 1173b7-13) 
where Plato's real belief Is expressed, seem to Imply 
quite the opDosite, namely that desire, -Pleasure, 
pain', are all in the body, are bodily exreriences and 
reach the soul through the body. 
1 
Shorey sees no contradiction at all in so far as the 
nature and seat of desire, rleasure and nain aro concerned 
and reminds us of Plato's statement that only a careless or 
captious rcader would misunderstand him. 
Further defending his case by citing: - 
Philebus '133,34) 43B, C cf; Rerublic 462C. 584C) ef Laws 
673A; Timaeus 451 and again Philebus 39D. 45B; Phaedo 65A; 
Timaeus 64A; Re7ublic 584C. 485D; Philebus 45A, 41C) 436C, 
33D; Timaeus 64ABC; Theat 186C, Shorey reaches the 
R. Hacxforth, Piato's Examination of Pleasure (The 
Philebus), Cambridge (1945) p. 61. -- 
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conclusion that the bodily states produce pleasure and 
pain only when they cross the threshold of conciousness. 
1 
Similarly Archer-Hind finds no disagreement at all 
between Phaedo 66D and Philebus 35CD and holds that the 
apparent discrepancy between the Phaedo and the Philebus is 
reconcilable. In the Phaedo., desires, etc., are attributed 
to the body as the result of the conjunction between soul 
and body; in the Philebus Plato ascribes more carefully 
and precisely the desires etc. to the soul, because they 
are an affection of the soul through the body. 
2 
As we are coming ncar to the cnd of this chapter, one 
unhurried inference could be dravm that Plato thinks of the 
body in general as the tomb) prison-house, enemy of the 
soul, and finally as its source of evil, disorder and 
I. ' P. Shorey, The Unity of Platots Thought,, pp. 45-6 
171-2 n. 32'8-, -330.333- 
2. R. D. Archer-Hind., "On some difficulties in the Platonic 
Psychology1l, The Journal of Philology (1882) X pp-130-1- 
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corruption. 1 
I have not mentioned any other notion of the soul-body 
relationship for I believe there is no other in the 
Platonic dialogues than that with which I have already 
dealt above. However this may be, R. C. Lodge, 
Platols Theory of Ethics, London (1ý28) nP. 175-2163 
produces a different and startling theory of the 
nature and inter-relation of soul and body which he 
charact , erises as 
"thoroughly Platonic" (!!. f) The 
central points of his theory are: 
(1) the nature of the body as an instrument, as 
adapted to sipiritual purposes, 
(2) the function of the soul as director of the body 
to the sniritual ends, and 
soul and body being regarded as correlates. In 
his eýfort to interpret the Platonic nassages in 
such a way in order to suit his purpose, I think, 
he misinterprets them and goes too far in his 
concl, U-Sions. 
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11 DUVIORTALITY OF THE SOUL 
I As we are coming to the end of this section dealing 
with the immortality of the soul., two things stand out for 
consideration: 
The doctrine of the iLimortality of the soul, as it is 
reprosented and set forth principally in the Phaedo., 
ReT-)ublic and Phacdrus, and very briefly and quite 
incidentally, in some of his other dialogues. 
Whether Plato, with what he says about the immortality 
of the soul, proves his case, viz. that the soul 
survives death and continues to be intelligent and to 
exist in some consciousness after the death of the 
individual 
(a) Immortality in the Phaodo. 
Plato., as is well known, discpsses particularly the 
soul's immortality -a theme of universal and Perretual 
interest In the Phaedo. 
His whole theory may be summarised into the following 
Phaedo 70B2-4: (ýC E'CYT L TE h (ývxý &nooav6vToc 
T'LVa HV(XýILV F5-XCLV XCCC cpp6V T)CY LV Tou &Opwhou xaL' 
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three arguments. 
The first of the three arguments (69C-78B) consists 
of two parts, (a) 69C-72E and (b) 72C-78B. 
The first part, the so-called "cyclicalv doctrine, or 
the doctrine of the cycle of oprosites, rests upon the r-; -, birtii 
the physical law of ( y6vcaLC Lý LvavTE'wv ) runs as 
f ollows: - 
Socrates, wishing to prove that the belief in the 
existence of the soul after death and its retention of 
intelligence beyond the grave is sound, adopts and reminds 
Cebes, of the old Orphic doctrine, according to-which souls 
which have come to this world exist in the other, and 
conversely souls come and are born into this world from the 
world of the dead. If that is true, if the living are 
born from the dead, this clearly imnlies that the souls 
must exist in the world beyond. 
' 
Further., Socrates,, noticing that his companion Cobes 
is not satisfied at all with his earlier argument and 
wanting to establish his point, turns Cobets attention to 
2 the whole animal and vegetable world. 
1. Phaedo 70C5-10, D1-5- 
2. Ibid 70D8-9. 
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Here, he makes two points: 
1. that contraries are rroduced from contraries) as from 
bigger to smal. 16r, from stronger to weaker and from 
slower to faster. 1 
2. as there are Pairs of opposites, there must also be 
pairs of two becomings or processes of generation 
from the one to the other and back again. 
2 
Socrates, turning now the discussion to his first 
argument of rebirth or 11cyclely and applying to It the 
previous analogy of the opposites and their bocomings, in 
conclusion demonstrates what in the beginning he had put as 
a problem, that is, the souls of the dead must cxIst in 
some placc from which they will bo reborn. 
3 
The second part (72E-77A) of the first argument 
depends upon the doctrine of &VdPV7JGLC, and on the 
existence of forms which are the objects of reminiscence. 
According to Cebes, Socrates' theory that learning is 
in itself recollection, is another indication that the soul 
is something immortal. 4 
1. PhaedR 71A3-4. 
2. Ibid 71A12-13) Bl-2. 
3. Ibid 72A4-10. 
4. Ibid 72E2-3,73A1-3- 
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Socrates..,. discussing the doctrine of recollection 
once more, finds that the content of sense-perception 
resembles the ideas, although with a certain degree of 
defectiveness. 
This, of course, implies that our limowledge of the 
form of equality must have been acquired before our birth 
(. the sameý could be said for the ideas of the good, the 
1 beautiful, the just and the Holy) 
If these objects (the beautiful and good and all 
reality of that sort) do exist if we relate all the data of 
our senses and compare them to this reality, it must 
follow that our souls do exist before we are born and 
possess intelligence as those principles do. 2 
Further, Socrates places em-, jhasis on the utmost 
significance of the existence of the surreme and absolute 
entities, the ideas for the existence of the soul as well. 
The existence of forms and that of souls before their 
incarnation are interrelated and in onc word stand or fall 
together. 3 Now in view of the first argument (opposite 
1. Phaedo 75B-76cl-9. 
2. I. bid 76P7-g-El-4 and 76C11-13- 
3. fbid 76E4-9 - 77A1-5- 
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from opposite, the living from the dead and conversely) 
the soul must exist also after death. 
2. Second argument from the affinities (78B-84B) 
A. E. Taylor, opening the second argument, writes the 
following: "This argument goes much more to the root of the 
question, since it is based not on any current general 
philosophical formula, but on consideration of the 
intrinsic character of a soul". 
' I 
This is true, because P131to, in order to refute Cebe's 
assertion, that the soul may be dispersed at death2 and 
established the fact that soul survives death, is immortal, 
divine and, as he put it in his own conclusion: "absolutely 
indissoluble (indestructible) or nearly soi,. 
3 attempts to 
prove his argument this time not from outside, but from 
within, namely, from the soul itself, from the nature and 
essence of the soul from a detailed study of its nature as 
a whole and more particularly from its affinities to the 
invisible world., to the unseen order, to the Forms. 
1. A. E. Taylor, Plato, p. 109. 
2. Phaedo 78B5-6. 
3. Ibid 8OB9-10. 
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Since Plato refers us to the soul's affinities to 
universals, to laws and spiritual nrinci-, nles., to his famous 
theory of Ideas., let us see how he develmns this soul's 
relation to the Forms. 
1. While composite things are liable to be srlit uP 
into their comronent parts, the incomposite are not. Again 
composite things are mutable and incomposite constant and C. - 
unchanging, but Socrates says such things, which never admit 
any sort of alteration or undergo any change whatsoever, are 
the Forms,, which at the same time, are invisible and 
intelligible, in contrast to particular things of the world, 
which are ever changing and never constant. 
This leads Socrates' remarks to the point that there 
are two classes of things visible and invisible. This 
distinction again hely; s Cebes to agree with Socrates) that 
the soul is akin to and belongs to the invisible and the 
body to the visible. 1 
2. Again when the soul seeks truth all by itself, it 
passes to that other world of -pure, immortal and 
imperishable Forms; it always remains there, and comes in 
close and constant contact with these unchanging realities. 
Cebes admits that this is another reason which forces us to 
believe that the soul resembles and is more akin to the 
1. Phacdo 78C, D, E - 79AB. 
log. 
everlasting and unchanging being. 
1 
Furthermore, it is in the soul's nature to rule and 
be maste r of the body and the body's always to serve and 
obey. Since it is also the function of the divine to rule 
and to lead and of the mortal to be ruled over and serve2 
it implies then that the soul is like the divine and the 
body like the mortal. 
2 
The result of the whole discussion amounts to Socratest 
affirmation that the soul is vcry like the Forms, viz. 
dývlne, immortal, inteiligible., indestructible and uniform3 
and also it is COMT)1(', telY indissoluble or nearly so. 
4 - 
Between the second argument and the third and final 
one., Plato discusses on the one hand, Simmias's and Cebes' 
objections that the soul is a "harmony" or an llattunetmenttl 
of the bodily constituents which may exist bcfore birth, 
but finally disappear and perish when wp die, and on the 
other hand, Socrates' refutation. 
I do not think we have to make any comment on them, as 
they have nothing to add to our immediate concern. 
1. Phaedo 79D, E. 
2. Ibid 80A. 
Ibld 8OBl-4; seralso 84B2-3. 
4. Ibid 80B9-10. 
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This implies that we must deal with the third and 
last argument. 
3. The crowning and final argument (102A-107A) 
relatively long, and with its difficulties as stands, is 
based also on the existcnce of the Forms and could be 
expressed very briefly as follows: 
Socrates proves the genercal rrincipal by means of 
analogies of tallness - shortness, hot - cold, snow - fire, 
even - odd, that OT-, [)osites exclude each other, cannot 
coalesce with one another or arise out of one another. 
In other words, neither a transcendent idea not a form-cony, 
an immanent character, can take upon itself the nature of 
its opposite. 
1 
Socratcs, now applying the already established 
princi-ole, argues that life is a necessary concomitant of 
the Presence of a soul) the vehicle of life) for soul isy 
by definition, that which gives life to the body. Hence 
the Soul will not ad. -arit death and consequently since it 
excludes its opposite., death, we may call it "immortal" 
deathless UdvaTov )2. 
Plato, discussing a further point, that of 
1. Phaedo 102B-105B4. 
2. Ibid 105B5-E. 
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imperishability or indestructibility 
1 in the remainder of 
Phaedo 106A-E. This additional examination of the 
indestructibility of the proposition soul has variously 
been connected, inter7reted by different scholars: 
Williamson,. E, haedo (1904) commenting on 105E7, writes: 
"It is a very curious turn of logic by which Plato, 
having arrived at the conclusion that QuXI"AdvaToc 
and wishing to nrove that It is also 
Wheopoc assumes, for the rurrose of his proof 
the very point he is proving, viz. that T6 WdvaTov 
Xac 0600pov haTtv ..... The step from 
AdvaTor, 
to Wxcopoc is unwarranted. It may have 
probability on its side, but logically it is worthless"; 
qtd. by R. S. Bluck, Platols Phaedo, r. 188. J. Burnet, 
Plato's Phaedo, Oxford (1959) n. on 105ElO holds that 
the AdVaTov is, ipso facto &WAPOV 
also L. Robin, Phaedo (Budeled 194') n. on 106D. 9 
remarks, "non-mortal ... est par definition indestructable"; A. E. Taylor, Plato, r. 206, argues as 
follows: "He is not actually called on to argue this 
fresh voint, since his auditors at once assert their 
conviction that if what is 'undying? is not imTerish- 
able, nothing can be supposed to be'so, whereas there 
are, in fact, imperishables, such as God and 'the form 
of life'. Thus in the end, the imperishability of the 
soul is accepted as a consequence of that standing 
conviction of all Greek religion that A WAyToy = 
A Mov . T6 UyOapTov". Next Prof. J. B. Skemp, The theory of Motion in Platols later-Dialogu6s, 
p. 8,4 -it a Nbiatant retitio princirli". 
R. Hackforth, Pidtols Phaedo, p. 164, sees "at 106D on 
the surface, no more than a rhetorical flourish which 
dismisses the question at issue as if it should never 
have been raised; but it may be that beneath the 
surface there is an anneal religious faith if the soul 
is deathless it is divine and therefore aMov 
everlasting". Finally, R. S. Bluck, ibid, discussing 
the whole question of imperishability in a (very) brief 
appendix, PP-188-194, quoting the rrevious scholars and 
some others and complaining against some of them as 
treating the roint under consideration in a "cavalier 
fashion" (P-194) makes the point that the implication 
of the rresent arguement and the kernel of the last 
part of this final proof of the soulfs indestructibility, 
is that destruction is a contradiction of soul &. 193). 
Further, The whole proof that the soul's &v6Xc0poc 
like the particular of the admissibility 
or non-admissibility of opposites and hence .... uDon his theory Forms ... ." 
WA94). Furthermore, he Is of the opinion that "Plato regarded this final proof as 
_______, _both 




the present argument, infers categorically and firmly that 
the soul is deathless, imuortal and imperishable and that 
our souls will exist in the other world. ' 
With the reference to the Phaedo's preceeding 
arguments for immortality, it may perhaps be said that they 
are not scientific proofs in the true sense of the word and 
are very puzzling and hard to follow, though intelligent 
2 in philosophical study and research. However, it is, I 
believe with Eodier, incontestableý that if one admits the 
theory of Iaeas, they are conclusive, and that if it is 
true that the old theology had inspired Plato to belief in 
immortality., "it is not the least matter that he has made 
his own in establishing thus validly these most fundamental 
doctrines. from his point of vieV the immortality of 
reason is validly demonstrated". 3 
,, yt)Xý &^5'\)auo\j xa' Phaedo 106E9,107A: Lp CL L &V6XCOPO\J XaC 
qLC 
IL60W, 
4 TCO OVTL E"GOWML T)UMV aL YUXOL' "V " 
comp. also 106EI-'8. It must be noted hero that Simmias 107B remains still in doubt about their 
assertions concerning the soul's immortality. To his 
doubts, Socrates recommends a fuller and more thorough 
going examination of the matter. Socrates' suggestion here does not imply that Plato himself doubted the 
validity of his previous arguments. 
Nemesius, de Nat. Homi. n. C. 2., 10-55p. /124, 
G. Rodierý Los preuves dr -Itimmortalite d'arrýs Ile Phodont, Etudes de philosoyýhie Grequol, ý Paris (1957) 
p- 154. 
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(b) Immortality in the Re-nublic. 
In the Fe-public, Plato produces a now, straight-forward 
and persuasive proof, which must be rather regarded as a 
supplementary one to the already existing nroof in the 
Phaedo of the inmiortality of the soul. 
According'to this new argument nothing can be 
destroyed and perish except by its ol-m specific and 
peculiar evil or disease, by its ( a6pyuTov xux6\) %aC v6anpcx) 
for example, ophthalmia for the eyes, disease for the body 
in general, mildew for grain, etc, 
1 
Now the sreciai evils or vices of the soul are 
injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But these 
do not destroy the soul at all; far from it, as exrorience 
shows that the truth is surely just the opT"Nosite; they 
fill the wic. Ked and unjust man with life, vigour and 
vitality. But if the particular evil or wickedness of the 
soul is incarable of diminishing and destroying it. 2 then 
we may safely arrive at the natural conclusion that the 
soul must exist for ever and since it exists for ever the 
logical sequence demands that it must be immortal as well. 3 
1. Renublic 609A. 
2. Ibid. 609B9-61OE10. 
it 6ý%O\j 8, rL &\jdyXT) cfb'rO &F-C OOV F-T\)CLLIO 3. Ibid. 611A1-2: T) 
E'; W&C L' 8V, &06\JCLTC)V" 
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(c) Immortality in the Phaedrus. 
In the Phaedrus, the argument for inmortality is 
stated and re-,, resented in a general and dogmatical, so to 
speak, way and relies on the conce-ýtion of the soul as 
scif-mover ana originator of all movement and consequently 
of all life. 
The self-mover., Plato argues, never leaves its motion, 
never abandons its own nature. It is the source and 
origin (beginning) of' motion for all other things that are 
not self-moved. In addition, it is ungenerated, that is, 
without source or beginning, and indestructible and 
immortal. 
But these same attributes may easily and precisely 
apply to the essence and the very idea of the soul. 
1 
Now if this analogy is correct', namely that which 
moves itself is nothing else but soul, then an unhurried 
inference is deduced that soul is ungenerated and immortal. 
A parallel concertion of the soul, as we have already I 
said., as the self-moved source of all motion, we find also 
in the tenth Book of th-e Laiý, -s and more sTecifically in 
Laws 894,895 and 896. However, we must remark with 
Haczforth that here the "indestructibility of the soul is 
1. Phaedrus 245C5-246Al-2. 
2. Ibld 246Al-2: &, v6Ly; jnr , 
&ybiTyý6v cc xa6 &, Mlva'uov 
(ýVV) 6V Clbo" . 
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not explicitly asserted but the conclusions of the 
Phaedrus argument are clearly implied. 111 
Arart from the above mentioned dialogues, on6 hardly 
finds any ciear view about the soul-Is immortality in the 
other dialogues of Plato. It could be said that the Q, 
Meno and the Timacus, and the Symposium contribute some- 
thing. But if we like to look at them a little closer we 
shall notice that these dialogues do not contribute very 
much to the problem we are investigating. 
The Meno, for instance, examines the rre-existence and 
i=ortaiity of the soul only with reforance to tho doctrine 
t 
of recollection and a rrior knowledge2 but such an 
argument, which is completed later in tile Phagdo, hardly 
withstands any criticism and "survives logical scrutinyit. 
3 
Ap to the Timacus, it should be observed that no 
serious student of Plato could exrect to trace any concrete 
and solid material concerning the immortality of the soul, 
other than that which has already been noted, viz, the 
mythical distinction of the immortal part of the soul 
1. R. Hacrforth) PIAols Phaedo., p. 23. 
2. Meno 80D ff I 
81C ff and the inference 86BI-2: 
"bbx: o-uv Ct &CC h &Xý-acLa hpL\) Toýv 5VTWV ECT(V ýv 
1ý OXT)o &OdVaTOC 6V h ýVXIO CILIT)" ... 
3. R. Hackforth, P1,9to's Phaedo, p. 19. 
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fashioned by the Demiurge (41D) and (69C2) mortal parts 
created by the celestial gods (42D), and the location of 
the three parts in certain organs of the body, i. e. the 
immortal situated in the head., the snirited in 
the heart and the appetitive part in the belly (69D-70E). 
The Symposium next, seems to recognize only the 
immortality of procreation and the subjective Immortality 
of fame. ' It does not recognize personal immortality, 
only a "vicarious survival., not an Immortality of the 
Sym-posium 20M 20BA7-81 B1-3; 212A6-7. 
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personal self". 1 
Before we reply to the second question dealing with 
the soul's survivallafter death, we must make some general 
remarks on two points: - 
1. Whether the immortality of the soul refers to the 
entirety of the soul or only to its rational Dart. 
2. What is the precise meaning of TuXý nuaa &OdvaTor. 
(Phaedrus 245CB). 
R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, p. 20. It must be 
further noted that'Hackforth., "Immortality in Platoo 
Symposium" in Classical Review, LXTV ( 19 50)', ) P- -3 -3 ip and again in Iiis Platots, Phaedo, pp. 20-21, maintains 
that t1the Symposium shows'us a relapse into temporary 
scepticism; it drops the claim that soul, collective 
or individual, is imperishable"; comp. also G. 1 , 
q. A. 
Grube, Plato's Thought, p. 149, note on Symposium K5C, 
208C; J. V. Luce. ' in his reply to Hackforth "Immort -al- 
ity'in Plato's Symposium" in Classica-1 Review, N. S, 11 
(1952) PP-137-41 (PP-135-7 here) isagree Is iýi-',, h 
Hackforthts view and holds that there is not cleavage 
between Phaedo and Symposium on the tmmortality o: ' the 
soul. He further remarks that their apparent incon- 
sistencies are reconcilable when one remembers that 
the Phaedo lays more emphasis on the immo. -tality of 
OEC? l ýUx 6VOPW and 
the Symposium on the 
ality of 
1he 
TE ['V'O y6a L r, ; He is followed"in 
his view by R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo., p. 28 n. 1; 
Prof. H. Cherniss, in a note in "ýlcassical Review, N. S. 
111 (1953) P-131) points to Laws 712BC., ths by itself 
proving the invalidityll of Hackforth's-conclusion and 
as alluding to a personal survival. , Two othe-- inter- 
preters of Plato, A. B. Taylor, Plato, p. 228 n. 1, on 
the one hand, insists that there is not a single word 
in Symposium which speaks of the perishabilýty of tjo 
soul; I EuxquTpýc, 11X6Twvoc Eupn6aLOV; CL L1. E %) 0V 
ýY) C'UAthens (19509 pp. 210-11 n. l., distinguishes bebween 
. 
6ivine and human immortality and sees no disagg. -comen. 
or discrepancy between Symposium and Phaedo. 
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For the first point we say this. Consistent with what 
we have earlier said about the soul., as being simple, 
uniform and incomposite, but in connection with the body 
assuming certain phases (LnL, 5U[ITjTLx6v OupocL66r. ) 
which are temporary and only exist as long as they are 
connected with the body, we shall do well to note that the 
immortality applies to the entirety, wholeness of the soul, 
as a rational and spiritual entity, as a vital nrinciple 
and acting force. 
1 
R. K. Gaye, The Platonic Conception of Immortalit 
PP-371 41) dealing with this point refers to 11ir. Archer- 
HindIs '? On some difficulties in the Platonic PsycholoC--rli 
Journal of Zhaldlogy) X (1882) pp. 120-131 cf 129-31; 
Phaedo (Ib944) London, pp. XXXII-XXXVII; and concludes 
that is'is as a single nature that soul is immortal; 
W. C. K. Guthrie., "Plato's views on the nature of the 
Soullf, Recherches sur la traditione Platonicienne, -i Entr(itiens'sur liantiguite classiqu , Tome III., p. 19 
and J. Adam., ' The Republic of Plato., II., p. 427 n. on 
611B12 are of the opinion that soul in its true nature 
is the highest part., the XOYLCTL%6v and this 
XOY LCT Lx6v alone is perfect, divine and immortal. 
K. F. Hermann takes up this point in his instructive 
dissertation: "Praemissa est disputatio do -, artibus 
animae immortalibus secundum. Plat . onemll., in Index 
Scholarum,, publice et Privatium in Academia Georgia 
Augusta per semestre hibernum, anni YiDCCCL-, MDCCCLI 
A-die XV., Octobris usque ad XV Martii,. habentarum, 
Gottingae, pp. 8-9; and claims that Plato intended to 
represent only the rational part as immortal and the 
other two parts as mortal. He is charged by G. Grote, 
Plato and the other Companions of Socrates, London 
(1667) 14 p n. a., that he failed to realize that 
Plato, when he used the various pass, -iges, sometimes 
held one language, sometimes the other, and that there 
is a big discrepancy between Phaedo and the other 
Platonic dialogues. 
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The exact meaning of OXT) aca which troubled I 7M 
and embarassed both ancient and modern scholars is 
particularly discussed by Frutiger and Hackforth at some 
length. The former, while he examines the usage of IUC 
with and without the article, finally rejects it as 
involving us in difficulties and leading us nowhere; he 
adopts the distributive meaning and characteristically 
wants to see ýuXý nUaa translated not Into naaa h ýUxf) 
but into 1'every soul"y parallel to its correlative TEav 
aMpa. "In conclusion, is it not very 7robable 
that (ýVxý 11aaa ought to be translated, not in the 
same fashion as naaa h ýuXý from which it differs 
grammatically, but conformably to nUv a-w[ta, -its 
correlative, that is to say for each soul, no matter which 
soul? Ill 
The latter, on the one hand, argues that there is no 
distinction here between collective and distributive senses 
before Plato's mind 
2 
and, on the other hand, he Drefors 
the rendering of OXý ndaa UdvaTOc. into "all soul is 
immortal, because the collective sense is that rrimarily 
1. C. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, P-134. 
2. R. Hackforth, Platots Phaedrus, p. 64. 
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demanded by the logic of the argument". 
' 
Further, whereas Hackforth admits that the Phaodrus 
argument, 245C-246A, cannot be regarded as a direct 
argument and 32roof for the Immortality of individual souls, 
he is convinced., "that Plato regarded any d, --monstratlon of 
the immortality of 'soul' In general as aprlicable to 
individual soulsit. 2 
The whole question of the Individual's immortality is 
well stated in the words of Gaye: '? So f ar as rersonal 
immortality is concerned, it supplies at most a negative 
argument; that is to say, it creates a cortain nresum-ýtlon 
in favour of ý, ersonal immortality In so far as it tends to 
inv"-lidate the -popular view of the finality of death. 
There is certainly a sense in which the soul survives the 
. death of the individuai E111OXOvi but whether this 
soul continues to exist as a conscious nersonality isy of 
course, a different question) and there is nothing in the 
1,, roof of iamortality which we have been considering that 
R. Hackforth, 
is in favour 
it nav arova ývXf) ixaaa 
anproximatin A 246B". 
, 
Platofs Phaedrus_, p. 64 n-3; J. B. Skemp, 
P-3 n. l. 
of the collective translation and wrItes: 
at 245E4 .... seenis the counterrart of here and both seem to ave a meaning 
g to Tt-dcya h ýUxf 
ka 
and TE "J 'ý6 "(W(Ov 
2. R. Hackforth,, ibid. pp. 64-65. 
121. 
can be said to furnish a direct argument in favour of it 
From whatever source he may have derived his 
justification for believing in personal immortality, there 
can be no doubt that he did believe in it, and moreover 
that he considered the proof that all soul is immortal" to 
give some support to the belief". 
1 
Furthermore, it should be observed that the myths of 
Phaedo, 107C ff. Republi 614 ff, Gorgias 524 ff, assume 
individual immortality. 
R. K. Gaye, The Platonic Concention of Immortalit , P-39- A. E. Taylor's view on personal immortality, Plato, p 207ynlj 
is quite convincing and worth quoting: "If the quesiion 
is asked whether the faith defended in the Phaedo is a 
belief in 1personalf immortality, I can only reply that 
though the'language of philosophers was not to acquire 
a word for 'personality', for many centuries the faith 
of Socrates*is a belief'in the immortality of his ýuXý 
and by his ýuXý the seat or supDositum 
of all we call 'personal character and nothing else', ftendence of the soul' is precisely what we call the development of moral * rsonalitylt. G. M. A. Grube, 
. 
Ej1ýato1s_Thoy&ht, p, 149eand B. Bosanquet, A Co'mranion to 
Platots 
- 
Renubiic., p. 406-7. argue that the soul's immortality involves comDlete loss of personality together with a merger of the rationafelement with a world or cosmic mind or soul. One wonders whether 
such views do not lead towards a pantheistic inter- 
pretation? MN A reply refuting their mistaken assertion is'that of R. D. Archer-Hind, The Phaedo of Plato, p. XXXII: "Plato knew very well that neither he 
nor anyone else could demonstrate the immortality of Individual souls, yet he was strongly disposed to believe .... that every soul on its senaration from the body will not be reabsorbed in the universal, but will survive as a concious rersonality even as it 
existed before its present incarnation". 
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Arriving at the end of this chaptery we must draw a 
conclusion by replying to the second question3 the survival 
of the soul after death; but what kind of infentilce may 
be 
deduced from the above Dages? The answer lies in 
HackforthIs words: III believe that both Rerublic X and 
Phaedo., he (Plato) thinks he has 7roved it; in Phaedo 
particularly the re7, -eated use of &no6T)xvUvaLj %6yov 
6L66vaL 
and the like ...... tazen together with 
Socrates' emphatic 
conclusion at 106E navT6r, [IUXXov ýuXý &Odva-rov xat 
&v6XEOpov 
xaC cCj o'vTL EcrovTaL ýIiM\j at ýUXCLC b) 
"AL(SOU 
seems conclusive, despite Socratest encouragement of 
"honest doubt" at 107B. The final argument of Phaedo no 
less than Phaedrus appears, however, to regard personal 
immortality as a corollary of the immortality of ". soul". * 
For Plato the immortality of the soul in general and 
of the individual particularly, was not a -ý. ious hore and 
an% thical postulatell. -- 
2 On the contrary, it was a firm 
belief, a strong and unshaken conviction, a certainty and 
reality, a serious problem, which urges us to accept it, 3 
1. R. Huckforth, Platols Phaedrus, P. 65 n. l. 
2. P. Shorey, The Unity of-Platols Thou gh , p. 40 
(or 166). 
3. C. Ritte The Essence of Platols Philosophy3 PP-119,301- See also a very interesting and illuminating article of the Rt. Hon. Sir P. Duncan, "Immortality of the soul in Platonic Dialogues and Aristotlet' in Philosorhy Vol. XVII (1942) London, rp-304-323., where'he trie's to Justify and endorse Ritterts conclusion as "irresistablelt. 
123. 
but not a dogma,, 
' a fundamental and very im-,. ortant issue. 
2 
Thus Plato passionately and firmly belived not broadly 
in the unseen, in the spiritualp in the ideal, but in the 
immortality of the soul and more particularly in rersonal 
immortality, self existence after death and survival with 
full conciousness and continued self-identity. 
E. Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, ,, ). 397,408 on the 
other hand argues that the doctriH-e- of the immortality is the 
point, the strictly dogmatic signification of' which 
can least be doubted. "Not only in the Phaedo but in 
the Phacdrus and Rerublic too, it is the subject of a 
comr, lete philosophic demonstration ...... but also in the strictest scientific enquiries? '. 
2. Imrortant and fundamontal, yes, but not to the extent 
which M. F. Sciacca, "Il problema dell1immortalita 
dell'anima et metemrsicosin Platonelt, Studi Sulla 
filosofia antica., Napoli (1935) p. 221, would have it 
when he write hat the whole of Plato's rhilosophy 
addresses itself to the rroblem of the immortality of 
the soul and of the destiny of man. IfDopo cio el 
ovidente, che attorno al 1)roblema delltimmortalita 
delifanima cal destino dell1nomo si articola tutta la 




ST. PAULI S THEORY OF THE HUMPOI. 50UL'. -O-DITS 
II-4MORTALITY. 
Preliminary Remarks. 
It is customary and fashionable for everyone who 
deals with St. Paul's theology, and more particularly in 
our case with his psychology or anthropology, to preface it 
with something about its difficulties. 
Since a great decal has been written by others which we 
do not wish to repeat here, we turn right away to our 
i&mediate task, which is to investigate the real meaning -and 
nature of the human soul and its immortality in St. Paul's 
mind, as we dict with Plato. But we must say from the 
beginning that our task in discussing it is not an easy one. 
On the contrary, it is extremely difficult to trace the 
soulf. s true meaning, for two simple reasons: 
1. 'the word j2syche is not of very frequent occurence 
125. 
in Pauline letters. ' 
2. He uses other parallel synonyms and interrelated 
terms of equal and great importance (or even of greater 
significance, i. e. nve-Upa ) such as nvc-Upa, cyMpa7crdp& etc. 
However, if we wish to get the best possible picture 
of the Pauline human soul, it is of the utmost necessity 
to consider the above terms as well. Thus our inquiry 
may come under the following headings: - 
Psychological terms or anthropological concepts. 
12. TuXý or Soul; a note on Imago Dei Gen. 1.26,27 and 
Gen. 2.7. 
13. rivc-Upa or Spirit; a note on TuXLAc-I1vcupaTLx6c. 
14. Mpa or Body. 
15. Trichotomy? Some general remarks on 1 Thess. 5.23. 
16- A---CbMiA9ratlviT-Llf'A-t4 resurTectierniýody-Llyfil-;. ý', ' 
'35`58 and' 2 Corinthians 5.1-10. Corinthians 15. W 
H. W. Robinson, I'Hebrew Pyschology in relation to 
Pauline Anthropology1l, Mansfield College Essays) 
London (1909) p. 279-80; ItThe most significant point 
in regard to" , psyche 
(continuing nephes ) is the limited 
use of the term'made by Paul"; also in hi The Christian Doctrine of Man., Edinburgh (192653 5.108- E. D. W. Burt6n. 
-Spirit, Soul and Flesh, 
Chicago (1918) 
p. 1886-7, ".. Yug? T- is now much less frequent than 
either; R. Bultmann, The Theology of the New Testament, London (1965) 1) p. 203., ' 11the term psyche (Soul) .... occurs relatively seldom'in Paul" W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, London (1965i p. 121: "The first fact thdt'emerges-u-nder this'heading is the'infrequency 
of the word"; The Expository Times, Oct. 1965 - Sept. 1967., Vol. 68 p-1 notes of recent exposition., "In St. Paul the important term is not Soul, which occurs comparatively seldom in his letters but spirit (pneuma)". 
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12. TYXH OR SOUL. 
The very infrequency of the occurence of this term 
in St. Paul (13 times., against the disproportionate use of 
nvct)ýLa ) makes it difficult to reach a firm 
conclusion as to which of its various uses gives the best 
clue as to the word's real meaning and) indeed, to 
distinguish clearly from each other the uses themselves. 
In view of this fact, we are invited to build up 
St'. Paul's theory of the soul exclusively on the 13 
passages. 
For a better understanding, clarification, and 
clearer view, we may classify these passages according to 
their own various meanings and connotations into three 
groups., as follows: 
(a) Soul C-. s life, vitality., life principle. 
(b) Soul as the seat of the feeling, will, emotion 
and thought. 
(c) Soul as individual. 
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(a) Soul as life, vitality, life principle... 
The meaning of the word psyche, which denotes life) 
life-principle, vitality or principle of the physical 
life., "without psychological content'll occurs in Pauline 
letters 6 times. 
In Romans he twice uses the word psyche instead of 
life. In 11-3. where he freely and no doubt from memory 
quotes 
2 the LXX I Kings 10.10,14ý 183 and he recalls 
Elijah's words that they are seeking I'my life"- 
and in 16,4, he speaks about Prisca and Aquila his fellow- 
workers, who risked their own necks to save his "life". 
Further passages are, e. g. "For he (Epaphroditus) 
nearly died for the work of Christ, risking his life to 
1. H. W. Robinson., I'Hebrew psychology in relation to Pauline 
anthropology" in Mansfield College Essays, p. 280; idem 
The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 10b. 
2. F. I. Leenhardt, The Epistle to the Romans, London (1961) 
. pp. 278-9. 
3. F. Godet, CommentarX on St. Paults Epistle to the 
Romans., Edinburgh (lbbl) Vol. ' 2, p. 224; also W. ' Sanday 
and A. C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary 
on the Epistle to the Eomans., 'Edinburgh (ICC) (18985)' 
p-11; William Barclay, The Letter to the Romans, 
Edinburgh (1960) P-155; C. X. Barrett, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, London (1957ý -p. 20d; F. I. 
Leenhardt, ibid. p. 278; F. F. Bruce, The Epistle of Paul to the Roman_s,, London (1963) p. 213; P-M-J- Lagrange., St. 'Paul--Epttre aux Romains., Paris (1950) 
ýj268- V Taylor, The Epistle to the' Romans, 'London 
955ý P-ý3; K. Barth, 
-The 
Epistle to the Romans, 
Londori (1933) P-395. 
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complete your service to me? '; 
11 fiso .... were ready to 
share with you not only the gospel of God but also our 
own selvesIt. 2 must be understood and interpreted exactly 
in the same way as in their own preceding context. 
There remain two other cases, the words "The first 
Adam became a living soultO are taken from Gen. 2.7 and 
-ft 
are an exact translation of the Hebrew-jý 
In 2 Corinthians]-23 St. Paul in a very emphatic and 
solemn statement appeals to God to witness on his psyche 
why he did not visit Corinth not because of caprice or 
cowardice or selfishness but out of consideration and 
compassion towards them. The exact translation of the 
word psyche is slightly problematic here, as there are 
Philip. 2.30 RSV; comp. also with I'latth. 2.20; 
6.25; 
10-39; 16.25; 20 . 28; Mar 
8.35-36; Luke 12.20-23; 
John 10.11; 15-17; 12.25; 13.37; Acts 5.26; 20.10-24; 
27*10; 22; 1 Pet. 4.19; 1 John 3.16; Apoc. 12.11. 
2.1 Thess. 2.8; RSV; I'Vulg. " etiam animas nostras"; AV 
"our own souls"; NEB "our very selves"; JB 'four 
whole livestf. 
3.15.45 " WvF-To 6 7xPw-Toc 'A6(ip ctr, OXýv ZMCFCLV" 
ing being"; Vulg. "animam viventem"; AV 
"a 'living soul"; NEB "an animate being"; JB "a living 
: ýOulft. 
4. It must be noted here that we do not fully discuss the 
ineaning of living soul ( (ýuxý ýWa ) for we are 
going to consider it later in a special additional note 
at the end of this chapter. 
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different renderings of the original. 1 Moreover, Stacey, 
while he does not rule out other possible translations, is 
in favour of "life? ' as the most likely here. 
2 
From the above, it becomes clear that when St. Paul 
spealks of the word-psyche, in the preceding examDles he 
simply uses it to express., as It has been already said, 
life, life-principle, vitality, principle of the physical 
life. 
AV "upon my soullf; RSV t1against mell; NEB "I stake my 
life upon itt'; , Aoffatt and ES "against my Soul"; 
also Vulg. ItIn animam meamll. Aug. I'super.. anto-am meam" 
quoted in A. Plummer,, 2 Corinthians, '(ICC) p. 43. 
2. W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, p. 122; R. V. G. 
Tasker, 2 Corinthians, Tyndale Press, London (1958) 
p. 49. It apipears from his comments on 5.23, as if he 
inclines to the RSV rendering. 
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Soul as the S 0 
To the use of the "soul" as the seat of the will., 
feeling, St. Paul refers us only in three cases. He 
exhorts the slaves to do the will of God, not in the way 
of eye-service as men pleasers, but heartily, with 
singleness of heart, "not grudgingly or formally, but ex 
2 
animo, with recadiness of heart'?. 
' 
as servants of Christ. 
In Col. 3.23ý, the same exhortations are rereated and 
the meaning of tx TuXTc, is similar to that of Eph. 6.6. 
The -oresence of the ýv ývc nvcýJIUTL in the same 
sentence (Phil. 1.27), ' makes the [tLa YuXý, susceptible 
of more than one meaning. AV and RSV have it "in one 
spirit, with one mindtf and NEB., "one in spirit, one in 
mind". Chrysostom compares it with ItIcts 4.4,, 11 ýv 
xap6ta xa( h ýuXý ýtta and with Theodore of 
1-S. D. F. Salmond, The Er)istle to the Enhesians in EDT 
(1903). D-378. 




Mopseuestia joins pLZI (PuXig with H. W. 
Robinson considers that it means "desiret, 
2 and R. Smith 
treats it as lllifett3. Bultmann and Stacey elaborate and 
add a few lines more on this point than the previous one. 
Here is what they say one after the other: "The phrase 
'with one psyche' (lirce in one spirit) means in agreement 
i. e. having the saine attitude or the same orientation-of 
will; and there is no difference between psyche here and 
other expres§ions that mean tendency of onets will, one's 
intention (cf. I Cor. 1.19 funited in the same mind - 
nous - aiad the same judgment'). Words compounded with 
the root psyche, indicate the same thing. Sym-psychos 
faeans Ibeing in agreetaent' (of one mind) Phil. 2.2 RSV; 
the isops chos (Phil. 2.20) is the like minded, Eunsychein 
The of good cheer., hopeful, confident, (Phil. 2.19), offer 
also in H. A. A. Aennedy, The Enistle to the 
Philipnians (MT) London (1903). p. 4 3 n. on 5.27; 
M. R. Vincent., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on 
the Epistles to the PhiliDpians and to Philemon 'ýICC) 
Edinburgh (1.697) PP-33-4 n. on 5.27 connecting on 
-lie ýtLq (pUX-Tj and regarding it as "the mind as 1. 
seit of sensation and desire, on the contrary suggests. 
that I'Here[LLa ývVg is not to be construe; d wich 
a, UT)%C. Ut but only with cTu%ja-&XOZvTEC"- 
2. "Hebrew Psychology in relation to Pauline Anthror), --)iogy" In Mansfield College Essays, p. 280; Idem The Christian 
Doc7trine of Man, p. 10b. 
3. R. Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Man, P-138. 
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a somewhat different nuance. It does not mean the 
willing of something, it is true, but it does also. 
express the intention element of that vitality which is 
denoted by nsychell. Stacey on the other hand remarks: 
I'The key is that it is meant to emphasize Lv ývC nvc6jiaTL. 
Paul wanted a word that would repeat the sense of nvetpa 
and he used Oxý because in one sense nvcvjýta 
and ýUxýj are synonyms. In doing so, he draws 
into a meaning which it does not usually bear, but which 
.2 n\jcupa often bearst' 
In three other instances the word psych stands for 
everyo ne, for the living person, for the self and the like. 
3 
1. R. Bultmann., Theology of the New Testament, I, pp. 204-5. 
2. W. D. Stacey, The Pauline Doctrine of Man, T)P-122-3; 
F. W. Beare The Eýistle to the Philippians in BTqTC, 
London (195-9-ý p. 67., seems to oppose here any distindt- 
ion between "soult' and "spirit" and to emphasize the 
demand f or the flentire inward unity". 
3. In favour of this meaning are the following: H. Cramer., 
*Biblico-Theoiogical Lexicon of N. T. ) P-5-5; G. Bauer Lexicon- Cambridge, --,: ). q0L-3; W. F. Arndt and 
G. W. Gingoich, Ei. T. Greek-English Lexikon of the New , Tesýtament and other Early Litgra-ture, PP-901-3; W-J- 
-t. I.. a- , -ýn 
ý- "S. -ul"tL- s7he' Nevr. Bjble- Dictiý)nary, e(II. by J. D. 
, D,:, u61as IVYý9-62-Tjý ; 'H. 14. Robinson, Hp. br'ew PSycholog 
in relation to Pauline finthro 1 p. 2dO; Idem The 0 
Christian Doctrine of Man, "D. 15 E. D. W. Burton, SDirit, 
Soul and Flesh) P-163; W. Guthbrod, Die Paulintsche'' 
Anthrolologie, 1,07; C. R. Smith, The Bible Doctrine of 
.!,, ýIan-, P-13d; 
' W-D-. Stacey The Pauline View of Man, p. 123; F. T. Lord The Unity of Body and Soul, *-London (lc2q) P-56; C. Spicq Dieu et lihomme, Paris (1961) P-156 n. 1; H. Mehl-Koehnlein L-1homme selon_llaTiotre Paulý Neuchatel - Paris (1951) p. -f1r-; -R. Bultmann, The Theology of the New Testament, p. 204; W. Barclay., Flesh and ST)irit ( 
.19 
2) pp'. 12-13. _,, 
London 
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St. Paul affirms that there is no favouritism with 
G od. Everyone, every single man, every human being, every 
i ndividual, 
1 
either Jew or Greek, who commits sin and is 
doing wrong or is against God., will be punished. Here it 
is apparent that the word psyche implies the whole man, 
-j -) - ). 2 the total man, the whole person, the self (like 
The expression naaa (ýuXý 
3 is a Hebraism, 
4 which 
emphasizes the individuality in general, and moans simply 
every person everyone, every individual5 
.9. 
or as we inight 
say, a living person or simply a soul. 6 
Romans 2.9; 11'En( naaav (PuXývll Vulg. "in omnem 
adimEn hominis"; AV "every soul of man". RSV, NEB 
flevery human bbing1l; *13.1; see also Acts 2.41,43; 
3.23; 7.14; Rev. 18-13; etc. 
2. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, p. 204; also 
in W. D. Stqcey op. cit. p. '123; H. M. Koehnlein Lthomme 
selon lIa, 0tre Paul, p. 21. 
3. Romans 13 1* comp. also with references of p. 16 n-1 and 
Epict. 1: 2L4; Lev. 7.27: naaa gXýI ý dv y6LyTj alpa; 
Rev.. 16-31 xa( nUaa (ýuXý CwQC &n Oave; see also for 
references only in F. J. Leenhardt, Romans, P-325 n. i. 
4. W. Sanday and A. Headlam, Romans in (ICC) P; 366 n. on 
5.1; also in J. Denney, Romans, in (BGT) . 
695 n. on 1; 
V. Taylor, To the Romans, p. T4-; K. Barrett riomans in 
BNTC p. 245- 
5. AV ? 'every soully; RSV, NEB "Every person"; F. F. Bruce., 
Romans (TNTC) p. 236. 
6. W. Barclay Flesh ---, nd Snirit., pp. 12-13. 
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Another example having exactly the same meaning as 
its two previous counterparts is the passage in which 
St. Paul emphatically says to the Corinthians, I will most 
gladly and willingly spend all I have (money, property, 
time, etc. ) and even be spent out myself for you, 
1 for 
your soulst sake. 
Stacey detects here the possibility of ascribing to 
Tsyche the force of spiritual state, but goes on to say 
that such an interpretation., though possible, is not 
exclusive, referring self consciousness rather to rneuma. 
2 
There remain to be considered 1 thess. 5.23 and the 
adjectives ýUXLx6c-nvcUJlaTLx6cq but hero we say nothing 
about them as we are going to discuss them later in 
special chapters. 
Arriving at the end of this chapter, the first thing 
we have to note is that for St. Paul the word psych is 
2 Cor. 12-15 "bTt4 'rW-v OX05v ý4v; Vulg. 
"animabus vestrlsll; AV and RSV Iffor your souls"; 
NEB "for you"; see also R. Bultmann., Theology of the 
New Testament, I, p. 204; W. H. Robinson, The Christian 
View of' Man, p. 10b. 
2. W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of I-Ian, p. 123; J. H. 
Bernard., 2 Corinthians in IDT P-113 n. on 5-15, says 
something similar 'to it: it 'YuXr*) is here used (as 
at fleb. 13-11-17,1 Pet. 2.11) of the spiritual part 
of man, the interests of which are eternalt'. 
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neither a significant term or idea (dass ýuXý bei Pls. 
Kein bezeichnender Begriff ist)' nor a word determining 
his thought., 2 far from it. 
The least we could say for its meaning is to 
summarize what has been already set out. 
What emerges from the foregoing pages is this: 
It is evident that St. Paul thinks of the 
.-i*. along the lines of the Old Testamentfs teaching. 
In other words the Pauline concept of nsyche is equivalent 
to the and mainly denotes life, the breathing, 
the vital rrinciple., the principle of physical life, of 
the human li*fe, "man as a living beingt'. 3 Further, by 
metonomy, psyche, on the one hand, designates the 
individual., the human 
.' 
being,, and in other 
cases, on the other hand, stands for a conscious being, 
thinking, feeling and acting. 
W. Gathbrod, Die Paulinis nk t, 
2. W. D. Stacey., Contributions and Comments., a reply to 
R. Laurin's article, HThe Concept of Man as a Soul") 
The Expository Times,, 'VO. L. 72, Oct. i960 - Se-, A. 1961, P-349. 
R. Buitmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, p. 204. 
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Bultmann's words well state the case, but do not 
readily admit of su, -iiraary and are quoted as they stand: 
"Hence it is incorrect to understand nsyche in Paul as 
meaning only. "the principle of animal lifell and as standing 
in close relation to 11flesh" understood as the matter 
enlivened by that DsYche. Rather psych is that 
specifically human state of being alive which inheresin 
man as a striving, willing, purposing., self1f. 
1 
R. Bultmann, Theoiogy of the New Testametn , I, p. 205; see also H. ,,. iehl -Kochlein, LIhomme selon L'An5tre Paul, p. 21, who anrears to follow and adopt Bultmann's 
views throughout his treatment; W. D. Stacey, The 
Pauline View of Man, *o. 125 n. 1, who cuotes the first 
and gives only the reference of 0. Pfleiderer, 
Primitive Christianity, Vol. I, N. Y. (1906) pp. 271-2; 
Pfleiderer seems to express a somewhat similar view to 
that of Bultmann's with what he remarks below: "We 
must not conclude however ...... that Paul thought of the latter (viz. soul) as a purely animal principle 
with the exclusion of spiritual functions, rather he uses "Soul" as well as spirit for subjcct of personal 
states of consciousness, especially feelings, in which 
the whole undivided man is concernedif. See also 
C. Spic . Dieu et 11homme Selon le Nouveau Testament, 
? P-155-ý- 
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A note on Gen. 1.26,27 and Gen. 2.7. 
Gerhard Von Rad observes that there is absolutely no 
unity in the ideas of the Old Testament about the nature of 
Man. 1 In view of this statement we regard it as 
unnecessary to deall with the Hebrew psychology (Old 
Testament., the Apocrypha and the Rabbinic teaching) as a 
whole. It is sufficient for us to investigate the true 
and exact meaning, as far Ls rossible, of-Gen. 1.26,27 
and Gen. 2.7 which are mentioned by St. PC--ul and are 
relevant to our thesis and of great importance, not at 
length, as this would take us far beyond the limits Of our 
present inquiry, but briefly. 
G. Von Rad, E. T. trans. by O. M. G. Stalker, Old Testament 
'Theology, London (1963) PP-152-3; Germaed., Theologie 
des Alten Testamentsý B"nd I., D5.156-7; see also 
J. Pederson, Isreal, 1-11 (1926 Dp. 99 ff; A. R. 
Johnson, The Vitality'of the Individual In the. Though 
of Ancient Isr-bal, Cardiff'(1964)- rn. 1-2; L. Koeher, 
Ola Testament Theology, London (19ý7) PP-131 ff; 
W. E4,. chrodt,, Theology of the Old Testament, II, rp. 69 
ff. 
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(a) Imago Dei; Gen. 
- 
1.26,2ý. 
Among the various passages' in which we meet the word 
imag e,. c tx6v, two T, assages, at least, stmid. out for 
the aescription of every man, man's humanity in a 
marginal sense2 and directly refer to Gen. 1.26,27. 
The two Piiuline passages which refer to Gen. 1.26,27 
run as follows: 
"For a man ought not to cover his head, since he 
is the image and glory of God"., 3 dnd 
(ii) "and have Tut on the new nature, which is being 
renewed in -unowledge after the image of its creator". 
(RSV) 
. 
1. Passages referring to image in general are the 
following: Rom. 1.23; 8.29; 1 Corinthians 11.7 and 
15-49; 
.2 
brinthians 3.18; 14: 4; Col. 1.15 and 3.10. 
2. D. Cairns, The Image-of God in Man, London 11953) P-32. 
3.1 Corinthians 11.7; see also S. V. McCasland ''The Image 
of God accoiding to Paul". The Jou1nal of Biblical 
Literature, MIX (1950) 0-652 87; C. R. Smith, The 
Bibie DocErine of'Man, p. 182; and aiso in the 
following commentaries: A Denney, I Corin . in MT (19083) Vol-II2 P-873 n. on 5.7; H. L. Goudge, The 
First Elistle to the Corinthians, A, London (19113) 
p. 96 n. on 5.7; L. lorris, 1 Corinthians, TNTC, London, 
(1958) 1). 153 n. on 5.7, 
Col. 3.10; also in S. V. McCasland, ibid. PP-85., 88; TT7. F. Smith ibid . 182; T. K. Abbot, Rrhis. Colos. (ICC) Lonuon (1909) p: 294 n. on 5.10; L. B. Radford, Colos. 
and Phil. in WC London (1931) p. 268. 
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Now., to trace the true meaning of the word Image, we 
have to go back and consider the Gen. 1.26,27*1 
St. Gregory of Nyssa underlines the difficulty of 
2 
understanding and interpreting this. 
To most of the Greek Fathers the terms image and 
likeness do not have the same meaning, but are 
distinguishable. The interPretation of one of the 
greatest and most eminent systematic theologians of the 
Greek Orthodox Church, St. John of Damascus, who epitomised 
and systemized in a scientific way, the doctrinal teaching 
of his Tredecessors, may be regarded as representative of 
all the Greek Fathers. 
His exposition may be rounded off into defining irmago 
in terins of rationality and freedom and likeness as 
1. ComT). also with Gen. 5.1-3 and 9.5-6. 
2. St. Grogory of Nyssa: Ad Imaginem Dei et ad 2-IPG -14., 1328A 
Similitudinem 11"EaTL y6p, F'-crTLv ý)c ElioC ye 5OxcT, h 
To"u &vop6nou xaTaaxcuý yopcpd TLC xaC 8vcycpp. 'O'VcvTOC, xac 
noUd xaC &n6xpuya puavopLa OcoZ LýcLxovCýouaa; '? 
also ibid. 1340B. 
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appertaining to assimilation to God through virtue. ' 
John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, 2,, 12; IAPG 94,920) 
To p6v y6p xaT"r-tx6va T6 \)ocp6\) 671NOT Xa[ abTCý06CJLOV 
T6 66 %aO'6j10(WaLV, Týv Týc &pcTýc xaTc'x T6 6uvaT6v ^0 6POCWCTL\)" ; 
see also in the following: 
1. ctn6v as signifying the rational faculties 
and freewill: 
(a) rational part: Origen, Commentary in Joan, Tom. 
2,75; MPG 14) 153B; Clement of Alexandria, 
Strom. Lib. 5. cap. 14; MPG 91 140A; 
Athanasius, Orat. de incarnatione Verbi, 3,40; 
MPG 25., 101B; St. Gregoryýof Nyssa, in verbay 
Fad. hom. ad imag. Ot simil., orat. I; MPG 44y 
273A BCD; St. John Chrysostom (sever. ) De 
mundi creatione oratio, 2.4y IOG 56y 443; 
C il of Alexandria, in John Evangcli1.1. -., i., Lib. 9 (ýr2l) MPG 74,276Dy 277A. 
(b) freewill: * Justin the Martyr, Apologia I 7)ro 
Christ 43, ! APG 6., 393B; St. Basil de Hominis 
structura, oratio 1.20, MIPG 30) 32BC; Y-lacarius 
of Egypt, Homiliae, Hom. 15,22-23. ý MPG 34) 592A; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Hominis opificio, 16, 
2APG 44,184A-D; St. John Chrysostom, in Cap. IV, 
Genes. homil. 19, ij IMPG 53) 158D; Cyril of ' Alexandria., in Joannis Evang. Lib. 9) 14 (822)y 
MPG 74y 277D. 
2. "OPO(WaLc, as denoting similarity through 
virtue: Origen., De Principis, Lib. 3. Cap. 6 (152), 
MPG 113 333 BCD- Clement of Alexandria, Strom. Lib. 
2 Cap. 22 AIPG ý, 108OC; Methodius Symp. (Conviv. 
dec Virg. orat. 1,4, MPG 18,44CD; St. Basil., de 
hominis Struct. orat. I, 21-22p IjIPG 30,32D-33A-C; 
Gregory of Nyssa, in verba., fac. hom. orat. I, MPG 
44,273A-D; St. John Chrysostom, Genes. flomil. 9-3) 
MPG 53) 78. 
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For the Latin Fathers we quote first of all Irenaeus, 
who first attempted to define in a systematic way the 
meaning of imago. He writes: "Homo vero rationabiliset 
secundum hoc similis Deo". 
1 
secondly, Augustine., who 
relates the image to mental and intellectual part of man: 
t'Ubi imago Dei? In monte, in intellectu! yt2 and lastly 
St. Thomas Aquinas, who deals with the question under 
consideration at some length3 and finds that the image of 
God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the 
King., as having the image of the King. 4 Further, he makes 
a subtle distinction between image and likeness as that of 
John of Damascus. 
5 
Luther appears to regard the imag as comprehending 
the moral faculties and thus as being lost by the Fall, and 
Irenaeus, Contra haereses 4,4 (ef 3), Ml-PG 7) 231,232A 
(98o-984). 
2. St. Augustine, in Joan. Evang. tract 3.1,4, ALP 35, 
1398. 
The Su, -. qma Thoolog4,, -Qa of 
St. Thomas Aquinas, Pa5t I., OQ 
LXXVCII, 'trans. by Dom. Fathers., London (1922 
XCIII, Art. 91 Pp. 282-304. 
4. Summa Theologica, ibid. GXCIII, generally art. 6 and 
more particularly: Reply to obj. I) pp. 292-96. 
Summa Theologica, QXCIII, generally art. 9 and 
especially h answer and reply to obj. 1-4, pp. 302-304. 
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restored by Redemption. 
Calvin aligns Imago Dei with the totality of human 
nature. As this nc-, ture is totally depraved in 
consequence of the Fall, so it is the imago defaced - 
though not effaced. It is-the fruit of Redemption that 
the imago is restored in like totality. 
2 
The position of modern exegesis and scholarship is 
that there is no distinction whatsoever between image and 
likeness, but simply a straightforward case of Hebrew 
parallelism, in which a second phrase repeats the meaning 
of the phrase that has gone before. 3 Or as Th. C. 
Vriezen puts it: TIBesides 'The image of God' we also find 
Ithe likeness of God'. This latter phrase is a further 
definition of the former, it does not add a new element. 
Those dogmatice which have founded certain speculation upon 
this view are therefore on the wrong track; the expression 
'after our likenesst is no more than a further explanation 
1 SermmiGe. n. 33)54)G7. 
2. J. Calvini, Institutio Christianae Religionis, ed. by 
Tholuch., Edinburgh., IMCCCLUIV, Vol. 1.15,45 pp. 
343-4. 
3. Alan Richardson, Genesis I- XI, SCAI, London (1959) P-54; 
see also J. Laidlaw,, *-The Bible Doctrine of 1.1an, pp. 
142-3; Idem. "Imaget' in J. Hastings, A Dictionarv of 
the Bible., Vol. ' II., Edinburgh (1906) 3.452; also J. * 
Orr., Godts Image in Ijan, London (1907 ) PP-36Y 54, n. l. 
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of the words 'in our image (1.26., v-3ý"'-l 
The position of G. von Rad may be taken as 
characteristic of that of modern scholarship. Starting . 
from the foregoing premise, he takes into consideration the 
primitive concept of a demiurge literally fashioning an 
"image" of himself from clay., as the fIrst step towards 
creating a man,. Von Rad points out that Hebraic 
anthropology, in its very refusal to make a firm dichotomy 
between bod and soul., must have taken account of the 
primitive concept, applying its own theological genius to 
interpet imago in terms neither merely physical nor solely 
2 
spiritual. Again, it Is a totality to which imago refers. 
Here, it is highly relevant to quote Driver, who 
suggests that "both words refer here evidently to spiritual 
resemblance aloneO and Skinner, who holds that Ilit may be 
truer to say that it denotes primarily the bodily form but 
Includes those spiritual attributes of which the former is 
1. Th. C. Vriezen, kn Outline of Old Testament Theolog 
Oxford (1958) p. 208. 
2. G. Von Rad, Genesis, London (1951) PP-56-7- 
3. S. R. Driver., The_Book of Genesis, in WC, London (1904) 
P-15. 
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the natural and self-evident symbol". 
1 
It falls outside the scope of the present note to 
discuss als. o the theological development and treatment of 
the subject. It would be sufficient to observe that this 
wholesome task has been undertaken by E. Brunner in his 
great book, Man in Revolt and K. Barth, in his Chulch 
Dogmatics., Vol. 111,11 1112 2.2 
J. Skinner., Genesis (ICC) London (1930 see also some 
other various views more or less along the same lines. 
W. Eichrodt, Theologie des Alten Testaments, Berlin 
(1950) 11, P. 62; "Image in the Conscious Personality" 
E. Jacob, Theology of Old Testament, London (1958) 
p 172- L. Koehler, Old Testament Theolog , London (i957J p. 147; Dr. Paul Heinisch, Theology of the Old 
Testament, 2inn6sota, U. S. A. (1955) p. 170 (A*Romayl 
Catholic view): "The basis of man's sovereignty over 
animals lies in his creation ? in the image of God, 
conformable to his Ilikenosst. This can refer only 
to man's spiritual Ondowments, it consists in 
intelli, -,, ence, which distinguishes man from the 
remaining visible creation. Man excels not in bodily 
strength, in fact he is inferior in this to many 
animals, but in mental capabilities". And two quite 
opposite views., C. R. Smith, The Bible Doctrine of 11-an, 
pp. 29-30Y 95-7y 182-5, maintain throughout all these 
pages that Gen. 1.26., 27., refer to "man's outward 
formiyand that this form must be understood as 
Ilphysicallt and not I'material't It I The same line of 
thought P. ' vari Imschoot., Theoi6gie De L'ancien Testa- 
ment, Tome II, LIhomme ) Paris (1956) pp. 5-9 follows: I'Several exdg*etes maintain that for the author of Genesis 1.26,27; 5.1; 9.6; man is the physical, 
corporeal image of Elohim (God). This -ýresur-, oses that the author conceives God under a human form". 
2. See also E. Brunner's article "The New Barth" in 
Scottish Journal of Theologyl(1951) 2, pp. 123-35. A 
very brief account and'analysis of Brunner's and Barth's 
views is given by D. Cairns., The Image of God in Man., 
pp. 146-205. 
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G en. 2.7. 
'IuXýv As far as the second noto on "etc, 
(71 St. Paul quotes Gen. 2 ^Lj) which -7- i j. T 
primarily we could say with R. Bultmann, donotes a living 
being, an animate person and in contrast with 11n\jc-D[ia 
ýWOROLO-UV. 11 life giving spirit, that is, to the 
divinely given capacity for eternal life, psyche, is now 
the merely natural earthly vitality. 2 Butthe case is not 
as simple as it anpears and cannot be dismissed with a 
single sentence. It needs further treatment and the best 
we can do is to go back to Gen. 2.7 and recaDitulate its 
true meaning as briefly as possible, confining ourselves 
to some of the modern scholars. 
1. I-Cor. 15.45. 
2. R. Bultmann, Theology of-the New Testament, I. p. 204; 
comp. also with John 5.21: Ou"'T wraC6 Yt6r, 
014 OeXCL ýWOROLETL"; 
see also W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Nlan, p. 122, 
"In I Cor. 15.45 (ýUxý ýMau is an exact 
translation o-l" the Hebrew of Gen. 2 .7 11 ly, i., and clearly conveys the natural taliveness' lo man-, Part 
from what might be called spiritual life. Tuxý Zwaa 
add to and interpret each other"; John 6.63; 20.22; 
Acts 11-33; 2 Cor. 3,6.17. One may find more or less 
or similar or slightly different views also in the 
following commentaries: G. G. Findlay, I Corinthioný, 
in EGT) P-397-8; F. Codet, I Corinthians, Vol. 2. 
pp. 417-23; H. L. Goudge, I Corinthians, in. WC, 
_P. 
57 
n-1; L. Morris, I Corinthians., in'TNTC pp 22 9. 
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Verse 7. "Then the Lord God formed man of dust from 
the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of 
life, and man became - living boing".., 
1 
which describes 
anthropomorphically and mythologically the origin and 
creation of man and which is a locus classicus of Old 
, must be conceived and interrreted Testament anthropology. 
2 
according to many modern scholars not in the analytical 
old Greek fashion or way, but more in the modern one, that 
isý the synthetical. In other words, the infusion of 
breath, which exists also in the an-imal worldý by God into 2 
the nostrils of man does not stand for an independent 
element and distinct spiritual, divine and immortal entity 
or a kind of mants hieher part and principle, as with the 
Plato) it simply denotes life, animal life, the vital power 
which gives life to the body and cannot exist outside and 
without it or as A. R. Johnson expresses better., "The term 
V . -I 
is obviously being used to indicate not something 
conceived as but one (albeit the surerior) part, of man's 
being, but the complete personality as a unified 
Vulg. "animam viventemll; JB "a living being"; AV., RV, 
t1a liVing soultt; A. R. Johnson, The One and'the rdany'in 
the Isrealite conception of God, Cardiff (1961) p. 2; 
The'Vita-iity of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient 
Isreal, Cardiff (179-4-2T p. 19 n. 1, regards AV, RV's 
rendering' as misleading, prefers that of RSV and'trans- 
lates it as '? a living person". 
2. T. Skinner, Genesis in ICC P-56; also in G. von Rad., 
Genesis., P-75. 
3. Gen. 2.19; 6.17; 7.15,22. 
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manifestation of vital power, it ropresentowhat Pedersen 
has called "the grasping of a totality". 
It must be noted that L. Koehler seems to differ from 
the undermentioned scholars by holding the gerieral state- 
ment that "It does not say man has a living soul. Soul 
is the nature of man, not his possession .... man is a 
soul". 
2 
Dr. Laurin, rolying on L. Koehler, takes up again the 
roint and tries to establish more or less the fact that 
man is a soul, on the grounds that nephesh very often 
signifies the man and rejýresents the courlcto individual 
and on the exegesis of the creation story (cf. Gen. 2.7. 
Job 27-3.33-4). 3 
1. A. R. Johnson, The One zýnd the gony in the Isrealite 
Conce'Ption of God, ' 1). 2 *. There is a consensus 
of opinion to this effect among-the following scholars: 
J. Pedersen, Isreal, I-II, pp. 106-33; H. W. Robinson, 
"Hebrew''Psychoiogy" in The Peonle and thp Book, ed.. by 
A. S. Peake, London (1925) P-368; A. E. Davidson, The 
Theology of the Old Testament, Edinburgh (1904) p-. -fj4; 
J. Skinner., Genesis in WC P-56; Th. Vriezon, An 
Outline of Old. 'Testament Theolog ) p. 202; G. Pidaux, LIhomme dans Itancien Testament, Paris (1953) r-17; 
E. C. Rust, Nature and Ilan in Biblical Though . London U953) P-105; Gerhard Von Rad., Genesis, P-75; A. 
Richardson in SCIIA Genesis, I-XI London (1959) P b2; 
G. Pidaux, ? 'Llhomme dans l1ancien Testament" -P-15ý ill 
J. Bleeker, AnthroDologie Religiouse, Lieden (1955ý- 
2. L. Koehler, 01cji Testament Theolog , n,. 142. 
3. R. Laurin., '? The Concept cof Man as a Soýilll in the Exnos., Times, Vol. 72, Oct. 1960 - Sept. 1961, PP-131-32 ff; 
also New Testament Abstracts., Vol. 5. Srring 1961, 
No. 37Y P-321 n. d26 or NTA 5 (3y 61). 
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His statement that "man is a soul"., which is a curious 
and ambiguous 
1 
one., and some other of' his conclusions, have 
been chalienged by W. D. Stacey and dismissed with the words 
that Mel2hes is thus just one of a dozen words that 
represent both a constituent element in man and an Casnect 
of his whole T-erson". 
Ne-phesh, therefore, when it is not referring to the 
whole person, means nothing more than the animal vitality 
that first came upon man in Gen. 2.7 and that distinguishes 
the living from the dead. 
Ne'Phesh, therefore, does not have special function of 
representing the body-spirit unity "except in the sense that 
all the terms for the constituent elements in 'man represent 
it. Consequently, it is misleading to say that man is a 
soul 2 
Coming to an end of the present paragraph, we shouic' 
note two things: 
Wý'D. Stacey, Contributions and Comments, "A Reply on 
Man as a Soul"., Exp. Times, ibid. P-349. 
2. W, D. Stacey, "A Reply on M-en as a Soul", in ExI2. Time. Z. 72 (196o-61) P-349. 
11 
149. 
1. That in Israelite thought man is conceived,, not so 
much in dual fashion as body ond soul., but 
synthetic-ally as a unit of vit,, l power or (in 
current torminology) a psycho-phy-sical organism 
1, 
ar, -1. 
So to sum up with an emphasis upon the tlextensions" of 
the personality we may say of the IsrcW-, Iite conceptLah 
of man that it was so diffuse that Heraclitus might 
I well have been speaking in Hebrew rather than Greek 
terms when he said, ItThough thou shouldst traverse 
every path, then could it not discover the boundaries 
of ? soul,, it hath so deep a meaning". 
2 
A. R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the 
Thought of Ancient Israel, p. 87; _ Idem. The ", )ne and 
the Ilan ) pp. 1-2; H. Vj'. Robinson '? Hebrew Psychology" in The People and the Book, P. 36ý, also defines HebreLr 
man as follows: "What is man? and try to answer it,, 
not in the old theological., but in the new psychological fashion, we shall say that for the Hebrew, man is a 
unity, and that unity is the body as a complex of parts drawing their life and activity from a breath-soul, 
which has no existence apart from the body". 
2. H. Diels., Die Fragmente de Vorsokratiker (19224) 1, 
p. 86 (No. 45); and also in G. van der leeuw, 
Religion in Essence and J-1-mifestation, London 1938) 
ET p. 275; A. 13. 'Johnson, The One and the M,, mY-., P-13 
n-3- 
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13. Spirit or Evel4la The Concert of Spirit. 
To trace the true and -, recise meaning as far as 
possible of thelkeyword"l pneuma., which after all is "the 
most im-rortant word in Paults psychological vocabulary, 
perhaps in his vocabulary as a wholeit2 is not an easy 
thing. It is, on the contrary, an extrmely difficult and 
complex one because of the large number of c-, ses when there 
is doubt as to whether it refers to God or to man. 
The difficulty is aggravated by the simnle orthographic 
fact that the Greek texts of the Pauline writings do not 
em, ploy the distinction used in rresent day English of 
signifying "Spirit" with a caT)itai letter when the 11, ý-)iy 
Sririt is meant, and leaving Isririt" of man with a, 
minuscule. In whichever sensc the word is used, howc -ver, 
the thing signified is "the link betwecýn God and Man" from 
one side or the other. Further, it is to man alone, of all 
living creatures in-the world, that -, neuma is attributed. 3 
While we acknowledge the difficulties and COMTVleXities, 
and however hard is the task, we must note right from tho 
beginning that we do not intend here to discuss all the 
1. H. W. Robinson, t'Hebrew Psychology in relation to 
Pauline Anthropology'T in Mansfield College Essays, 
p. 281. 
2. H. W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 109. 
3. W. barclay, Flesh and Sniri (1962) T". 13. 
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as-ects of Paul's use of IIST-drit". 
1 but the psychological 
The word s7irit occurs in Pauline epistles 146 times 
(H. W. Robinson) in The Christian Loctrine of Man, 
p. 109; Idem. Hebrew Psychology in-relcation to Pauline 
Anthropology, , ). 2bl; 
(Jacquier) as he is quoted by Le. 
P. E. - B. Ailo, Saint Paul, Premiere eriýtre aux 
Corinthians,, Paris U9562) p. 91, I'Le mot nvcUýla 
apparait foiS (Jacquier) dans les ecrits de Paul" and 
it is distinguished in various senses; H. W. Robinson., 
ibid2 pp. 109-10; and ibid. pri. 281-2, classifies them 
as follows: 11(l) In the natural sense of "wind" it is 
not used by Paul., who employs anemos in this sense 
(Eph. 4.14)) (2) Most of the ca-s-e-T7116) fall into the 
second class, namely, "super-natural influences" .... 
we read of the pneum of God or Christ (hom. 8.23) in 
Hebrew psychology etc. p. 281, (3) the use of ruach 
to denote the principle of life or breath (in man) is 
hardly represented amongst the usages of T)n'cuma The 
Christian Doctrine of' Man, p. 110 n. ý), 2Y_he_1s-s-. 
11.8 (of Isa. 11.4) belongs to the second group). This 
connotation, like that of "mind'? has been displ,, ý,: ), ced by the higher associations of the term. (4) There remain 
30 cases of the psychical use of rno. uma, in the narrower 
scnse, of which 14 refer to the higher nature of a 
Christian man and are hardly to be distinguished from 
the result of the divine-, neuma, whilst 16 denote a 
normal element in human naturetf. W. D. Davics, an 
eminent N. T. scholar himself, also lists different 
meanings of the word s-. 3irit in his article: "Paul and. 
the Dead Sea Scrolls: Flesh and SpiritIt in The Scrolls 
and the New Testament, ed. by K. Stendahl, London 
1956) P-176, as follows: 11 .... of the s-nirit of man 22 instances), of the spirit ýs t, ) thc; flosh 6), of the Spirit of God (Holy 6-pirit, 72). of the 
sT)irit as o-, ý,,, osed to the Law and the letter (4); of the 
spirit denoting a uality or disT, osition (13); of the 
Spirit of Christ (9); of the soirit of evil or the 
world (2); W. D. Stacey', The Pauline View of I'Aan, -Or. 128-9, similarly sel,, arates and defines six senses of 
pneum in the Pauline corý 
- 
-us (ibid. p. 128). For the 
various meanings of the sririt in general see the 
following works: W. P. Dickson St. Paults use of the ternis Flesh and Srýiri , Glaa Scott 
Sgow TI-87-3-Tr5 - 13 0-97E. F. 
., 
The StArit'in the New Testament, London (1923) 
pp 127-86; E. D. W. Burton,, Spirit, Soul and Flesh., -p. j, 17ý-82; Le P. E-B. Allo, Saint Paul, Premiere ewftre 
aux Corinthians, pp. 91-4,101-15., "Les sens divers de 
nvcupa 11 and most rarticularly the excellent treatment of the term -, -. ne'uma 
by E. Schweizer, if nveZiia". 
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one. and more particularly we could put it this way: we 
are going to deal with two things: (1) to discover as 
thoroughly as possible the true and precise meaning of 
those Pauline rassages which d1rectly refer to man and 
then (2) to assess the relationship between the spirit of 
man and Spirit of God or as Prof. #Barclay would -ut it, 
ItBut the real Lroblem is to know whether the 7neuma,, the 
spirit, is part of man as such, or uhcther it is only 
part of a man after he has become a Christian, whether 
the pneum is Dart of human nature or whether it is the 
gift of God to redeemed human nature". 
2 
Since we acCeT'ted that the two -,, oints are sufficient 
to give us a clearer view of the second psychological 
term pneuma, we may take this as one point of departure 
for considering that term -s applied to man. The 
different meanings of these passages may be classified as 
1. (Contd. from page 151). In Kitte's TAT Vol. VI (1959) 
pp. 413-36, ET, under the title "Spirit of God", in the 
series Bible Keywords, London (196o) v-54-88. 
2., W. Barclay., Flesh and S-ririt, p. 14; See also W. Bawer., 
Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament., ET by W. F. Aindt and 





1. spirit denoting the whole man., the self, the ego, the I. 
spirit as synomymous with soul. 
spirit as the seat of emotion and will, (rneum in the 
psychological sense of an ensemble of faculties, 
dispositions,, tendencies, good or bad, or indeed the 
subjective princiPlc of these attributes). 
4. pneum in the strictly moral sense, spirit as o-j-,, )osed 
to the flesh, which signifies weakness and 
human vices. 
pneuma as the seat of (human) consciousness and 
intelligence (or the human soul or its Psychological 
faculty in gencral intelligence or rsychological 
perceTtion). 
-pneuma signifying the sririt of man sanctified, united 
with God., divinised. 
Now let us have a closer look at these categories one 
We are well aware of the questions and doubts arising 
about this classification, and we . --dmit with P. E. -B. Allo, op. cit. p. 94, "Nous essayons une classification, 
quoique . dans tel ou tel passage, l1assignation du mot , I., - a telle ou telle des categories que'nous indiquerous 
reste douteuse, ou qutil puisse rentrer dans plusiours A la foist'. 
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by one and the corresponding Pauline passages: 
1. When St. P"nul,, at the closjýg of his first letter to 
the Corintians, 1 Cor. 16.18, expresses pleasure., his Joy 
and gladness at the arrival of Stephanas, Fortunatus and 
Achaicus, representing their own church, and adds 
characteristically that "they refreshed my spirit as well 
as yourls", it can simply mean Itme and yoU'I., 
' the person's 
very self or ego. The same thing may be said for the 
following passages. 2 Cor. 2,13, "But my mind (Vulg. 
I'spiritui meoll, RSV and NEB., llsTiritll, AV, JB, "I in mind") 
Itould not rest because I did not find my brother Titus 
there"., 2 and also 2 Cor. 7.13., "and besides our own comfort 
we rejoiced still more at the joy of Titus, because his 
mind (Vulg. I'Spiritus ejus'l., RSV and'NEB v1spiritt' AV) has 
been set at rest by you all". Furtherý in the concluding 
greetings or in the concluding benedictions like this. -- 
if [tevi ro'O nvF-Zýta-uor, lbýtMv lt3 are used instead 
1. R. Bultmam, Thcolo y of tbe, New Tostament,, 13 T-ý0'206.4 
2. Comp. with 2 Cor. 7- ýCaV F)-ICIX'QHF-V aVECYLV h cj6pý 
hpo5v "our bo21csOb(8RFS . NEB: flesh AV) had no 
rest"; see also R. Bultmann, ibid. p. 206; also A. 
Plummer., 2 Corinthians in JQQ P. 65 and 217. 
3. Gal. 
_ 
6.18; Phil. 4.23; 2 Tim. 4.22; Philem. 25. 
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of the usual 11 tic. & 'bp-w\) or pcT6 TEdVTWV 
bpU)\J 
(because of the rhetorical pathos); 
2 what is meant is 
exactly the person as a whole, the man, the self, just the 
IIIII and ityoutt. 
3 
2. St. Paul uscd the pneuma and psyche together at least 
in two cases, Phil. 1.27) "1 may hear you that you stand 
I 
I Cor. 16.24; 2 Cor. 13-13; Eph. 6.24; Colos. 4.18; 
I Thess. 5.28; 2 Thess. 3.19; 1 Tim. 6.21; Tit. 
3.151 
R. Bultmann, Theology of the Now Testament, I. p. 206. 
3. The first paragraph's above mentioned passages with 
their respective meaning., are mentioned mainly in the: 
W. Bawer, Ivorterbuch zum Neuen Testament (1958) 
P-1339., ET by W. F. Arndt ana F. W. Gringrich., p. 681; 
E. Schweizer, 11 Ilve-Uvall in Kittel's TVXIT r-433 
and E. T. IIS-pirit of God" (in the Bible Keywordsý pp. 
84-85; R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I. 
p. 206; also W. D. Davies., "Paul and the Dead Sea 
Scrolls: Flesh and S-irit" in the Scrolls and the New 
TestamQnt, PP-177,281 n. 
46; 
and in some of the 
commentaries, such as: 
1. A. Robertson, A. Plummer, I Corinthians, 
-ICC, 396-7; A. Plummer, 2 Corinthians, ICC pp. '65., 2267 
H. L. Goudge., I Corinthians in 14C (19113) P-170; F. 
Godet, I Corin 
' 
thians,, Vol II) pp . 467-8; E. D. W. Burton, Galat * in ICC 
(1921)' rr-3L-2; M. R. Vincent,, 
Philippians and Philemon in ICC - W. E. ,, 
T, P. 154 and 192; 
Oesterley, Philemon in EnT, p. 217; L. B. Radford, 
Philemon in WC. P-367; E. F. Scott, Philemon in the 
Moffat NTC, P-115; F. W. Beare, The Epistle to the 
Philipnians in Black's NTC. j P-158; W. Lock, The Pastoral Epistles in ICC, '7,.. 112 and elsewhere. 
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firm in one spirit, with one mind (ýv ývC nvcWaTL, 
40 TUXý )land in I Thess. 5.23) 
synonymously and as equivalent to each other. " Further., 
E. Schweizer points out that the. nneuma-psyche in the 
above mentioned Dassages and also the Hebrew 4.12 11riercing 
to division of -soul and spirit" 
( dXpL pepLapo-V (ývXýýC. 
XaC TEVE: 16ýta-CO(; ) must not be regarded as 
inde-rendent and distinct rarts for the man; but in"his 
own words: "In 4.12 Tsririt? and 'soul' are. distingUished 
in rurely psychological terms, as two closely inter- 
dependent rarts; in other words the distinction is'a 
cliche". 
2 According to E. Schweizer then, we have not 
here a distinction of the rarts of human i-ersonality but 
simply a stereotyped literary Dhruse, a cliche, but more 
of this later. 
St. Luke 1.46,47; Jn. 11-33; Comp. 12.27; 1 Cor. 
'2.11; see also E. Schwiezer, 11 nvc-Wall in 
Kittel's TIMT, p. 433 E. T. IISrIrit of God",, in Bible 
Keywords, p. -84; C. RI. Smith. ' The Bible Doctrine of 
Man, n. 141; R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Test- 
agent, -,,. ). 205; !. R. Vincent, To the' Phili-n7-Aans and 
to Philemon in ICC, P-33; F. F. Bruce, The Eristle to 
the 'Romans, 'j). 47; Cramer., Lexico , ol, ). cit. T)-74; Le P-B Allo., op. cit. p. 92. 
E. Schweizer, 
"Spirit of Gi 
Lleiýitre aux 
are also the 
33-4., "there 
and Ilve-upa 
they are not 
11 rIve'Upa" in TWNT, 
_p-. 
444, E. T. 
: )d") n. 100; to the same effect C. Sricq, 
Hebrewx (1953) ad loc; worth mentioning 
foiiowing, M. R. Vincent, o7. cit. pp. 
are cases where the meanings of TuXý 
approached very nGarly, if indeed 
practically synonymous 
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3. St. Paul, using 1 Cor. 2.11, an argument "a minori ad 
majus", ' a human comparison and analogy, writes that 
"there are certain things which only a man's own spirit 
knows, there are feelings which are so personal, things 
which are so private, experiences which are so intimate 
that no-one knows them except a manIs ow-n sDirit. 2 No-one 
can really see into our hearts and know what is there 
except our own spirits. Now, Paul goes on to argue, the 
same is true of God. There arc deeD and intimate things 
in God which only God's spirit knows ... it. 
3 
We are not far away from the truth if we observe that 
4 the pneuma is used here, as elsewhere, in the purely 
psychological sense, and denotes the seat of human 
1. A. Robertson and A. Plummer, 1 Cor. in ICC, p. 44; 
also G. G. Findlay, I Cor. in EDT, p. ý82 n. on 2.11. 
2.1 Cor. 2.11., It -u(r, ydp ol5ev &vDp6nwv Td To-D 
&v0pWhou ctp' T6 nvcZpa ToZ &vopwhou T6 Lv abTVI; 
3. W Barclay., Tho Letters to the Corinthians, Edinburgh ý1961) 
P-31. 
4.1 Cor. 5.5; 7.34; 2 Cor. 7.1; 1 Thess. 5.23; comP. 
also Matt., 5.3; Mark 2.8; Luke 1.80. 
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consciousness, intelligence, nsychologica-l rerception, 
and the intellectual faculties, or as Bultmann. would rut 
it 11pneum ap-,. )roaches the-modern idera of consciousness". 
2 
4. In the following passages Pneuma stands for (a) the 
source and seat of feeling, exrrcssing a sriritual state 
of mind, a disposition or tenire-ament, or as Allo has it: 
1111ve-lipa or sens j. -, sychilogique d' une ensemble de 
i 
., 
de dispositions., de tendencies bonnes ou facuities 
mauvaises, oubien de principe subjectif de ces attributstt3, 
Rom. 1.4. flana declared to be the Son of God with power., 
according to the spirit (S7irit RSV) of holiness" (AV); 
8.15., "for you did not receive the spirit of slavery to 
fall back into fear, but you have received the spirit of 
sonshIp", RSV,, AV, TTIEB 1111ve-Wa 8oliXeCar . ...... 
11 VC _U ý1 CL 
UtOOEGL'aq, 12.11 "With unflagging energy., in 
ardour of snirit (Spirit RSV), serve the Lordt' (NEB, AV 
E. D. Burton., Silirit, Soul, Flesh, r-179; F. Godet) 
.1 Cor. II) p. 11ý0; A. B. D. Alexander, The Ethics of St.. ' 
Paul, Glasgow (1910) n. 64; W. P. Dickson St. 
- 
Paul's 
use of the terms Flesh and STirit., pn. 16ý Tnd 427ý; J. 
L, ýidlaw ., 
The Bible Doctrine' of L-1-an, -, -,. 133; E 
Schwiezer ! IvF--Wa in TWNT, p. 433, E: T. n-85; 
W. R. Schoemaker, t'The Use of Jý ,I -ý 
( in the O. T. and 
of nV E -I) [I CL in the N. T. 11,, A study) in the Biblical Literature 
,, 
Vol. XXIII 1004) 11ass. pp. 64-5; Le P. E-B. Alio, or. cit. n. 46 andmore part-'- 
icuia-riy 1). 92; H. Ciavier., "Breves Remarques sur ia notion de aW-jja nVEU[ta-6 L7C()V " in the Back- 
ground of the New Testament -n6 its Eschatology, ed. by 
W. D. Davies, Cambridge (1956) r-351 n. 2. 
2. R. Bultmann, Theology ---)f the IN(. -, w Testament, I, p. 207. 
3. Le P. E. B. Allo_, St. Paul 1-. remiereerTtre aux 
Corinthians, p. 92. 
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Vulg. bpiritu ferventes; "Tw- Trve6paTL Z! ffoovTcr, 11 
) 
.1 
1 Cor. 4.21 "Shall I come to you with a rod or with love 
in a soirit of gentieness? " (RSV) 2 Cor. 4-13 "Since we 
I, 
Gal. 6.1 if .... in a s:, irit have the same s,, Irit of faith" 
of gentienessff (RSV) Ephes. 1.17 "that the God .... may 
give you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the 
knowledge of him" (RSV), 2 Tim. 1.7 "For God did not give 
us a s,,, irit of timidity but a sTirit of rower and 1, )ve and 
self-control" (RSV); 
I 
or (b) Pneuma may be placed in 
For the above references ; and their res-ective meanings 'oul and see the following: E. D. Burton, S, -irIt, fIj Flesh., r . 179. Td. P. Dickson, St. Pau'Lls use of the terms Flesh and Spirit, p. 4.29; W. Beuer., '-., IZNT, E. T. 
p. 6FI; Le P. B. B. Ailo, o-. cit. p. 92; W. D. Davies, 
"Paul and the Dead SeC. Scrolls: Flesh and Sririt" in 
The Scrolls and the Neir Testament, )-, ). 177 and 280 n. 65; 
F. Godet, St. Paul's Fristle to the Pomans, Edinburgh 
(1880) Vol. I2 pp. 26-3, -) Vol-II., rT)-dl-3; W. Sanday and 
A. C. Headlam , Eowans in ICC., Ectinburgh 
(1898) -, M, 202-3) 
361; C. H. Dodd, The Eii, stie of Paul to the Fornt,,. ns., 
'ristle to Fontana edition (1ý60) r). 14,1; X. BL-rth,, 
- 
The L", 
the Romans,, Oxforu (1933) i,, p. 296-8., 456; Lo P. M. J. 
Lagrange, 0-3int Paul opitre aux homans., Trl; ýris (195o7) 
pl)-7-9., 20i-2ý, 302; W. J. Cameron., IISS-Arit" in thc Now 
Biblo Dictionz:., r IVF, London (1962) r' 1212; V. Taylor, 
Tho Q, istle to the f-, omrý, ns, Lonuon (19ý5) rp. 20., 52; 
F. J. Leenhardt, Romans, rT. 37,, 213,314; F. F. Bruce. ' 
Romans in TNTC, r. 165; 0. Kuss, Der Romer brief 
Vortrag Regc. nsbujg,, Erste Lieferung (1957) TIT. -7., 
, weite Lieferung ý1959) rr. 6oi-4; A. Robortson and A. 
Plummer., I Corinthians in ICC., T). 93; G. G. Findlay, 
.1 Corinthians in EGT., p. 806 n. on v. 21; H. L. Goudge, I 
Corinthians in WE., p. n. on v. 21; J. H. Bernard,. 2 
Corinthians in LUT, 71 
CorilithiL. ns . 
ýý3 
n. . -, n v. 13; ii. Plu=. jQr,.. 2, 
.1P. -L33; 
E. D. Burton, The, E- istic, t-. the 
G&I.,, tiý)is in ICC, * Cý. Iriburdh (1921) v-328; - T.., K. PI)b, 2tj.. F,, istic 
-. s 
tr) tho Fý,, hcsians vnd-to tho Col,, )ssians i"n ICC Et-Ainburgh ý1909) j-.. 2U_; T_-F. Wý; stcott st, P. Iulls t,, the F, '--hf_-; sip. ns, Lon(on (190t)ý-*). 23 n. -, n v-17; W. Lo'cki-j-Pastoral Epistlesin ICC., T). 86. - 
160. 
contrast (a) with the flesh in Rom. 8.4-6; 
not according to the flesh but according to 
(RSV, AV, NEB. Vuig. 11spiritum". JB "as the 
dictates")., Rom. 8.9., 13: bpeTc 6C 01 
aapxC &W tv nvEupa-uL ........ xard a6. pxa 
CW TCVF-6jIaTL. " 
.... who walk 
the Spirit 
spirit 
h ýCYTC Ev 
(Vulg. "spirituit, AV, ESV., INEB "Spirit"), 1 Cor. 5.5 
for the destruction of the flesh, that his sp-Lrit" (RSV), 
2 Cor. 7.1 11 ... let us cleanse ourselves from every 
defilement of body and spirit ( &no navT6c ýtoXvaýtoýj 
crapx6c, %a( nvcUpuTor, 
)II. 
(RSV). (b) with the body, Rom, 8.10 it ... although your 
bodies are dead because of sin, your spirits are alive 
because of righteousness", 1 Cor. 5.3 "For though absent 
in body I am present in Spirit TW- C6PUTL 
66 )q 7.34 "how to bo holy 
in body and spiritt', Col. 2.5 "For though I am absent in 
161. 
body, yet I am with you in spirit"-. 
1 
The second and final point of this chapter is the 
relationship between the Snirit of God and the spirit of 
man. 
See also for the above references and their resnective 
meanings and a andbin the following: W. IP. Dickson., 
op. cit. pp. 169 and 429; W. Bauers, WZNT, E. T. D. 683; 
P. E. B. Allo op. cit. pl.,. 92-93; F. Godet, Romans, 
Vol. II, pp. 67,80; W. Sanday, A. Headlam, Romans in 
ICCI pp. 194-199; J. Denney., Romans in EGT, -p-r. 674-7; 
K. Barth, Romans, pp. 283-295; Le P. 11. J. Lagrange, 
Romans, PP-195ý 201; A. Pallis, To the Romans, 
Liverpool, (1920) pp. 98-101; C. H. Dodd, Romans, pp. 
137-143; A. Nygren, liomans, T)P. 312-325; C. -K. Barrett, Romans, in Black's NTC, PD-157-60; E. Brunner. The 
T Letter to the Romans, ýJondon (1959) pp. 68-71; 'V. Taylor, *Romans in EPC, pp. 49-52; E. F. Scott., Paul's 
Epistle to the Romans, London, in SCM (1947) pp-. 49-50; 
A. M. Hunter., The Enistle to the Romans in TBC, London 
(1955) pl) -12; ,. 
79-80; F. J. Leonhardt., Romans, pp. 205 
F. F. Bruce., Romans, pp. 163-5; F. Godet, I 
Corinthians, Vol. I, pp. 255-60; A. Robertson and A. 
Plummer, I Corinthians in ICC., D . 99-100; G. G. Findlay., I, Corinthiana MT. pp'. 
ý08-9; 
H. L. Goudge., 
I Corinthians in WC,, ")-P-38-339; L. Morris., I 
Corinthians TNTC, pp-88-9; A. Plummer, 2 Corinthians 
in ICC, p. 211; J. H. Bernard I Corinthians in MT., 
p. 80 n. on v. 7-1 and more T, arj'ticularly P-50 on v. 12, 13; R. V. G. Taslkcr, 2 Corinthians in TNTC, pp. 100-111; E. D. Burton, Galatians in ICC,, p. 148 on 3.3, pp. 297- 304; for Romans 8.10 and 1 Cor. 5.3; 7.34, all the 
above mentioned commentaries ad loc; Col. 2.5: T. K. 
Abbott, Colosians in ICC, np. 242-3 n. on 2.5; E. F. 
Scott, Romans in SCII., PP-38-9 n. on 2.5; other uses 
of pneuma such as in contrast with the ypdppa 
wisdom of men,, etc. see at the above mentioned dictionaries and especially to W. Bauer's WZNT, E. T. 
p. 683- 
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This relationship or difference becomes most clear 
In Paulls most famous and richest passage about the Holy 
Spirit, and the snirit of man in Rom. 8.1-17 
1 
and in Cor. 
2.112 where the sririt of man and the spirit of God are 
expressly distinguished from each other and set over 
against each other. 
Here then, in Paul's mind the distinction and contrast 
between the two spirits is obvious and fundamental. 3 it 
rules out any kind of absorption4 and signifies fellowship 
and communion between them. 
5 Finally, it would not be 
natural with men who identified man's pneuma with God? s,,. 
6 
1. W. Barclay, Flesh and bT, irit, TI-15. 
2. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, 
pp. 205,207; see aiso W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic 
Judaism, London (Paperbacks 196; ) p. 186; S. C. Smith, 
The bible Loctrine of Man, p. 14 ; II. W. Robinson,, 
, 'Hebrew Psychology in relation t Pauline Anthrorologyf,! 5-. 27-72 ; Idem. The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 110; 
W. L. Stacey, The Pauling VIew 
' 
of Man ) P-132; N. H. Snaith, The Distinctive, Ideas of the Old Testament, 
London (i-9-44IT Pp-lb3-4; J. G. Machen The Origin of 
Paul's Religion., New York (1921) g. 296; W. Sanday and 
A. C. Headlam, Tomans in ICC, p. 19 . 
3. W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man. 
4. W. D. Stacey, ibid. P-133; N. H. Snalth., The Distinctive 
Ideas of the Olcý Testament., p, 184; J. G. Machen, The 
Origin of Paul's Er,, ligiol., P. 56; S. C. Smith., The 
Bible Doctri_-io of Man. 
5. S. C. Smith, ibid; W. D. Stacey, ibid. P-133. 
6. S. C. Smith, ibid. p. 149. 
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Further while it is true to say that St. Paul has 
inherited the O. T. double use of ruach (after the 
ezUle) for a supernatural influence and for a natural 
elemcnt in human nature,, 
l that he is thinking in terms of 
the Hebrew ruach 
2 
and that his framework of belief about 
spirit is exactly the Old Testament framework, 
3 
we must 
not overlook the very fact that4 since his conversion at 
Damascus where he met the risen Christ and found himself 
In a new situation, his personal and intimate knowledge and 
exrerience of our Lord enabled him to look at and inter- 
T, ret everything and this is , -)articularly relevant for our 
case, here, "not through some soaring imagination, not in 
the midst of some demonic exrerience ...... through the 
Srtiritj who is neither rational nor irrational, but who is 
the LOGOS., the beginning and the end ...... Jesus Christ 
in his particularity and existentiality from life to death 
1. H. W. Robinson, Hcbrew 
-Psychology, T). 
282; Idem. The 
Christian Doctrine of Man, -p. 110. 
2. S. C. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, 
p. 184. 
3. W. D. Stacey, o-., t,. cit- Pný-137., 138, ý 144-5. 
4. Compare also with S. C. Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Man, 
p. 142p "the differentia of the New Tcstament, however 
under the doctrine of the spirit of man. does not 
appear so long as the pneuma of man is considered alone, 
but only when it is related to the pneuma of God"; W. D. 
Stacey, ibid. n-133., Itthe true nature of the human 
spirit is discovered only in the sight of God's spirit"; 
see also E. Schweizer., "Spirit of God" in Bible Key- 
words, pp. 86-7- 
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and from death to life". 
1 As we may notice throughout 
Aters or again as W. D. Stacey has it, "Paul's his le 
-knowledge of the Spirit was first hand. Paul did not 
gather ideas, he met a person and in intimacy with that 
person,, his knowledge of both Spirit and spirit grew. 
Knowledge can only be communicated in words, and in the 
Epistles we see Paul bursting to express what he had seen 
and known". 
2 Now if this is the case we may be allowed 
to conclude with two well known New Tostament scholars that 
the s, -, irit of man is that element within him which is, by 
its nature, accessible to the Snirit of God3 or "in Paul 
the human spirit may perhaps be described as the God- 
conscious element in man, which is dormant or dead until 
it is stirred into life by the Sririt of God, or it may be 
thought of as "the Christian personality" of t1men who, if 
we may put it so., are not only alive, but 'Christianlyt 
1. K. Barth, The EListle to the Roman2, p. 298. 
2. W. D. Stacey, The Piuline View of Man, p. 145. 
3. W. Barclay, Flesh and SrirQ, p. 16. 
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alivet'. 1 
Furthermore, it would be a mistake if we did not add 
a comment about an admittedlythorny point and rroblem 
about which many scholars keep silent, that is., the inter- 
ralationship of the spirit of believer and unbeliever or 
"whether the entry of God's Spirit createsanihilo a new 
snirit in the Christian, which exists side by side with 
his natural spirit., or whether the SiArit recreates t1--3 
natural spirit, sothat the Christian possesse-s only ons 
Spirit diferent in quality that of unbcli(-, vcrs11. 
'1 
1. F. F. Bruce,, Romans in TNITC., p. 48; com-p. also C. Snicq, 
Dieu et lthomme selon le N. T., p. 161 n. 2 and 5., 
Biblicral writer i, 4. )uld' r ef Lne man as a rcas-: )nrable 
(ra ti, )nal) animal. Thoy all conceivo him 
essentially as a religious being??. St. P'.. ul ý,:: -lone 
would have subscribed to Platols affirmation I'm-an is 
(a) soul ( (ýVxý )11 but he would have -added, "the Christian is 0. spirit RVE-Wa )- ff In the 
order of words ( pneuma in the first 
place) and the movement of the rhr. -se in the rrayer 
of 1 Thess. 5.23, Paul begs from God the full, 
accomplished and complete sanctification of Christians". 
E. Schweizer., "Spirit of God" in Bible Keywords., P-87., 
"Consequently the Spirit remains entirely God's and is 
never merged in the spirit which is never given to the 
individual (cf. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament 
Vo. 12 pp. 206-7) yet at the same time it can be the 
deepest "I" of the man whose life no longer procedes 
from his'ovin being but from God's being on his behalf1l. 
2. W. D. Stacey., The Pauline View of Man., P-134. 
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This is not the place to deal with it in detail. Stacey 
treats it at some length and rej)roduces some of the views 
of various scholars. 
Some of the scholars hold the first view, although 
from our point of view Stacey's two-fold question is a 
more scholastic and technical one, that is., they insist on 
the distinction and regard "the Sr. irit asýa srecial gift of 
God, not "s pronerty of the soul of mc. n as such". 
' 
Stevens, with wh=" we would like to associate our- 
selves, concludes that 11the human nVE_UýLa is not a 
donum sureradditum which is conferred in regeneration. 
It is a factor of man's nersonality which is develored and 
2 assumes dominance in the Christian Life". Sanday and 
Headlam3 share his viow in spite of the unjust criticism 
of Snaith in some ways. 
4 
However, 6naith's conclusion is that "the word 
1. W. L. Knox., St. Pc-ul ana the - 
Church of the Gentiles., 
Cambridge FI, 19 49ý7 p. 117; a lso W. D. Davies., Plul and 
Rabbinic Judaism, pp. 186 ff; W. D. Stacey, ibid. pp. 
4 133 n. 3., " 134 n 
_, 
5,6; D. P fleiderer, Paulinism., Vol. I , ) Edinburgh (169i p . 
64 ff; . H. A. A. Kennedy, St. Paul and 
the Mystery Relig ions., Lon don (1913) P-135 f. 
2. G. B. Stevens, The Theology of the New Testament, 
Edinburgh (19-5)Z7 -p. 344. 
3. W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, Romans. in ICC., pp. 196-7. 
4. N. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, 
PP-185-7- 
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pneuma used of the natural man is not the same thing at 
1 
all as the pneuma of the spiritu"-l man,, "and further., "All 
men have TLVF--Upa from birth but the Christian 
TtvcZpa in fellowshiT) with the Sririt of God takes 
on a new character and a new dignity (Rom. 8.10). 112 
P.. 
1. N... Thý, Eiýý jUctlYe.. the 016 Testament, 
2. W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, P-135. 
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A Note on TuXLx6r, -IIvcupcx'uLx6r, 
The word -)sychicos is set in shar-Dest contrast to 
p, neumC. 'ticos in the etymological sense and nearly so in the 
ordinary sense in 1 Cor. 2.14-15 and 15.44-46.1 
The -psychicos (AV Natural; Vulg. Animalis homo; RSV 
and NEB unspiritual) is'the Ifunrenewed", 
2 the "unregener- 
ateO and is contrasted with the rneumaticos on the ground 
that the former does not welcome the things of spirit; he 
refuses them, he rejects them. Such a man is not 
equipped to discern tho actIvities of Godfs 6pirit. To 
him they are no more than foolishness. 4 Morris, however, 
goes on to point out that nsvchicos_ is what might be 
described as a biological rather than an ethical term, and 
that it is not to be taken as equivalent to sinful. 
5 This 
view is taken by Robertson., also, who sees no need to 
regard the word as stemming from a surposed "trichotomous" 
psychology., but rather as designating 11the mere correlative 
of organic lifell. He goes on to say that psvchicos is the 
1. A. Robertson and A. Plummer, 1 Corinthians in ICC, p. 48. 
2. A. Robertson, ibid. p. 49. 
3. John Laidlaw, The Bible Doctrine of Man, Edinburgh (1895) P-93. 
4. L. Morris, 1 Corinthians, TNTC, P. 60. 
5. L. Morris, ibid. p. 60. I 
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unronewed man., the natural man, as distinct from the man 
who is actuated by the Spirit, l none the less, Psychicos 
must be taken as synonymous with sarkinos or sarkitos. 
2 
This antithesis is still more clearly expressed in Jude. 
J. 9, (ývxLxoc P, TcVF-10pa 
"XOV'CF-r, T) E3 While the 
unspiritual man is more concerned with the things about 
this life and cannot and does not appreciate the things of 
the Holy Spirit'., the -pnouigiaticos on the contrary., who is 
gifted with the Spirit., "has an insight into the meaning 
of everything" (Phillips). This communion with God's 
A. Robertson, A. Plummer, I Corinthians in ICCp. 4.0; Comp. 
also H. Clavier, IlBrbves remarques sur la notion ue, 
awpa the Background of the 
New Testamen and its eschatology, -p. 30-44remarks, 
TUX Lx6v the ending x6v as in aap%Lx6\) 
seems to indicate that this adjective does not 
designate a composition., a psychic formation, in 
(ýVxý but a derendence or a direction. 
2. A. Robertson, ibid. p. 49; E. D. Burton., Snirit, Soul 
and Flesh, p. 205; R. H. Charles., Eschatolog , London Fl 9-13 ý-) ; the proposition that the I'soulish man"' and 
"fleshly man" are used as kindred and interchangeable 
terms over against the spiritual man, finds full 
support and. a-Tr 
. 
proval in the following as well: 0. 
Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianit 
, I, r. 271; G. B. Stevens, Theology of the New Testament., P-341. 
However there is this difference between j)sychicos and 
sarkicos: "Yet the TuXLx6cq ýLý ýXwj nveUlid 
(Jude. 19) may be lower than tho aaPXLx6c, where 
the latter as in 3.3 and Gal. 5.17,25 is already 
touched by the lifegivi t? G. G. Findlay, ný nvcupa 
1 Corinthians in B3T P-7 3 n. on v. 12., 14. 
3. See also E. D. Burton, Snirit, Soul and Flesh, D. 205; E. Schweizer., "nvF-ZIIOL" TWNT p. 435 n-701,446-, 432 ff., 
E. T. D. 87 n. 2 and pp. 102-3. ' 
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STArit and fellowshilN, which must not be thought of as a 
different natural endowment from that of the -nsychicos.. 
l 
"enables him to penetrate the divine mysteriestt2 and "to 
acknowledge GodIs saving worktY3 for him personally. The 
distinction between the two adjectives is still better 
illustrated in the words of Prof. Barclay; Paul 
distinguishes two kinds of men (a) there are those who 
are pneum"-tikoi. Pneua,, a is the wordfor the Spirit; and 
pneumatikos is the man who is sensitive and. obedient to 
the S-pirit; the man whose life is guided and directed by 
the Spirit; the man who makes all his decisions and 
exercises all his judgments under the influence of and the 
guidance of the Spirit; the man who lives in the 
consciousness that there are things beyond the things of 
this world; that there is a life beyond the life of this 
world ...... ...... and 
(b) thcre is the man who is 
psychikos. Now psyche in Greek is often translated soul 
but that is not its real meaning; rsyche is the princirle 
of physical life. Everything which is alive has rsyche; 
but it has not got 7neum PsYche is that physical L. 
1. L. Morris,, 1 Corinthians in TNTC, T. 61. 
2. W. Bawer, WZNT, E. T. 685. 
E. Schweizer, ITINE-upall in TWNT., ', ). 4ý5, E. T. 
t'Sririt of God" in tho Bible Keywords, p-07. 
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life which a man, shares with every living thing, but 
-neum , spirit,, is that which makes man a man. The 
psychikos is the man who lives as if there was nothing 
beyond physical life; as if there were no needs other 
than physical and material needs; whose values are all 
physical and material values; who judges everything from 
purely physical and material standards. A man like that 
cannot understand spiritual things ...... and a man who 
has never a thought beyond this world cannot understand 
the things of God. To him they look mere foolishness". 
Dr. E. White takes the same view, affirming that in 
the New Testament "soul stands for the animal life, the 
life of the mind and body". This life man acquires by 
natural inheritance, so that-psychico-s can be translated 
in this context as "natural", whereas the nneum is a 
supernatural gift, derived directly from God. 
Dr. White describes the natural man as living on the 
temporal., material plane., with "no insight into sT, iritual 
thingstf. These t1belong to a different realm .... a new 
realm of truth", which Is the level at which the sniritual 
W. Barclay, The Letters to the Corinthians, PP-31-32. 
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man experiences existence. 1 
The distinction which we are examining becomes yet 
clearer in 1 Corinthians 15.44, where St. Paul, nresent- 
ing to his fellow Christians of Corinth his arguments 
about resurrection, sets in contrast the aropa (PUXL%6v 
(natural AV; physical RSV; NEB animal), the rresent, the 
ordinary body with the C-Wpa RVCUVaTLx6v , the 
spiritual, the post-resurrection body. 2 Further I'the 
term is associated (v. 45) with the fact, t3 that "Just as 
the first Adam had introduced the order of animate life on 
the physical or earthly plane, so Christ, the second Adam, 
4 had introduced a Tiew order of life in the S-ririt",, 
We have said enough, I think, to -point out the 
distinction between these two opposing epithets. It is 
E. White, "The Psychology of St. Paul's Epistles" in 
Journal of the transaction of the Victoria Institute 
or rhilosophical Society of Gt. Britain, Vol. LXXXVII., 71955) P-8; Prof. F. K Bruce in his written comwun- 
ication Dr. E. White's parer and in the same Vol. 
p. 110, describes as psuchicos the man who is ''self- 
centred, self-dominated" and'his spirit is uniesrons- 
ive to the Divine Spirit" and pneumaticos the man who 'Is responsive ana obedient to every prompting of the 
Holy Spirit''and ''whose Spirit is en raDport with the 
Spirit of God". 
2. Vie shall consider the Doint further and at some length in its proper place. 
W. D. Burton, Spirit, Soul and Flesh, p. 205. 
4. W. D. Davies., Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, p. 49 
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no part of our purpose to trace their whole Pauline 
background, beyond saying that Reitzenstein'claimed that 
satisfactory paraiiels to St. Paul's usage could be found 
in the Hellenistic Mystery Religions (cults). 
1 
He has 
been sucessfully refutet, at some considerable length by a 
number of scholars and more rarticularly by Kennedy2 and 
G. vos3 and W. D. Stacey too (although very briefly but 
s kilfully). 
4 Kennedy and Davies argue that the relation 
of psuche to pneum and psuchicos to T)neumaticos are best 
explained in the Old Testament usage., 
5 in the light of Old 
Testament anthropology. 
6 
Bultmann likewise rules out a 
Greek or Old Testament influence -:,, nd sees only a Gnostic 
one. 
7 
We., for the reasons given ad loc. and explained 
R. Reitzenstein,, Die Hellenistischen Mysterien 
Religiono , Leipzig, mund Berlin (1910) PP-43-46 in 
general and here cf. 1D. 43. 
2. H. A. A. Kennedy, St. Paul and the Mystery Religions., 
pp. 142-9. 
3. G. Vos., ''The eschatological aspect of the Pauline 
conception of the Spiritj in Biblical and Theological 
Studies by the Members of the Faculty of Princeton 
Theological Seminary (1912) pp. 24d-50 n-55; also in 
J. G. Machen, The Origin of Paulls Religion, pp. 265-8 
cf. 265 n. l. 
4. W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, PP-150-52. 
5. H. A. A. Kennedy, St. Paul'and the Mystery Religions., 
P-156. 
6. W. D. Davies, Paul and the Rabbinic Judaism, P-193. 
7. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, P-176. 
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by the critics themselves, prefer to endorse the two 
following conclusions: "To begin with, it may be noted 
that these all-important adjectives are really the 
apostleys own coinage. No light can be shed on them from 
the Old Testament ...... The t(,, rms can only be understood 
from the apostle's own use of them". 
1 
and another., "The 
general background of (ýUxll and ixvE-u[La is 
the Old Testament, and in an indirect way, the Old 
Testament lies behind the adjectives5 but if Paul's view 
of 71VEIUýIa showed an advance on previous conceptions, 
his views on nvEupaTLx6r, showed an even 
greater one ...... lorcovor, Paul himself gave to the 
adjective subtle shades of meaning, all derived from his 
conception of ITVF-Zpa - Consequcntly, the word is 
Paults word, and the force and effect of the contrast must 
be largely attributed to his own religious insight't. 2 
H. A. A. Kennedy, St. P-Dults Conception of the last 
Things., London (1904) pp. 251-2; also W. D. Stacey'., 
OP. ' Cit. P-153 n. 2. 
2. W. D. Stacey, op. cit. P-153. 
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14. E(C)'Ua or Body. 
While we do not overlook or minimise the 
significance and relevance of the fles by omitting it., 
Passing over that very important and "much discussed" 
(H. W. Robinson, Christian Doctrine of Man, u. 111) term, 
one way be ailowed to mention the double natural and 
moral meaning by referring to some definitions of 
others: J. A. T. Robinson, in his excellent and concise 
r book, The Body, Uondon SCId Press (1961) pp. 19) 25Y 31) 
defines flesh as denoting man in his character of 
creature, i. e. as belonging to the temporal, and 
therefore ? by definition, decaying order, as contrasted to God., "in his distance from God"; see also W. D. 
Davies, "Paul and the Dead Sea Scroll: Flesh and 
Spirit", in The Scrolls and the New Testament, pp. 162, 
278 n-32; Prof. W. Barclay defines it as follows: 
IlThe flesh is exactly the bridgehead through which sin 
invades the human ý)ersonality .... The flesh stands for human nature weakened, vitiated, tainteO by sin. 
The flesh is man as he is apart from Jesus Christ and 
L -and 
Spiri his SDirittl (Flesh t) pp. 21-22; Ambassador 
for Christ., Edinburgh (1960) P-150). He returns to 
this in -another outstLAnding book of his, The Mind of St. Paul, Fontana (1954) emphasising the idea of flesh 
as meaning human nature's helplessness in the face of 
sin, its proneness there to all, deriving from the 
very fact of its "Christlessnessli. C. H. Dodd writes "The flesh is the common stuff of human nature which 
we inherit. P-ul does not think of it as necessarily 
evil but as powerless for moral ends. A. Scheatter, 
Der Theologie der kpostel (19222) p. 272: "The Spirit is the mark of' God' and 71e agent of his activity. Flesh on the other hand, is the mark of man in all his dissimilarity from God". From the wide rang e of bibliography, studies, papers, articles, etc. on this topic we mention here only the following, some of 
considerable length, some short: A. W. Robinson, The 
Christian Doctrine of '224an, pr. 111-122; G. B. Stevens, 
The Theolo, of the New Tr-stament, PP-338-48 (Flesh 
and Spirit J. ii. T. Robinson, The Body, PP-17-26; W. D. Stacey, The PLuline View of 
_14_an) 
PP-154-173; R Bultmann, Theilogy, Vol. j, pp * 232-3; 8 (the term fleshj and also 239-Z6-7flesh and sin); -K. G. * Kuhn., Mew Light in toLiptation, sin and flesh In St. Paul', (he 
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it is almost necessary to confine ourselves only to the 
examination of the word soma which is 11the Keystone of 
Paults theology. In its closely interconnected meanings 
of the word soma., laiits tog. ether all his great themes ... 
Here with the exception of the doctrine of God are 
represented all the main tenets of the Christian faith - 
the doctrines of Man, Sin, the Incarnation and Atonement, 
, it2 the Church,, the Sacraments, Sanctification, and Eschatology 
even although we might not be preDared to go so for as Dr. 
Robinson. His words do indicate the im.,,: )ortance of the 
terms we for our part, shall more srecifically pay closer 
attention to those passcages only, which will serve our 
purpuse. 
I 
1. (Contd. from page 175). finds great similarities) in 
the Scrolls and the New Testament, ed. by H. Stendahl, 
pp. 101-106; also W. D. Davies., "Paul and the Dead Sea 
Scrolls: Flesh ana Snirit" PP-159-171 (he discusses 
it as Kuhn L, oes); W. Barclay., Flesh and Spiri , Dp. 17-22; Idem. The Mind of St. PLul., pp, 147-55; F. F. 
Bruce, The Ei, istle to the Romans, pp. 4 -46; F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, London (1957) Vol. II, ý)p. 402-4; 
an excellent treatment and account is given by E. 
Schweizer,, TI a6pC 11 TVRIT) pp. 124-38. 
J. A. T. Robinson., The Body., pp. 1 
author: In the aid, God .... C. Davis, The Study of Theolo 
and n. 1; H.. "L. A. Kennedy,, ' on 
Paul's Conception of the Last 
soma Alcolourless" in contrast 
9,, 26 ; of the same 
London (1950) P-83; and 
ly, Londbn (1962) P-318 
the other hand, St. 
Things, p. 146, calls 
with the sarx. 
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Leaving aside 811 the passages which denote either 
the external man I'llorganisme physique"., the physical 
body, i. e. Gal. 6.17 "1 bear on my body the marks of 
Jesus" (ESV), 1 Cor. 9.27 "1 Ponniel my body and subdue" 
( SV) ! LId I Cor. 13.3 ...... ý if I deliver ray body to be 
'24 11 .... to the dishonoring of their burned" 
(RSV), hom. 1. 
bodies among themselves" (ESV), Rom. 4.19 "He did not 
wea-&-en in faith when he considered his own body" (RSV); 
1 
or the whole man: 2 Cor. 10.10 11 .... but his bodily 
presence is weak" (RSV)., 1 Cor. 5.3., 11 ... absent in body 
I am present in spirit" (RSV), Col. 2.5 
2t? 
.... absent In 
body, yet I ain vjith you in s-pirit" (RSV), or is used 
instead of 11tantot la personne elle-meme". a personal 
pronoun in the following cases: ET)h. 5.28 "Even so, 
husbands should love their wives as their oim bodiest' 
1. J. A. T. Robinson., The Doýy) p. 27; C. Spicq., Die et 
11homme io N. T., P-170 and n. 3; R. Bultmann, Theolog 
of' the New Testament, I, PP-193-4; W. Barclay, Flesh 
and Snirit, pp. 16-17 cf. One should add here that a 
general presont4tion of the different shades of 
meanings of tho word amývx arart from "des 
Leibes Christill is found in Kittel's TýM (by E. 
Schweizer) Vol. VII, PP-1057-1064. 
2. J. A. T. Robinson, 
_Zhe 
Bog, -8. , y) pp. 
27 
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(RSV), also in Rom. 6.12 f, 12.1ý 1 Cor. 6.15,1 cor. 12. 
21 Philip. 1.20; or may stand for man as being "in the 71 
world" in contrast to God: 2 Cor. 12.2 f 11 .... whether 
in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows" 
(trans. RSV) and in 2 Cor. 5.3, 6, 8.1o. 2 
We are coming to consider whether the body in its 
nature is evil, imperfect., weak and resronSible for the 
sin of man or, to put it in another way, whether the soma 
is identical and synonymous with the sarx and whether it 
I differs from it. 
The identification and synonimity of the body with 
the flesh aprears to be almost complete, when we are 
confronted with St. Paul's own words: in Romans he 
refers to it as sinful body ( T6 aMpa TýC &[tapT(aC 6.6 
mortal body (b) T-W OVT)TW" bpW-V C6paTL 6.12 
Td OVT)Td c6paTa 8.11) or a body of death 
(. tx uotý c6l. tauor, uoZ Oooyk-COV 7.24) and of humiliation 
(. Phil- 3.21 r6 crolia T-9c, TanCLV6CCWC )3. Besides 
1. J. A. T. Robinson, The Body, p. 29; also C. Spicq, Dieu 
11homme selon le N. T., P-170 n. 4. 
2. J. A. T. Robinson, ibid. p. 29. 
3. J. A. T. Robinson, ibid. P-30; W. Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, P-17; Sanday and Headlam, Romans in ICC, 
pp. M-9 on 6.6; F. F. Bruce, Romans, TNTC. $ PP-138-9 n. on 6.6. 
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it must be noted that Dr. J. A. T. Eobinson begins by 
stating the case for this identification between flesh 
and body and it is only fair to give his insissima verba: 
"So there is a aMpa Týc &papTCac (Rom. 6.6), 
a body that belongs to sin., just cas there is a 
crdg ailap-rcac, as (Rom. 8-3) .... Like the cdpýj' 
the aMlia is mortal (Rom. 6.12; 8.11); IfThe deeds of 
the body" in Rom. 8.13 are none other than the results of 
living xaTd adpxa. In Rom. 8.10, "the body" 
that "is dead because of sin" is but a -periphrasis for the 
flesh; while in Rom. 7.22-25, we have the following 
equivalents; my members (i. e. my c'Mia )= that which 
is in captivity under the law of sin = the flesh = the 
opposite of the votuc or inner man where I delight in 
the law of God. Col. 3.5 makes the identity of a-wua 
with sin even more complete: I'Mortify., therefore., your 
members which are upon the earth; fornication etc. " It is 
here not merely, as in Roma-is, "Sin in your members? ': 
ttYour members are themselves sin". 
' 
This may well be so, but there are Pauline passages 
which speak against this identification and suggest note- 
worthy difference. 
A. Robinson, The Bod , op. cit. P-30; F. Pratt, The Theology of St. Paul., Vol. II) PD-52-3, surports this 
synonemety'of both and more srecifically supplies in 
a foot-note (n. 1) four rairs of exnressions for 
comparison. 
18o. 
This difference becomes clear and the basic contrast 
comes out sharply when St. Paul declares quite 
categorically in 1 Cor. 15.50 that: III tell you this, 
brethern; flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of 
God., nor does the perishable inherit the imnerishable". 
(RSV). And again in 1 Cor. 6.13-20 "Food is for the belly 
and the belly for food ..... and one day God will rut an 
end to both .... the body is for the 
Lord and the Lord for 
the body ...... R. Bultmann poses the sarx-body 
distinction clearly. He recognises that the flesh is 
that which must die; the body is that which will rise with 
Christ 1 and Dr. hobinson adds "Paul rromises no re- 
surrection of the flesh, he proclaims it for the body. " 
2 
In addition Prof. Barclay observes that the body as 
such is accessible to God, and indeed can be the Temple of 
Holy Spirit. I-1 support, he quotes the following 
passages: "The body can be redeemed (Romans 8.23) and 
transformed (Phii. 2.21). The body can be taken and 
R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, p. 201. g; 
see also 0. Pfleiderer, Paulinism, 1, p. 49;, J. 
Baillie, And the Life Everlasti (1961) r. 194; R. C. 
Smith, Bible Doctrine of' Man, p. 165: H. II.. A. Kennedy, 
St. Paul's conception of the Last Things, pn. 244-8- 
ýv. D. Stacey, op. cit. The Pauline View of 'IAan, 1:. 1ý8 
ns. 1., 4. 
2. J. A. T. Robinson., The Body, P-31. 
181. 
offered as a aacrifice to God (Rom. 12.1)., and with it 
and in it a man can glorify God (1 Cor. 6.20; Phil. 
1.20). The body can be and for the Christian is, the 
temple of the Holy ST., irit (1 Cor. ) "Equally", he 
points out, "the body,, as such is accessible to evil,, and 
is of course involved in man's physical mortality but it 
is not of itself evil, and its fate depends on whether 
the powers of good or these of evil are allowed to 
dominate it, it has tremendous potentialities for good 
and evil, according as It is dominated by sin or 
dedicated to God: for Paul the body itself is quite neutral 
Finally the difference between soma and sarx is well 
stated in J. A. T. Robinsonts words. Dr. Robinson with 
his usual lucidity has It: "Whiie adpý st, -ands 
for man, in the solidarity of creation, in his distance 
aw[la stands for man in the solidarity of from God 
W. Barclay, Flesh and the Snirit, P-17. 
182. 
creation., as made for God". 
' There remains to be 
examined how two great and prominent N. T. scholars have 
understood the meaning of soma. It is defined and 
described by R. Bultmann: as the real Self, ego, as the 
very essence, the "I" (p. 194): "Man .... can be called 
soma, that is, as having a relationship to himself .... 
Or, more exactly, he is so called as that self from whom 
he, as subject, distinguishes himself, the self with whom 
he can deal as the object of his own conduct, and also the 
self whom he can perceive as subjected to an occurence 
that springs from a will other than his own. 
The B2d We must mention here, and by the way, ! Yi P-31- 
'that Pfleiderer building on the assumption that St. 
Paul is a dichotomist, distinguishes and calls "the 
outer manff body in reference to its form as an 
organism., 'ttflesh" in reference to its material sub- 
stance., Primitive Christianit , VoI, E. T., p. 270, or 
as again he has it in Paulinism, E. T. Vol i., 
YýAq: "The adpý is the material of the (earihl body, 
but the body is the organized form in which this matter 
exists as a concrete earthly individual". (R. Bultmann 
op. cit. p. 192 f. ), such a distinction regards it as 
flun-Paulinell and argues against it. To us also this 
appears highly Aristotelian in formulat, 104 and worthier 
of Mediaeval scholasticism. J. A. T. Robinson, The 
Bod Y PP-31-2 n. 1, insists that Sarx and Somo do not 
rerresent different parts of man's make-up, Eut that 
each stands for the whole man differently regarded - ffman as wholly ý. erishable, man as wholly destined for 
Godt'. He further quotes Prof. P. Althaus to supnort 
his case and condemns the tendency to discuss this 
relation sarx-soma flin terms of the modern and un- 
Hebraic category matterfl, P-32 n. l. Further., W. 
Stacey., oT). cit. p. 186, concludes as follows: ItIn 
its most highly developed meanings , a4a is far away from adpý but in the simnlest sense, they 
are interchangeablefl. 
183. 
It is such a self that man is called somall., l and 
further and in conclusion he goes on to say, "More 
accurately,, man is soma when he is objectivized in 
relation to himself by becoming the object of his own 
thought, attitude, or conduct; he is man in that he can 
separate from himself and came under the dominion of out- 
2 
side powers" Dodd puts it in his descriptive way as 
"the individual self as an organism .... But his 
conceT)tion of the body, as the organised individual self, 
may be illustrated by the 6onceT)t of the sentiment in 
modern psychology". 
Bishop Robinson comes out against them, controverts 
them and rejects their own way of thinking as "essentially 
un-Hebraic and indeed post-Cartesian". 
4 He holds for 
himself the view that "Soma is the nearest equivalent to 
our word "persconality"IT. 5 He further admits that he has 
1. R. Bultmann., Theology of the N(-w Testament, T)P-195-6; 
see also H. Mehl-Koehnlein, Llhomme selon l'a7otre 
Paul) (1951) pp. 10-11,, who follows and re-roduces 
R. Bultmann on this point. 
2. R. Bultmann, ibid. pp. 202-3. 
3. C. H. Dodd, The ET, istle of Paul to the Romans., Fontana 
ed. ('1960) -polio. 
4. J. A. T. Robinson, The Body, D. 12 n. l. 
5. Ibid. p. 28. 
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been mistaken in his olc-ý view about man as made up of 
sarx and psyche' and adopts a new one: It a-wpa , a6pý 
and Tuxý all represent the whole man under 
2 different aspectsIt. 
J. A. T. Robinson, The Body, P-13 n. 1 and his In the End, 
God, London (1950) p. d4 and cf. P-K with F. J. 
Leenhardt., exposition of aM[ta The Eristle to 
the Romans, n. 162, as 11aprropriate organ through which 
the rersonality expresses and realises litself". We 
are in general agreement. His subsequent attemnt at 
a more lapidary statement secms to succeed only in 
seriously over-simplifying: I'My body is myself; I am 
my Body". 
J. A. T. Robinson., The Body, P-13 n. l.. 
185. 
15. Trichotomy: Some General Remarks on 1 Thess. 5.23. 
The only genuine Pauline passage, and this probably 
applies to the whole New Testament, which clearly and 
directly sneaks out about man's throefold nature, 
trichotomy,. is anC. above 
mentioned passage which runs as follows: 
' TIMay the God of 
peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and 
soul and. body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of 
our Lord Jesus ChristTl. 
Since the present chapter is not a detailed and 
eikhaustive study but a general survey of this quotation, I 
see no better and more profitable way of dealing with it - 
by saying this we do not exclude other ways of course - 
than that of a very-very brief historical review of this 
question, in some ancient and modern scholars who are in 
favour of trichotomy and those who are against it, with a 
short concluding discussion. 
We do not refer to the early Fathers - Greek and 
Latin - at length, for we believe that they do not say much 
directly concerned with the text under consideration; and 
1 Thess. 5.23: 
"AbT6c 66 6 Ge6c T-T)c CtpýVT)C &yLdCaL b[laC 6XOTCXC-LCq T) 
%aC 6X6%Xnpov bpMv T6 TcvcZpa xaC h OXý xaC T6 
awpa &pc'pnTwC ýv Tý napovaCa T60 KuPL'OU T')ýLW-V 
anaotý XPLGTOZ T71pnoeL, T)II., 
186. 
when they deal with the matter, either directly commenting 
on 1 Thess, 5.23, or in a general manner thinking of the 
trichomistic problem., they express themselves in a vague 
and ambiguous way and it could be said that their views 
resemble more the Platonic and the Aristotelian. 
However, it must be observed that some of the 
Fathers favour a dichotomistic view, 
1 
some a 
In favour of the dichotomistic view are: Athenagoras 
de fiesur. 15 (12) B. 4.322-23 and 320-21, MPG 1004A-D. 
1005A; Cyril of Jerusalem Catech. 4,18) IMPG 33,477; 
Athanasius oratio contra Gentes.., 33., MPG 25,65B-D; 
Gregory of Nazian. (Theolog. ) Orat. 45 in Sanc. Pdscha, 
7, MPG 36,632AB; Gregory of Nyssa, De hom. Opificio, 
29, *MPG 44,, 233D; St. Basil, Comment. in Isaiam. Pro7h. 
cap. l.. ' 13) IAPG 30A, 140A; St. Chrysostom., in Cap. 1., 
Genes. * homil. 14,5) MPG 53s 117; Idem. in Epist. ad 
Rom. homil. 13,2, MPG 602 510; St. Augustine's and 
St. John of Damascus views are quite relevant, well 
stated and reipresenting the consensus of opinion of all 
the above mentioned Fathers and for that reason are 
worth quoting:. St. Augustine, The City of God, London 
(1945) a rev. and translation by R. V. Tasker, in Dent's 
Everyman's Library, Vol. 2, book 13 cf. 24, p. 22: 
"This man therefore being frame of dust or loam .... 
'When it received a soul was made an animate body .... 
being neither soul only, nor body only., but consisting 
of both. It is true, the soul is not the whole man 
but the better part only; nor the body the whole man 
but the worse part only,, and both conjoined make man; 
Yes, it both calls (the H. Scripture) the body 
and the soul conjoined by the name of man St. 
John of Damascus, exp. of the Orthodox faith, book 2. 
ch. 12., trans. by S. D. F. Salmond, in the Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers, Oxford (1898) Vol-T "OP-30-31; 
It ... He creates with his own*hands man of a visible 
nature and an invisible ... on the other his reason- ing and thinging soul He bestowed upon him by his in- 
breathing ... Further, body ahd soul were formed at 
one and the same time". 
187. 
trichomistic. 1 
Amongst the modern writers who hold the trichomistic 
view of man and are in favour of it without any hesitation 
2 
are the following: C. Vitriuga, Olshausen3 and 
In favour of trichomistic view are the following 
Fathers: Justin, fragmenta, 8 and 10, MPG 1585 and 
1589; Irenaeus., contra hereses, 5.8., 2; 5,6,1; 
2., 33 chaps. 4 and 5; 5y 9y 1; 5)10Y ly MPG 7, 
114) 833,1137 and 1144; Justin: Apol. I pro*Christ 
Clement of Alex. Strom. 6,12; MPG 93 283; Idem. 
Paedag. 3.1; MPG 8,92; 
Origen, comment in Joan., tom. 22,2; AIPG 741-5; 
_ Idem. Comm. in Epist. ad Rom. Lib. 13 18 IMPG 
865 8; 
Tertullian, Adv-. Marc. Lib. 4, ch. 37, also Lib. 5. ch. 
15; MPL3 2.483AB3 552; Tatianus, Orat. adv. 
Graecos, 1,4) 123 MPG 61 829C; St. Didimus of Alex. 
De spiritu Sancto MPG 393 1079-82; Idem. .p 
54. " 55., 593 
De Trinitate 3., 313 MPG 39., 956-7. 
2. C. Vitriuga., Observationem Sacrarum, Am. stelodomi, 
MDqC. XXVIIy PP-549-50. 
3. "The TEvc-upa being vis surerior, agens, im, ýerans 
in homine; the vis inferior quae agitur 
movetur, in imperio tenetur; I Olshausen: de naturae 
humanae trichotomia in Opusc. P-154, qtd. in (as we 
have not been able to trace it anywhere) C. Ellicott's 
St. Paul's Enistles to the Thessalonians, London 
(1866. )) P-d5 n. on 5.23; see also H. Olshausen, 
Thessalonians, E. T. in 
T. T. Clark., Edinburgh (1851) pp. 457-8. 
188. 
1234 Ellicott., A. T. Mason., J. Hutchison F. Delitzsch, 
C. Ellicott, Destiny of the Creature Sermon 5, Pn-99- 
120 and., discussing the text at some length and citing 
some Scriptural and patriotic -oassages., draws the 
general conclusion Itthat a body., soul and s, ýirit are 
the three component T)arts of man's nature. That the 
spirit is the realm of' the intellectual forces, and the 
shrine of the Holy Ghost. That the, soul is the region 
of the feelings, affections, and impulses, all that 
peculiarly individualizes and rersonifios. Lastly, 
that these three Tarts, especially the two incornoreal 
parts, are intimately associated and united, and form 
the media of communication, both with each other, and 
with the higher and the lower clements"; further in 
his Epistle, ibid. p. 85 n. on 5.23, he maintains the 
same view; rejects D. Wette's assertion as rhetorical 
ennumerations and Joweett's. who argues against any kind 
of distinction., as setting aside "all sound rules of 
scriptural exegesis", finnally finds Lunemann's 
attribution to Plato unsatisfactory and remarks' "And if 
Plato or Philo have maintained (as ai)pears demonstrable) 
substantially the same view,, then God has rermitted a 
heathen and a Jewish philosopher to advance conjectural 
opinions which have been since confirmed by the 
independent teaching of an inspired A7, ostleff. T. I. 1 
2. Thessalonians, Lonuon, ed by C. I. Ellicott, Cassell & 
Co. Ltd., Vol. VIII, p. 
06 
n. on 5.23, "This is St. 
Paul's fullest and most scientific psychology, not 
merely a rhetorical piling up of words without any 
particuiar meaning being assigned to them". (??? III) 
3. Lectures on the ET)istle 
, 
to the Thessalonians., Edinburgh 
(i6d4) pp. 238-246 and cf. Dp. 239-242, where he favours 
such a view. 
4. A System of Biblical Psycholog , Edinburgh 
(18692) 
p-110: "It apT-)ears therefore., ' that Paul distinguishes 
three essential elements of man, to everyone of which the work of sanctifying grace extends in its manner". 
189. 
J. B. Hcard.. ' G. Lunvnan. 2 B. F. Westcott., 
3 
W. Borneman, 4 
J. B. Lightfoot. 5 With all due respect to'their views,, 
weight of scholarship and learning, at least of some of 
them., the fact remcains that they have not seriously 
discussed the subject and "their statements are more in 
the nature of incidental reflections ,6 or as the late 
The tripartite Nature of 11an, Spirit, Soul, Body, 
Edinburgh (lb66). Its title is indicative enough 
but special for our case see pp. 67-70. 
2. Thessalonians in H. A. W. Meyer's critical and exeg. comm. 
T. T. Cla-r-k-T1880) pp. 163-4, who argues that: "the 
totality of man is here divided into three parts .... 
we are not to assume that this has a purely rhetorical 
signific-ntion .... The orig n of the trichotomy is Platonic (!!! ); but Paul has it not from the writings 
of Plato dnd'his scholars, but from the current 
language of Society; into which it has passed from 
the narrow circle of the schoolit. 
3. The Epistle to the. Hebrews, London (1889) pp. 114-15., 
add. note on v. 4.12 where he equate's the analysis of 
man's constitution of Heb. 4.12 to 1 Thess. 5.23. 
4. Die Thessalonicher briefe .... von H. A. W. Meyer, Gottingen (1894) p. 247., while he admits that the origin 
of trichotomy is Platonic and in its present form St. 
Paul did not derive it directly from Plato and his 
School of Writers. Nevertheless, he adds: "TEve"UýLa 
ist dann die hohere rein geistige Seite des inneren 
Lebens ( Vour, 
j, IYUXT) die niedere, 
physischanimalische Seite des nichtsinnlichen 
Wesensteiles, Welche mit dem Gebiet der Sinnlichkeit 
in Beruhrung trittty. 
Notes on ET)istles of St. Paul, London (1895) rp. 88-9 n. on 5.23; he sees here a tripartite division of man, he does not like at all the idea of treating it "as a mere rhetorical exTiression". 
6. A. McCaig., "Thoughts on the tripartite theory of human 
naturelf in The-Ev, -, ngel_ical Quarterly.,, 3 (1931) p. 122. 
190. 
Prof. J. Laidlaw puts it, "Yet their utterances on this 
point are little more than. obiter dicta". 
' 
In our own day Festugiere and Allo hold some form of 
tripartite view and "rattachment la pensee de lf. apotre a 
une conception Grecque". 
2 
Festugiere's research, 3 
although Iýnfest pas toute vainefI4 and well worth it, very 
informative and in an excellent way developed, does not 
succeed in its purpose to internret 1 Thess. 5.23 in a 
trichotomisti ,c Greek way, that is, to discover borrowings 
from Plato and Aristotle through their posterity down to 
St. Paul. He fails in his effort and misses the whole 
point, on the ground that his findings and conclusions are 
unbiblical and entirely un-Pauline. 
Alio, on the other hand, excluding'Paulls borrowings 
from Pa gan Hellenic psychology and oven from Philb, he 
thinks (along with Festugiere)5 "that the two h, -zd a common 
The Bible Doctrine of Man, p. 67. 
2. B. Rigaux, S, aint P" pul les Epitres aux Thossal-onians, 
P-ris (1956) P-597 n. on 5.23. ' 
A. J. Festugiere, La trichotomie de 1 Thess. 5.23 et la 
philosophie grecque., in Recherches de science 
Roligieuse, 930. 
XIX 13 PP-386-415. 
4. Ibid. P-388. 
Le P. E. B. Allo,, S--int Paul Premiere Epitre aux Corinthians, p. 104. 
191. 
source, and that the St. Paul's trichotomy, like that of 
the older philosopher, is 'a Jewish conceptI., or 
- of elaborated af0ter jeurish conceptions based on the tex-'Ll 
Genesis". Further, he does not feel very sure and 
happy about trichotomy and says that for the Apostle, 
there exists in 1 Thess. 5.23 TIa model difference only 
between TuXý as the soul in the totality of its 
functions, above all living and conscious, and nvc-UýLa 
as the same soul in its high intellectual functions., 
without implying two creative acts by Godjj. 
2 
Contrary to these trichotomistic views are those 
who see the Divine bpirit in the believer and relate 
pneuma here to the Divine Spirit granted to Christians. 
3 
In the Martyrium of Polycarpus we read the following 
words 11 Etr, "A\)d(jTaaLv Zwý(; atwv(oi) TuXýrq Tc xaC 
a6liaTor, ýv 6youpala RvcýpaToc 'AyCou". 4- The 
Antiochene Fathers speaking against Appollinarius 
1. Le P. E. B. Allo, Saint Paul Premiere Enitre aux 
Corinthians5 PP-103-4. 
2. Ibid. p.. 104. 
3. We may mention here., that about the relation between 
human spirit and divine spirit and the believer's 
spirit to an unbeliever, we have spoken carlicr*in 
the chapter ; >f 0-n nve-Wa or Spirit. 
4. Týc, EpvpvaCwv 'ExxXrg(ar, nept papTup(ou 'AYL'OU rIOXUXdPROU 
15-17 in Patres ADostolice ed. by 
G. Jacobson, Tom. II., Oxonii (1863).. p. 640-. - 
192. 
heresies advance this explanation: 
Thus "Regards býL-wv T6 nvc-upa as 
equivalent to LnLXopr)youpC'vn ý[LN h XdPLC TOZ 
TEVe6pa-roc. So Chrysostom: T6 nve-Upa TC yT)atv 
, r6 XdpLaVa and Thdt.., to the same IvTau. &a; 
effect. ' Next another anonymous exegete explains very 
accurately the thought of the Apostle: I'God has never 
placed the three, soul, spirit, and body in an unbeliever, 
but only in believers. Of these, the soul and the body 
are natural, but the spirit is a special benefit 
(energesia) to us, a gift of grace to those who believe".. 
(Trans. from W. Barciay., Flesh and ST)irit, p. 14). 2 
11OWTEOrc btc &n6arou vi upCa -uýOcLxcv, Tcvcvpd, 
TvXýv, xaC a-wpa, &WýnC p6vwv TMv nLaTcv6v-uwv 
1v TuXý pCv xaC aw-pa Týc yuacwc, T6 U nve-upa Týc 
cbcpycaCac, xobTCaTLv T6 Xdpwpa Tw-v TELcrrc-u6vrwv". 
H. B. Swete., Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in epistolas 
B. Pauli, Commentarii, Cambridge (1882) Vol-ITY P-39; 
J. E. Frame., Thessalonians,, p. 212 n. on 5.23. * 




E. von Dobschutz, 
1 
J. E. Frame, 
2 E. Fuchs, 
3 
and W. G. Kumme, 4 
1. Die Thessalonichen briefe, Gottingen (1909) in Meyerl. s 
Commentary on N. T., Vol. 10, especially: Exkurszur 
. Trichotomic, pp. 230-32. The author insists that trichotomy is not biblical at all, alien to Josephus, 
Philo, Aristotle; that it appears for the first time 
clearly in the Neoplatonists from whom it passed to 
the Christian Neoplatonists (Origen, Apollin,, -, ris). Further, he believes soma and nsych and pneuma is the 
new living element from God., which enters intothe 
Christians. To prove his case he cites Chrystostom's 
Theodoret's., anonymous writerls Cramer, Mart. Polycs., * 
Ambrosiasterls, Pel--1gius? and'Ambrosels word.. 
2. Thessalonians in ICC., p. 212., "The divine in man and the 
the human individuality must be keDt Intact)-an 
undivided whole". 
3. Christus unter Geist bei Paulus, Leipzig (1932)'in 
un-tersuchutgen., zual NT Heff. 23, pp. 42-44., cf. p. 44 
where he ends as follows: "When Paul speaks of the 
body and the soul, means the border lines of the 
respectively human and Christian dealings and not the 
constitucnt parts of human nature. This shows itself 
already previously in exposition of the passage 1 
Thess. 5.23. Consequently the word pneuma - where it 
signifies the Christian ego, has nothing to do with 
trichotomical anthropology, but it stands in the last 
analysis for an entirely different thing .... it is 
related to the Holy Spirit". 
4.. Man in the New Testament, London (1963) pp. 44-45: 
"There appears to be a-trichotomy here, with a 
distinction between psuche as the lower and pneuma as 
the higher function of mants inner life. But that 
would be very strange, and*one must either accept that 
Paul, without furhter thought, places psuche and 
pneuma beside one another herein a liturgical form, 
without the pneuma being distinguished in any way as 
standing closer tO' God, or else one must (which Is 
more probable) relate pneuma here to the Divine Spirit 
accorded to Christians". '' 
194. 
share the same view. 
Neither the trichomistic view nor the view of the 
Divine Spirit in the believer satisfies. Others, taking 
the moderate view, put it better: they think that either 
St. Paul flis not writing a treatise on the soul., but 
pouring forth, from the fulness of his heart, a prayer for 
his convertsyl 
1 
or "the enumeration is not systematic but 
hortatory, to emphasize the completene 
preservation. It should be coinpared 
similar enumeration of Dcut. 6-, k. 5(cf. 
"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with 
(leb) and all they soul (nephesh), and 
ss of the 
with the somewhat 
4.29,10.12 etc. ): 
all thine heart 
with all thy 
B. Jowett, -The E-Asties of St. Paul to the Thess-,, lon- 
ians, Galatians, and Romans, A Tran6ldtibn and 
'Co=entary,, London (1894) P-51 n. on 5.23; G. 
Milligan, St. Paul's ET)istles to the Thessalonians 
London (19-3-2)-p. -7-TT n. on 5.23; E. J. Bicknell, The2 
First and the Second Eýistle to the Thessalonians., 
London (i952-Y -in WC p. 64 n. on 5.23., while indirectly 
refers to Jowett., he remarks that "St. Paul is not 
giving a lesson in psychology. It is a complete 
misunderstanding of the nature of the passage to b, --.. se 
on it a system of trichotomy .... What he is concerned with is the preservation and consecration -)f 
the whole man. There is an element of rhetoric in 




or they regard it II. as a popular statement, and 
not as an expression of the Apostle's own-o. T 
2 
, chology'l., or 
as an eminent biblical scholar and original thinker h"-s 
it., as a formulation coming from liturgical-rhetorical 
W. Robinson., "Hebrew psychology and its relation to 
Pauline Anthrýopologylt, Mansfield College Essays, 
p. 280; idem. The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 108; 
J. A. T. Robinson, The Bod , p. 27 n. 2; E. Schweizer 
TEveluopa in TWINT, p. 433 n. 685, E. T. OP- cit- 
65 
n. 1; Comp. also with D. Pfleiderer, Primitive 
Christianity, p. 272 n. 2. asserting that soul and 
spirit are not different parts, but only different 
names for the one human being, adds: I'Even 1 Thess. 
5.23 is not inconsistent with this, since here the 
apparent trichotomy nvc-upaj (ýUxý and 
ampa is only a rhetorical 
emphasising of the completeness of the man just as 
in Phil. 1.17 tv Lv( nvCvPaTL, PLa OX-T) 
3 
and in Luke 1.46 h (ýuXý pou, T6 nvc-upa pou 
are placed in rhetorical parallelism without any 
reference to different subjects being intended; 
Similarly F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul. Vol. II., 
P-54 n. 4., writes 11the enumeration (- r6 TEvet)'Pa, h OXý 
xaC T6 aMpa ) seems to prove that it is a question 
here of grandeurs of the same orderlt and B. Rigaux, 
Thessalonians, P-597 n. on 5.23 adds also: III1 ya 
un element de rhetorique dans ces fins de develop. Der-cnt 
Paulinien. on ne doit pas y chercher une doctrine 
sur la psychologic., qutil nta pas voulu y mettret'. 
2. R. H. Charles, Eschatol2gy, London (1913) P-468; see 
also J. E. Frame, Thessalonians, in ICC, p. 213 n. on 
5.23. 
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(perhaps traditional) diction. 
1 
In addition the liturgical-traditional-rhetorical 
origin and nature of the uassage under discussion is well 
stated by Masson: Placing side by side similarly worded 
Pauline texts Gal. 6.18, Phil. 4.13, Philemon 25 and 2 
Tim. 4.22 - he draws the conclusion that tI. e formula 
lic, ud uo"u nveupauoc b[iMv is simply 
R. Bultmann Theology of the Now Testament, Vol. I, pp. 
205-6; comp. also with M. Dibelius,, Iin die 
'I and die Philipre , in HZNT Thessalonicher I, I Tubingen (1937T P-32, who says, "we have 
heietoaccept it .... 'that the Arostle here follows' the 
customary liturgical terminology usage. 11 W. Gutbrod 
op. cit. 90-91, arguing that St. Paul in'all T)robab- 
ility has not considered the question whether man 
consists of a trichotomy or dichotomy, that employs 
these particular expressions wholly unemphasised and 
that it will be best to see here a description of man 
which shall be the most concrete possible, and which 
most likely by the names man comprised in the further 
elements of his being, says characteristically, p. 91, 
"So werden wir nvelOpa auch hier als das 
Innenlebendes Menschen zuverstehen haben, ohne 'p, doch 
diesen liturgischen brief schluss terminologisch 
j 
ausbenten zu wollen; 1' see also Prof. F. F. Bruce, from 
his written communication to Dr. White, naper on. cit. 
p. 67,11 .... i Thess 5.23. It is not U - certain that Paul is protounding'a formal trichotomy in these words. it 
would be equally Valid to deduce a formal tetrachomy Of 
heart, soul, mind and strength from Mark 12.30"; Dr. 
A. McCaig, op. cit. P-136) arrives at the same' 
conclusion. *aul without further thought, places 
psyche --and pneuma beside one another here in a litur- 
gical form; 11 E. Schweizer., TWNT, ')., 433 n. 685, E. T. or). 
Cit. P-85 n. 1, goes on ras follows'.. "The greeting is - 
very likely traditional, if not liturgical and so tells 
us little about Paults conception of man (Dibelius 
Thess. 3 ad loc); ori the other hand., W. Noil., The 
Enistle of Paul to the Thessalonians, In the Moffat NT., 
London (1950) 1 3. observes,. "The tri*ple combination 
may indeed have been a current liturgical formula in 
Christian or Jewish circles. At all events, Paul is 
certainly as unconcerned about psychology as was our 
Lord when he gave us the chief commandment to love God 
with heart, soul. mind and strenTth Ollark I 
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"another, more solemn manner of saying jicO'bPMv 
and goes on to equate ftvC-VjIa in this context with 
person - 11 bli-Wv r6 nvc-Upa to youp 
-personally". From this, he is able to render the cognate 
phrase WxXT)pov b4Mv T6 nvc-upa , 
"your whole rersonfl, indicating its two constituent 
elements - the soul and. tho'body. 
1 
What conclusions shall we draw amidst so many different 
views and various opinions? The reply would be simply 
this: St. Paul is not a scientific psychologist or a 
philosopher in the true sense of the word and he 
consequently does not use his, so to sreak., anthropological 
- terminology with literary accuracy and precision, he 
C. Masson, Les Deux Epitres aux Thessolonians, Paris 
(1.101,57) in CNT, Ila, PP-77-7b) whilo we agroc with and 
accept his given account on the text as liturgical etc. 
nevertheless, we are unhapg with his last words of 
the present paragrapl and his other words too, 
(P-77): "Llesprit erait l1element surcrieur, nurement 
spirituel. ' psychologique, ýlus directement on rarrort 
avec le corps1l, which suggest that the pneuma would bo 
the surerior element of the inmost being of man and 
consequently could mean the whole person, the whole 
man, and soul and body its inferior rarts and we 
should very much like to, record with W. G. Ku-a!: ael)- op. 
cit. D. 45 n-51, our own disagreement. We are wonder- 
ing, does not his view approach Plato's view of 
man??? 111 By the way, we may note that rI. Mnparat6TT)c, 
'0 "AvOewTEoý tv 
., 
rý Kaývý ALaO T) -A 
XnI 
Athens (1955) pp. 10-11., while he rejects the 
trichotdmistic view of 1 Thess. 5.23Y understands the 
distinction between psyche and pneuma as that between 
the animal and spiritual (higher-lower) life rrinciple; 
see also W. G. Kimmel., ibid. D. 45 n. 51. 
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makes use of the current, popular, simple and approximate 
language of his time. 
' 
Here., as we have already said, he is speaking 
rhetorically, not theologically, in a traditional, 
liturgical fashion. Here, as elsewhere in his Enistles., 
he does not look at human nature in a trichotomistic way; 
he is not thinking of man as composed of three different 
distinct parts, or exclusive elements or entities, nor 
does he divide the humon being "into three well-defined 
compartments". 
2 On the contrary, St. Paul in the Present 
text is speaking for the entire man, for the whole man. 
He is concerned for the preservation and sanctification 
of manIs entire being, for his totality, for his 
personality, for the man as a whole. lilligan has it: 
"They are evidently chosen in accordance with tho general 
O. T. view of the constitution of man to emrhasize a 
sanctification which shall extend to manIs whole being, 
whether on its immortal, its personal, or its bodily side"--' 
F. C. Grant., An Introductic 
New York (1950) pp. 162-3. 
2. W. Neil 
to New Test htý 
G. Milligan, Thessalonians, P-78; see also in L. Morris, The ETistle of Paul tO the Thessalonians (1956) in TINT cf. p-107- 
199. 
or again., as G. G. Findlay puts it., t1here the entire man 
is surveyed, with his whole nature in its manifold aspects 
and functions, as the subject of sanctifying grace". 
Once more St. Paul emphasizes here the preservation and 
sanctification of man in his completeness, in his totality, 
in his wholeness, in his entire being. 
Thus-lDneum , Psyche and soma are not distinct parts., 
elements of man, but different aspects and functions of 
man himself, of his actuality, of his Dersonality, of his 
entire unity, different names of his entire being. Man 
is not made up of parts, does not consist of separate 
elements, he is a living unity. Man here and throughout 
the Pauline lettersand in the Bible generally,, is Van 
indissoluble whole, manifested under one aspcct or another. 
It is a case not of a "human composite" but of a monismit. 2 
Brunner insists that while the physical, psychical 
and spiritual functions are distinguishable in man, they 
cannot be Isolated from their synthesis in him. All three 
are involved in man as a creature, all three will be 
involved in his eternal destiny. It is clear that Brunner 
The Eristles of Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians, 
Cambridge (1925) P-133. 
2. C. Spicq, Dieu et 11homme solon let N. T.., p. 161 n-3. 
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refuses to regard any of the three as T'dispensable matterl' 
which eternity will ultimately consign to the dust-bin. 
1 
E. Brunner, IMan in Revolt, London (1939) PP-362-3 n. 1 (cf. P-363 n. 1). Perh#s it may be of interest to 
refer to Dr. A. Carrel's remarks on this point from 
a psychophysic and biological point of view, Ilan the 
Unknown., Penguin Books (1948) ', T)P. 115-61 1383 -25Z-, 
which are quite relevant indeed. 
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.%3 
As we enter into the discussion of our las: '*. chapter, 
two things most particularly stand out for 
consideration: 
1. The nature of the resurrection body as it is 
represented in the locus classicus 1 Cor. 15-35-58 
(cf. 35-49)l and 2 Cor. 5.1-10- 
2. The relationship of 1 cor. 15-35-58 to 2 Cor. 
5.1-10. 
In sayi. -. L.; LLiis we do not rule out other passages in Pauline wr.! i7ings dealing with the resurrection body 
jr transf'Qrmation of the body directly or indirectly, 
briefly or in detail; on the contrary, such 
passages are the following: Rom. 8.11,18,25; 
2 Cor. 4.7-18; Phil. 3.20,21; Col. 3.4; but we 
maintain that 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5'are the main 
and especially the most celebrated 1 Cor. 15. 
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The nature of the resurrection bod 
(a) in 1 Cor. 15.35-58. 
After establishing that Christ's resurrection is 
a historical fact beyond doubt and question. 1 the 
cornerstone and foundation of our faith, the heart of 
the Holy Gospel, which will be a lie and delusion 
without it, and also the basis of the resurrection of 
the living and dead, 
2 St. Paul proceeds next to answer 
those who held either the crude Jewish notion of a 
resurrection of flesh in a literal sense or the Greek 
one of a disembodied immortality of the soul after 
death and demand to know the manner and the nature of 
the resurrection body. 
3 
To give a reply to these questions he turns to a 
series of analogies and illustrations. 
We would form an idea as to the nature of the 
resurrection body, says St. Paul, if we turn our 
attention to the phenomenon of the seed. 
1.1 Cor. 15-1-11- 
2. Ibid. 15.12-19 and 20-23. 
3. Ibid. 15-35. 
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The bare grain of wheat must be sown in the 
ground and die in order to give a new and glorious 
body. God gives the seed the sort of body 
according to His will and laws. ' 
The interesting thing here is thatl? aul is showing 
that, at one and the same time, there can be 
dissolution, difference and yet continuity, and yet, in 
spite of the dissolution anc: in spite of the difference, 
2 it is. the same life, the same seed". 
From the sowing of a seed and its growth into a 
plant, St. Paul passes on to the world in general and 
adds a supplementary illustration. He points out that 
there are varieties of flesh., different types of 
animal life: there is the flesh of human beings, 
anot-her flesh of animals., another flesh of birds and a 
different one of fishes. In like manner there is 
also a difference between celestial bodies and 
terrestial ones, not only in quality but in glory as 
1.1-Cor. 15-36-38; comp. John 12.24. 
2. W. Barclay, The Letters to the Corinthians3 P-175. 
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weli. 
Now that the Apostle has removed. the object -ions 
and made his point, he applies this analogy to the 
antithesis and difference between the present, earthly 
body and the resurrection body. 
To emphasize the marked antithesis between the 
body that now is and the body of the future and to 
make clearer his point, Paul uses four contraste. 
He argues that (1) the present body is mortal, 
perishabie and liable to corruption, decay and death, 
while the resurrection body will be imperishable, 
incorruptible and immortal; 
2 (2) the body of earth is 
a body of dishonour, of humiliation, the future body 
is a body of glory, of splendour; 
3 (3) the body that 
is now is weak., feeble and the body to come is 
powerful; 
4 
and (4) the earthly, the present body is a 
1.1 Cor. 15-39-4-1. 
2. Ibid. 15.42: aTEcIpcTaL tv yOopl, tyc(puuaL tv 
C 3- Ibid. 15.43: tl CYnECPC'CaL ýV 6TLjlLa,, ýYCCPC'CaL tV 
comp. Philip. 3.21. 
7-7 ... : 
4. Ibid. 15.43: OTEC C PCT(l LLV &CYOC'VC (a LYCCPF-, uat. tv 
6uvdiltf, 
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natural, physical, and animated body, whereas the 
future, the resurrection body will be a s-piritual body. 
' 
In the fourth contrast, which is the heart of the 
matter and the core of the whole argument, St. Paul 
concludes that if there is a natural, physical body, 
surely there must be a spiritual one as well. 2 
P", ul, to confirm what he has just been saying, 
turns this time to the Holy Scriptures and furnishes 
-4, * a parallel between Adam and Christ. 
The main idea of this parallelism may be stated 
in sumiary fashion as follows: 
The natural body corresponds to the first man, 
Adam, who became an animate being3 through the divine 
act of creation. ' Adam is earthly and passes on to 
the whole human race a form of animate life which is 
the physical body; the spiritual body is related and 
1 Cor. 15.44: CF7TC(PETaL GM11a (ýUXL)t6v, ýycCpeTaL 
gwýta nvcupaTMv. Vulg. "Corpus animale ... corpus spiritalell; AV fInatural ... spiritualt'; RSV "physical 
spiritual"; NEB "animal ... spiritual"; comp. also with'l Cor. 2.14-15; 2 Cor. 5.1; Heb. 4.12 
Jud. 19. 
2. Ibid. 15.44. 
3.1 Cor.. 15.45; comp. also with Gen.. 2.7 and 5-3. 
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corresponds to the second Adam, Christ himself,, the 
life-giving Spirit, who through his incarnation, life, 
death and resurrection, has brought into being a now 
kind of humnan existence, completely controlled by the 
Holy Spirit and consequently incorruptible, glorious, 
powerful, spiritual. ' 
Having answered the questions of v. 35 and 
completed the picture of the nature of the 
resurrection body in W. 36-49, in v-50 he emphatically 
reaffirms what has earlier been said -and preDares the 
reader for the next section vv. 51-58. 
His reassertion goes like this: It is not only 
impossible, but at the same time inconceivable that 
flesh and blood will ever participate in the Kingdom 
of God. Indeed, such a thing is utterly imnossible 
for the simple reason - the perishable, transitory, 
temporal and corruptible cannot inherit the 
everlasting, incorruptible and immortal. 2 
1 Cor. 15.45-49; comp. with Dan 7.13; Jo 6.63; 
Rom. 8.29; 1 Cor. 15.20-28;. 2 Cor. 3.6,17; 
Philip. 3.21. 
2.1 Cor. 15-50: T'To-uvo 6c yT)II[2 &6CX(POL'7 O'TL CTdpý 
xC PaaLXECUV GEOZ) XXT)POVOýLýGUL aL alýta Ob 6u\)(xTaL, 
ob6c h Y, ýOpd Týv &YO v%X ovoll cpo(: m"l)a. wi 
Rp GaIF -1.16; Heb. 
2.4; Matt. 16-17; Eph. 6.12. 
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Since this verse might be regarded as a 
conclusion of W. 36-49 and has a significance of its 
own, let us pause for a moment and see its real 
meaning through the eyes of some commentators: 
St. John Chrysostom and Photius argue that flesh 
and blood must be taken in its moral sense as 
denoting moral frailty. 
' Theodcritus and Cyril of 
Alexandria took it to mean the mortal and corruptible 
2 human nature. Some others understood it as 
our present physical )rganismlf., 3 It... human nature in 
its p-resent material., mortal . corruntible state" 
I 
.... our present mortal nature., not our evil 
propensitiesft., 5 "the body as capable of corruption and 
Chrysostom,, lfadpxa TdC novT)pdq npdC. cLr, xaXc-L-; o 
Photius: TIOL capxLxoC %cL( tpTcaOr-ýrpaaLXcCav Ocot) U 
Ob XXT)pOVOjI'CFOUCYL" T) 
2. Theodoritus: L 
"GdpXa HaL, aTpa -Uýv 0\)Ti'rT)v' Yý&ýV"XaxýL T) 
Cyril of Alexandria ""'Ewr, ta-c( u6 cyW-pa -r6 
&v%Dp6nLvov cdpý xaC. a[[ta, votjT'F'-cjcL DvT), r6v xaC 
0 p-c6\)"qtd YX9r' 
-UT)C. 'OL T] r. CL 7) T) r. .Tc(; 'g jq5-6 3. F. Godet., 1 Corinthians, Vol. 2. p. 433. 
4. T. C. Edvards, A CommentarX on the First. Enistle to the Corinthians, London (. Idb5) -5---449- 
5. A. Robertson and A. Plummer, 
-1 
Corin-thians in ICC!, 
PP-375-6. 
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of being or causing any inconvenience''., 
' ''It is 
stated firmly as a conclusion, that the Jewish 
thought of a resurrection of this fleshly body 
is to be rejected"., 
2 
11 .... human nature as ornosed to the Divinell., 
3 , is 
not the material as distinguished from the 
immaterial, it is the natural as opDosed to the 
supernaturalt'. 4 I'The phrase describes humanity living 
under present earthly conditions. These are not 
continued in the Resurrection (Mar. 12.25)tt. 
5 In 
recent years Jeremias., in an excellent and illuminating 
articie, makes the following remarz: s. about the meaning 
of 1 Cor. 15-50: The whole sentence has not been 
created by St. Paul himself, but it goes back to the 
E. Evans, The Epistles of Pr. ml the Ai-), ostle to the 
. 
Corinthians, in CB, Oxford (1930) P-14-7. 
2. H. Lietzmann., An die Korinther I-II, Tubingen 
(1923) in HZNT,, p. 87- 
3. J. Moffatt., 1 Corinthians, in. AINTC, London (1938) 
p. 265- 
4. R. Xnox, A New Testament Commentary for English 
.. 
Readers,,, II, London (19 4 Tp). 172. 5 7- 
5. C. T. Craig, 
.1 
Corinthians., in the Interpreter's 
.. 
New York F 
. 
Bible 1953) Vol-10y p. 249. 
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eschatological teaching of the early Church and means 
tthe natural man as a frail creature in opposition to 
Godf. Further., the meaning of 'flesh and bloodl is 
that neither the living nor the dead can take part in 
the Kingdom of God as they are in their rresent 
state. The same sentence refers to the change of the 
living at the Parousia and not to the resurrection of 
2 the dead 
Whiteley finds Jeremias's solution correct and 
3 convincing and follows him. 
Allo charges Robertson and Plummer, who had made 
much the same point as Jeremias, with being unduly 
subtle., -but adauces no reason to substantiate his 
judge, ment. 4 
1. J. Jeremias., "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the 
Kingdom of God", New Testament Studies (1963) 
Vol. 2, No. 3., 'P. J-52. 
2. Ibid. PP-152-4. 
3. D. E. H. IThiteley, The Theology of St. Paul, p. 253- 
A 
4. P. Allý Premiere E2itre aux Corinthians, Paris (1956 3, p. 431 on 15-50; also in D. E. H. Whiteley, .e ibia. p. 253 n-l- 
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The remaining section of the text runs as 
foliows: St. Paul sCays with a solemn way and firmness., 
we shall not all die, but we shall all pass through 
a change and transformation. 
2 This "change will not 
be a long-drawn-out affairt', 3 but on the contrary will 
be a sudden one, instantaneous, will take place in the 
twinkling of an eye, when the last trumpet sounds. 
As soon as the trumpet sounds the dead shall be 
raised imperishable and incorruptible and we (the 
living) shall be changed as well. 
4 
It is quite natural an4 almost inevitable to give 
an answer to the question: how shall we be trans- 
formed and raised up? Paul's answer to this question 
is positive and 11-a wholly Christ-centred and a 
.5 He says quite ex., wholly moral one" Aicitly that 
There are some other readings or variants here. 
We for our part follow that of AV., RSV., NEB,, JB h KaLvý ALaO. Jinn ed. BFBS and the rccent 
eb. ition of Greek New Testament ed. by K. Aland, 
M. Black, Am. B. S., BEBS etc. 
2. 1 Cor. -15-51; comp. also with 1 Thess. 4.15,17. 
3. L. Morris, 1 Corinthians in TNTC, p. 233. 
4. Ibid. 52; comp. with. ý'Igtt. 24-31; Rev. 8.2; 
Esdr. 6.23. 
5. C. F. D. Moule., "St. Paul and Dualism: The Pauline 
Condeption of 'Resurrection" in New Testament 
Studies (1966) Vol. 12, No. 2., p. 10FT-. 
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God who raised Our own Lord Jesus Christ from the 
dead will also raise us by His power. 
' St. Paul 
here does not speculate, he does not use vague and 
incomprehensible terms, he does not play with the 
words, he does not use ambiguous expressions -and Dut 
across into peopie's minds dubious and false ideas; 
quite the opposite., he makes use of simple words and 
clear statements; he speaks out from the bottom of 
his heart, from the inmost part of his very being, 
with unusual, unsurpassed firmness and certainty, as 
he feels, as he believes, as the Holy Spirit insTires 
him. 
His words imply and convey to every Christian this 
most fundamental and important message: we are not 
immortal creatures by nature, in our own right; we do 
not possess immortality within us or a potentiality 
capable of giving immortality; we shall be transformed 
and raised up from the dead through the infinite love 
and mercy of God, by the Grace and glorious power of 
God., through our Redeemer and Saviour, through the 
crucified and Risen Christ, who has been raised up by 
1 Cor. 6.14; 15.20-22; 2 Cor. 4.14; Rom. 8.11; 
5-1 6.5; Philip. 3.21; ' ýOlos; 3-1-4p I. Thess. 
4.1 comp. With MAttO 22-31-ý32; * Jo 6-392 40p' 
44,54; 11.25; Acts 4.2. 
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the Father. 
Our own resurrection then is not our own 
natural possession, it is the gift of God to us, it 
is the beneficence of God towards us. 
In the remainder of the section, St. Paul reminds 
us of-the coming change. He distinguishes again 
between perishable and imperishable, adding for the 
first time here the word immortality, not 
necessarily in the Platonic sense, far from it. 
1 
For St. Paul, Our Lord's resurrection and victory 
over death are so profound and fundamental that, by 
combining and adapting Isa. 25.8 and Hos. 13-14, he 
celebrates and declares triumphantly the 
annihilation of death, the victory over sin and death 
and., in a word, the final triumph which is due to God 
through our risen Lord and Saviour Christ. 
In v-58, as elsewhere, we can trace the great- 
ness of his mind and personality. He is the 
theoritician but simultaneously the practical minded 
man. He deals with abstract and abstruse subjocts 
1.1 Cor. 15-53,54. 
2.1 Cor. 15-55-57. 
213. 
many times, but on the other hand puts them into 
practice and applies them in every-day life, urging 
others to follow the same course of action. 
Thasheý closes the whole chapter with a practical 
conclusion. Knowing very well that the Corinthians 
were prone to fickleness, inconstant, easily 
changeabie in their faith and full of doubts, he urges 
them never to give in and admit defeat, but to stand 
firm and immovable in the hope of future glory, doing 
GodIs work, applying God's will in their daily lives 
and serving God as it pleases Him., taking into account 
that their labour and strife will not be in vain, 
' 
or 
as two commentatDrs, in their standard work have it: 
"They must get rid of the unsettled and unfruitful 
state of mind caused by habitual sce-, ticism, and must 
learn to be firmly seated, so as to be able to resist 
the false teaching and other hostile forces that would 
carry them away (Col. 1.23). Let there be less 
1.1 Cor. 15-58--- 
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speculation and more work. Ill 
Since we have already outlined St. Paul's teaching 
on the resurrection body, we must ask how are we to 
uncterstand his words, how after all shall we express it 
in modern terms? 
Right from the outset we must rule out any notion 
of tho, future resurrection body as being similar to our 
physical one, to ttie material, earthly 
A. Robertson and A. Piummor. I Corinthians in ICC, 
P-379; some scholars, in order to exvlain better 
the meaning of the present -,., ssage, quote 
Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 2-zl-3 
where AristotlO is insisting on morol actions 
being the outcome of conscious, steady character. 
"In the case of moral excellence a man uiust know 
what he is doing, then he must choose to do it and 
to do it for its own sake, and finally his actions 
must express a stable., immovable character". G. G. 
Findiay, 1 QDrintD: V- ID ,, D§ 
in BGT, , . 943 n. on v-58; A. Robertson anc! A. Plummer, 1 Corinthians in ICC, 
P-379 n. on v-58; J. Moffatt, I Corinthians in 
,. VLNTC, p. 269; G. Simon, -The 
First Eristle to the 
Corinthians, in Torch Bible (paperback) M-A Press, 
(1965) P_75_ý3- rL 
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body; 1 such a view would be a grossly misleading 
Most of the Greek and Latin Fathers, generally 
speaking, are moving towards these lines. They 
assume the identity of the risen to the natural 
body and believe in the resuscitation of the very 
same body that lived on earth: Justine the Martyr, 
A, pol. 1 pro Christ, 18,19, MPG 6, PP-356-7; 
Athenugoras., Do rbsurr. '15,18-. 25, MPG 6 pp. 1004-5 
and 1009-24. The interesting point about 
Athenagoras is that he thinks of man as a composite 
being, soul and body together, not as soul or body 
alone and such a happy partnership of soul and body 
will rarticipate in the future life; Irenaeus, Con. 
Hereses. 5.3., 3 MPG 7) P-1131; Tertulian De resurr., 
T'V ý carn. cap. LII., ,, dPL 2 pp. 918-9,923 Jerome Con. Joan Hieros. 16., MPL 23 pp. 
S; 
4- 
Methodius of Olympus, De resurr. 2.3. MPG 1; 2 p. 268; Eustathius of Antioch., De engastr. con. Ori, en, 22, 
IAPG 18, p. 660; EI)iT)hanius ad 'Hae. r. Lib. 2) tom. 2,, 
Haer. 64.20-22 14PG 42 1p. 63-8; ibid. Haer. 66. 
34-42., PP-87-92 (all týe three aTiti-Orig. enists); 
Ambrose,, Do excess. Sat. 2.87,88, MPL 16) P-1398; 
Augustine., De civitate Dei, Lib. 22 CaP. 13-30 Cf- 
19-21, MPL 41) pp-776-804; Chrysostom, Hom. in ep, 
2 ad Cor. hom. 10 MPG 61., pp. 466-74; gpm. in Ep. 1 
ad Cor. 41.2 IMPG 
61 Pr-356-7. although5ýýasserts the 
identity of the two bodies., nevertheless lays 
stress in particular on the Pauline distinction 
between the -' 7resent and the futare body. Origen, 
Con. Cels. 5 18-19 11"G 11 Dp. 1205-9; ibid. 3.41y 
PP-0172-3 iýld. cf 4 56, '61 pný. 1121-28; ibid. 7. 
32 PP-144-66; ibiL 
L49 'Pal589; idem. De Princ. 
2.10.3 M. PG 11 pp. 235-6; ibi - 3.61 
6 PP-338-409 
adhering to Platonism adopts a sniritual and 
idealistic theory; Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 2. 
17,1APG 35 pp. 426-8; ibid. Orat. 7.21-3 ýTt-T-K-5; 
Gregory of Nyssa, De hon- onif. 27 MPG_441 pp. 225-9; 
idem. De anim. et resurr. MPG 46 PP-73 80 and 145-9; 
and rerhars Basil the Great, Hexaem. hom. 8.8 MPG 
29 pp. 184-5; idem. homin d. temp. fam. et 5 ICC 9 
MPG 31 PT-327, ado7ted the idealizing and spiritual- 
izing views of Origen; some other Fathers ýollow 
cautiously along lines reminiscent of Origen but 
they aviod anything which is prominent Oripenistic 
element: Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. 18.18, MPG 33 
p. 1040; Amphilochius, sentent et e2Lcer. 10 MPG 391 
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interpretation of St. Paults words. 
The resurrection body while it will have real 
organic continuity with the former natural body and an 
identity of essence, it will be an entirely different 
organization, absolutely distinct from its earthly 
counterpart. It will be the transformed human 
nature, renewed by the Holy Sririt. It will be an 
organic individual., a psycho-physical organism, a form 
of existence free from the limitations and imrer- 
fections of this physical life (Mark 12.25 and 1 Cor. 
6.13) and similar to that of our Risen Lord and 
Saviour Jesus Christ, fit and well-adapted for the 
glorious and rerfect life of the eternal Kingdom of God. 
(Contd. from page 215). p. 108; Didimus of Alex. 
'frg. in ep. 2 ad Cor. ' 5.1,21' MPG 39 P-1704; 
Isidore of Pilousýio Erist. Lib. 2. ep. 43; St. 
Thomas Aquinas, The I'Summa- Theolog1call part Ksuppl. ) 3Y QQ 75) 78., * 79 c0 pp. 116-128) 148- 85, ed. -and trans. by Dom. Fathers, adopts the 
doctrine of the identity ofthe risen to the 
natural body of the Ancient Church with many 
strange conjectures, such as tho numorical identity 
of the body which dies and rises again; H. Clavier 
"Breves ... sur la notion de a-wpa nvcvpaTLx6v in the Background of the N. T. and-its EschatologY. 
ed. by W. D. Davies and D. Daube, P-347 n. 4) argues 
against Thomas Aquinas's numerical identity and 
finds a recent article J-W. Cobb IfThe Nature of the Resurrection Body" in the Revi6w and Ex-nositor (Oct. * 1952) p. 435 ff, interesting, but inadequate- 
and unconvincing. 
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Thus St. Paul's resurrection body is rendered in 
modem terminology as the complete man., organism or 
frame., the real man, the individual., 'Ithe somatic 
identity", l the personality. 2 as the termination and 
perfection of the whole man before God who gives 
him eternal life. 
M. E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, study of 
1 Corinthians 15) SCM Press . (1962) p. 94; -it may be 
of interest to note that R. J. ' Daly., reviewing the 
above Interpretation in New Testament Abstracts 
(Spring 1963) Vol. 7, No. 33 P-369-2 972 r. finds 
that Dah11 
's 
study has several weaknesses, among 
which theimost im]portant are: (1) Dahl neglects 
the role of Jesus Christ1s Resurrection, the most 
essential element in thelinterpretation of 1 Cor. 
15. (2) "The main handicap of this highly stimul- 
ating'inteirpretation seems to be the singling out 
of the individual and physical aspect of resurrect- 
ion at the expense of its christological, 
soteriological and communal basis". 
2. A. M. Hunter, Internreting Paul's Gospel, SCIA (1962) 
PP-54 and 133; ideý. ' Introducing Net4, Testdmdnt 
. 
Theology, SCM (1963 ) P-101 idem. The Gospel* 
According to St. Paul, SCM 
4966) 
P-35; see' also 
C. 1. Anderson Scott 'Christianity according to St. 
Paul, Cambridge (1986) p. 23d; J. Moffat, 1'Corin- 
thians in 14NTC p. '260. It must be 'noted further., ' 
that in favout of the resurrection body as meaning 
the resurrection of the entire., same, real, whole 
man, individual, living whole, and the like, are 
also the following: G. G. Findlay, 1 Corinthians in 
EGT P-746; H. L. Goudg'e, ' 1 Corinthians in WC pp. '161 
and 164; R. 'Niebuhr, The *Ndture and Des_tiný of-Man 
London (1944) Val-II DP-306-ý7; ' C. T. Craig., ' 1'''' 
Corinthians in IB p. '253; L. Morris., 1 Corinthians 
in _TNTC P. 34; W. Barclay, The Letters to'the - 
Corinthians, P-175; * I-LI. E. Thrall. ' 1 and 2 Corinth- 
. 
Ian s (10 .., 
675 in the CBC P-113; K' Rahner, Theo- 
logical Investigations: 
-Man 
in ihe Church, Vol. II 
'') pp. 210-il; K. Rahner,, Herbert Vdrgrimlei., 
ItEschatology., Resurrection of the Flesh't, Concise 
Theological Dictionar q Herder-Burn's and Oates, Frciburg-ýLohdon (1965ff pp-150,409. 
1 
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(b) Next St. Paul takes up the question of the 
resurrection body again in 2 Corinthians 5.1-10. The 
whole section might be one of the finest Passages 
in his writings and its verses might be too beautiful 
and full of meaning which "afford an admirable examT)le 
of. the imv. ortance of attending, not merely to the 
words at the moment before us, but to the inind of St. 
Paul as a whole". 
1 This might -ýýcrhars bc so, but we 
must not forget that the 1ý, resent i)cassago under discussion 
is, at the same time, one of the most obscure -1-wassages 
in the Pauline letters., if not in the whole Now 
Testament because of the mixture of metaphor and is 
full of difficult -probiems. No wonder then, that 
there is the variety of interr, retations and divergence 
of opinions on the matter. 
Now let us recapitulate it first then consider 
very briefly the Problems involved. 
Onde more St. Paul affirms emphatically that we 
know that when we are done with the earthly body, the 
I house of our tabernacle, with our llpersonality-involved- 
1. H. L. Goudge, 2 Corinthians in WC 
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in-perishable body"' we have a heavenly house, 
2 
lipersonality-glorified-by-spiritual-body".., a 
building made, not by man, but by God. From the 
image of the earthly body as a tent, St. Paul points 
to that of clothing. Ile groan and earnestly desire 
to be clothed with the house which is from Heaven; 
with such clothing ve shall not be found naked. 
3 
While his exl,. ressions are as human and homely as 
anybody elsets, nevertheless., he does not wish to be 
unclothed and strinred of this house; on the contrary 
he earnestly longs to nut on a heavenly garment over 
it., so that what is mortal is swallowed up by life. 4 
1. R. P. C. Hanson., 2 Corinthinns (Torch ser. ) London 
(1954) p. 46, in SCIM; also in D. E. H. Whiteley., The 
Theology of St. Paul., D. 254 ns. 69 and 70. 
2. Ibid. rp. 46 and 24.6 ns. 69,70. 
3- 2 Cor. 5-1-3: '? O'Lf6aýLEV y6p 8, uL Hv h biCycLoc h4v 
otxCa To-v axývovC xaTaXvOý, otxo5oýLýv ýx Oeo-u 
C 'XO[LCV 
'7 
Oth(aV &XCLPO1OC1OTOV at(LVLOV ýV ToLq obpavoLc.... 
,r6 OLL (ýOt-ýf) pL0V u6, ý4 obpavot tTcev56aqccrOqL ý'ýrTLL 
Lea, comp. 1 also with' 4 *'l 
5; 2Pe ty. 
-Ls. 
1 
38-12; Rom. 8. ý-3-, - 1 Cor., 15.44--49., 51-53; Col. 
3-3-4; Ph. 3.20. 
1 4.2 Cor- 5-4. ' ey y ob OýXopev bt6ýaaaOaL &XX 
bEC\)(S6CTaaOaL, tva xauaTwO-ý v6 OvT), u6v ýn6 uýr, ýwýr, 111 
comp. with Is. 25-8; 1 Cor. 15-53-54. 
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In addition to it and in v. 5. the Apostle goes on to 
insist time and again that it is God who effects this 
change., by His Sririt, who was given to us as a 
guarantee, TIplcdge and instalment") (Moffat) the Q 
assurance of its truth. ' 
The resuiae of the vvs. 6-8,1 think is simnly 
this: though the assurance of the Holy Snirit Insrires 
confidence, the fact remains that the life in the body 
is iikened to the life of an exile away from Christ; 
for it Is by faith we walk, not by sight. When we can 
see God face to face, then we shall have full 
communion, fellowship and union with Christ; for that 
reason we would really rather be away from the body and 
2 at home with the Lord. 
Finaily, he concludes that our most important task 
is to do God's will here and nleU-se Him., for we must 
all appear before the judgment seat of Christ and each 
of us will receive his due reward or punishment for 
2 Cor. 5.5; comp. with Rom. 8.16) 23; 2 Cor. 1.22. 




jInX/%OV ýX6T)ýLýaaL LX TOV) CF6pCLTOC. 
xaC Lv6TIp-WaL np6c T6V K6PLOV". 
see also Phil. 1.23. 
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the things he did in the body, good or bad. 
' 
2. After the recapitulation of the above 
contraversial section, its relation to I Cor. 15 calls 
for some comments. 
In v. 1 and indeed in the whole passage, some 
scholars detect a hellenization, hellenistic 
influences. 
Thus Thackeray traces a hellenistic influence on 
Paulf. s thought and in particular a literary connection 
only - without any basic alteration of his views 
concerning the resurrection body - between 2 Cor. 5-1., 
4 and Wisdom 9.15: "for a rerishable body -,, resses 
down the soul, and this tent of clay weighs dovm the 
teeming hiind" (trans. JB) 
cp, &., ap-u6v -y, dp' affý& Pap'6vcL 4wXýpj'. xat P0CL vt! 
-y,, E: C5&cr. ax, ýv,, oc, , toUv Tco%uyp6=u, 8a. 
2 
whichgoes bacic to Pythagoreans and Plato. 
2 Cor. 5.9-10. 
2. For parallels and other references see also in 
C. Clemen, Primitive Christianity and its non- 
Jewish Slurces,, Edinburgh (1912) r. p. 68-9; H. 
Windisch., Der Zweite ýKorintherbrief, Gottingen 
(1924) P. 1-5'9-; 14. L. Knox, St. Raul 
- and 
the Church 
of the Gentiles., Cambridge (1939) ! )7ý-136-7 n. 8; 
W. D. Davies., Pýiul and Rabbinic Judaism., rr-311-12, 
n. l. 
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Further, somo other scholars who support the 
above view, argue as follows: Windisch argues that 
St. Paul shows here a clear similarity to Hellenism in 
his dualistic anthropology. ' Here are his words: 
I'Mit dem Griechentum und der durch Plato beeinfluszten 
hellenistischen Religionsphilosophie teilt Paulus 
jedenfalls die dualistiche Antropologie und das 
bedruckende -Befuhl, desz dioser irdische Leib eino Last 
fur den Geist ist., ein beongendes Kleid, eine Fessel 
oder ein Gefangnis, wio die Hellenisten in ihren 
Vergleichcn es ausdruckten'l. 1.1 
Knox., starting from his general position that 
Paulls'lepistles show a progressive adaptation of the 
Christian message to the general mental outlook of the 
1. H. I-Jindisch, Der Zweite Korintherbrief, p. 164; R. 
Bultmann, Theology of the New Testar-. ient, I. pp. 201-2. accepts the sa-me position: "The case of 2 Cor. 5.1 ff is different. Here Paul comes very 
close to Hellenistic-Gnostic dualism not merely in 




maintains that St. Paulfs 2 Cor-5 
Itis largely devoted to a complete revision of Pauline 
eschatology in a Hellenistic sense". To prove his case 
he discusses it at some length in the succeeding pages 
and makes the points: the Apostle, on the one hand, 
speaks about the body as a burden, from which he 
earnestly longs to be delivered; 
2 
on the other hand, 
the notion that the "present state of the Christian 
life as one in which the soul was an exile from its 
true home in heaven", because the soul itself or the 
highest part of the soul t1was of divine origin and, 
although a celestial being,, imprisoned in the material 
W. L. Knox, St. P-ul and the Church of the Gentiles) 
p. 26 n. 2; '-*ibi-d. p. 128. Others who take the same 
view in a different way are: Pfleiderer, Teich-mann, 
Holtzmann and others, whose views are examined and 
criticised by A. Schweitzer, Paul and his Inter- 
preters, London (1912) pp. cf. 69 ff; C. Clcmen, 
Primitive Christianity and - 
its non-Jewish Sources. 
P-367, where he supports the view that 2-5.! -'10 depends on Greek philosophy and that the same 
passage is ftthe clearest instance of Paulfs 
indebtedness to Greek ph-losophy"; W. H. P. ' Hatch 
I'St. Paul's view of the future life" in Paulus- 
Hellas-061mmene, Athens (1951) p. 96, concludes that 
though Judaism 'and Hellenist religion fundamentally 
are quite distinct and differ a great deal in almost 
all points, notwithstanding they exercised an influence on the formation of Paulls ideas on the future life. 
2. W. L. Knox., St. Paul and the-Church of the Gentiless 
pp. 136-7 
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world". is basically of Hellenistic origin. 
1 
A refutation of the above view is carried out by 
Schweitzer,, 2 Davies, 3 and Grundmann. 
4 Their 
contentions may be expressed in Davies words: "The 
language of Paul can be explained without recourse to 
Helienistic sourcesti. 
5 
Some other scholars maintain that St. Paults 
thought in the interval between writing 1 Cor. 15 and 
writing 2 Cor. 5.1-10 had undergone a very significant 
development, that is, reviewing his previous Dosition 
of the matter (in 1 Cor. 15) in the face of death 
(2 Cor. 1.8-10), he now Duts forward new ideas. 
W. L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, 
p. 140. 
2. A. Schweitzer The Mysticism of Paul the knostle, 
London (1931ý P-134. 
3. W. D. Davies., Paul ond Rabbinic Judaismy PP-308-14. 
4. W. Grundmann, It ýX6T)p6wj tv6IP6W 11 in 
Kittells TWNT' E. T. by W. Bromiley, Vol. 2. 
pp. 62-4; ZTf-*' . 
64, n. 2. p 
W. D. Davies., ibid. P-314. 
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Charles., for instance., argues that St. Paul felt 
in the interval between the time of writing First and 
Second Corinthians, the inconsistency of his earlier 
traditional view concerning the Resurrection body at 
the Parousia and now in the 2 Cor., he ado. pts the 
resurrection'of the righteous following immediately 
on death. He next sees no contradiction between 1 
Cor. 15-35-49 and 2 Cor. 5.1-8 concerning the idea of 
the future body as a divine gift, ý'but maintains that 
they complement each other. 
' 
R. H. Charles, Eschatolog , pp. 452-31 457-9; W. D. Davies, op. cit. PP. *309-10 rejects Charies's views as 
doubtful and hazardous. Others who favour the view 
of progression of thought in this respect are: A. 
Sabatier, The Apostle Paul., London'(18994) -OT). 179-80 
speaks of a momentous crisis "in the great Apostlets 
own soullf and of a Itmarked change" of Paulls eschat- 
ological notions which took place'in the iriterval 
between the writing of the two epistles to the Cor- 
inthians; G. B. Stevens, The Pauline Theology, p. 
343 n. 1, finds Sabatier's view 1.1a'fanciful picture"; 
H. W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, pp. * 
129-30; H. A. Guy, ' The -New Testame'nt Doctrine of the 
"Last Things1f, London (1949ý_5_. 117; C. V. Pilcher, 
The flereafterý in Jewish and Christian Thouph . 67-T * R. Bultmann., Theology London (1940) pp. 1 i. of 
the New Testament, p, 201; C. H. Dodd, New'Tes tame'nt 
Studies., Manchester 1953) pp. 110-11., sees in*Paul 
an alteration of his'viewsý concerning the Resurrect- 
ion Body, because of the extreme danger of death 
which Paul faced (2 Cor. 1.8-9). Further, he writes 
that "logically this should make no difference to 
his conviction that the Lord will soon come, but 
psychologically, an event which lies beyond the 
limits of one's own reasonable expectation of life has ceased to'be in any vital sense imminent. And 
we do in fact find that in subsequent Epistles the 
thought of the imminence of the Advent retires into 
the background" J. A. T. Robinson, J. Osus -and His 
Co6ing., Lonaon 
11957) 
pp. 160-61 n. l. '' 
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Pfleiderer, on the other hand., argues that both Greek 
and Jewish concepts could co-exist quite harmlessly 
side by side in Paul's mind, for a shorter or longer 
period, ? 'without any thought of their essential 
inconsistency"&' 
0. Pfleiderer, Paulinism) Vol. I) T). 264; A. 
Schweitzer, Paul and his Interrreters) P-77, 
finding Pfleiderer's view"lan untenable theoretical 
hypothesis". furthdr remarks ItFrom the whole range 
of the history of thought no analogy could be 
produced for this harmonious co-existence of two 
different worlds of thoughtfl; Dr. J. Lowe., "An 
Examination of attempts to detect developments in 
St. Paul's Theology", The Journal of Theological 
. 
Studies., '(July-Oct. 1941) Vol. XLII., pp. 129-142. ' 
cf. ' 141-42, after examining the character of the 
letters, the chronology, the topic of eschatol-ogy in the Pauline letters and Knox and Dodd's views 
at some length, holds the above view'too; ' He 
characteristically concludes: "One of the 
essential clues to Paul's thinking is surely this 
coupling of opposite poles, this tireless 
emission of flashes of insight which he never bothers to relate to one another .... these revol- utionary ideas with an almost reactionary conserv- 
atism in the matter of social practice, this 
streaky mixture of Hebraic and Hellenic elements 
000 Fortunately he left the whole wonderful 
muddle unarranged and alive, and we are the richer for itt'. In our day some others taking up the 
point In excellent and very illuminating papers, 
assert the following: R. F. Hettinger., 112 Corin- 
thians 5.1-10"., Scottish Journal of The6log , (1957) Vol. 10, No. 2, PP-174-194 cf. 191-4. first' ' 
discusses the views advanced by others and secondly 
argues that this transition and development of thought was for St. Paul important, but not central 
and, though he expected to die before the Parousia 
nevertheless he still lived with the threat of the3 
end of this age. Further, he summarizes his 
exposition as follows (p. 194): "In other words 
although baptism and not death is the decisive 
moment for the Christian, he does 
227. 
This theory'of the radical transformation of 
(Contd. from Page 226). enter at death upon a 
significantly new stago of that embodiment in 
Christ which will be consummated at the Parousiall; 
R. Berry, I'Death and life in Christ: the meaning 
of 2 Corinthians 5.1-10". Scottish Journal of - 
Theology (1961) Vol. 14) No. 11 PP-60-76, after 
considering thd verses of the text 2 Cor. 5.1-10 
one by one and Hettlinger's views on it, and 
rejecting (ibid. 1). 67) the change of mind 
attributed*to Paul., upholds the view that St. Paul 
t1was in two minds about death? '., disliking and 
drawing back from the aspect cif 11nakedness" and 
longing for the other asrect of it, the conimunion 
and fellowship with Christ; C. F. D. Idoule, "St. 
Paul and aualism". New Testament Studies (1962) 
Vol. 12, No. 21 PP-107-23) while he does riot reject 
the supported view of a change in St. Paull. s 
outlook between 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5.1-10, he 
examines it from a different angle. He sees the 
difference between 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5.1-10 not 
in the 
' 
when, the moment of the chan e, as in the 
manner of it. As he has it (p. 1165 t1the change is 
in Paul's ideas about the relation between the two 
phases df soma, between soma psychico and somn 
pneumaticon, betwoon the body of hum. -Iliation''and 
the body of glory, between the t1outward and the 
inward" and further (p. 123): 11the essential 
distinction between his positions in 1 Cor. 15 and 
2 Cor. 5 is only that, in the former, he too 
lightly looked for addition, whereas by 2 Cor. 5. 
he was more realistically reckoning with exchange; 
and that throughout his thinking in the extant 
epistles, he main'tains, with remarkable tenacity, 
a basic consistency regarding dualismU. By dualism 
he rueans not the metaphysical or demonic dualism 
but the moral one, that is, "the dualism of'will - 
a dualism of obedience and disobedience". (pp. 
lo6-7,121-3). 
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Paul'.. s ideas on the future life, on a subject so 
I 
vital and essential., has been subjected to severe 
criticism by many scholars. 
Kennedy, for example, has sharply criticized 
the theory of those writers who hold the hypothesis 
of St. Paulls alteration of mind within such a short 
period of time, a hypothesis which "really springs 
from a literalistic, pedantic interpretation'l. He 
further, excluding any reference of time, of period, 
in 2 Cor. 5.1.2 claims that the same passage may be 
taken as equivalent to that of 1 Cor. 15,38, ? 'God 
giveth it a body". 3 Furthermore he argues that the 
1. H. A. A. Kennedy., St. Pýulfs Concertionsof the Last 
'Things, London 71-9044) pp. 263p 271. 
2. OLX060PýV LX OEOt 'C'XOjICV" Vulg. "quod 
aedificationem ex Deo habemusll; AV "a buildirig of 
God"; NEB Ita building which G'od has 'provided" 
FISV "a building from God". 
3. H'A. A. Kennedy, St. Paul's Concention of the Last ýhings., ' pp. 265-T_; E. E. 'Eliis, 112 Corinthians 
5.1-10 in Pauline eschatology", in New Tostament 
Studies (1960) Vol. 6. No. 3. p. 21ý_. maintains 
thatt'heavenly habitation't-is not an individual 
spiritual body at all, but it refers to the 
corporate solidarity in Christ. He acquiesces in 
the judgment of J. A. T. Robinson, * The Body., p. ý6, 
who writes t1whenever Paul uses the word * 
(except in the purely figurative sense of 
Vedification'), it means the Body of Christ, the 
Church (1 Cor. ' 3.9; Eph. 2.21; 4.12p 16) not an 
individual body". R. Berry, op. cit. p. 62, 
observes that Rdbinsonts suggestion is unconvincing 
and 11the statistical evidence he adduces is in- 
sufficient to uphold his contentionfl; P. E. Hughes,, 
2 Cor. in NLCNT " additional note on 5.1-10, ý. 184. p argues to the same effect. 
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words of 2 Cor. 5.4: "For while we are still in this 
tent., we sigh with -:, nxiety; not that we would be 
unclothed3 but that we would be further clothed, so 
that what is mortal may be swallowed up by lifet' 
(trans. RSV) "give a hint of St. Paul's earnest desire 
and hope of surviving to the Parousia, and so 
1 
escaping the terrifying experience of deathil. 
In addition, he protests against those who read 
in St. Paull: s words "ye may not be found naked" 
(. Olb YUgVOC F-ýPF--9'0a64F-eU ) (2 Cor. 5.3), 
H. A. A. Kennedy, St. Paults ConceptionTof the Last 
Things, T). 265-6. 
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an inte=ediate state, 
' 
calling such notion 
H. A. A. Kenned . St. -P-aul's 
Concer-tionsof the Last 
_JhLnAsy r. 
2N. ' The same rosition is maintained 
by R. H. Strachan 2 Corinthinns in Moffat NTC 
P. 100, who followJs Kennody; G. B. Stevens, The 
Pauline Thoolog j Pr. 358-9. is content to note that Paul ci-ir, not give any definite answer to 
this problem., "beyond expressing the confident 
hope that the belicver enters Lt death into 
fellowship with Christ"; W. D. Davies.. P, -. ijl end 
Rabbinic Judaism2 P-318, asserts that'-there is 
no room in PaUITs theology for an intermediate 
state of the dedd"; Oepke 11 yuliv6r, in 
T IAN T7 
., 
E. T. Vol. 1, up. 714-5y rejects any idea of 
intervening state; also E. E. Ellis, 112 Cor. 
5.1-10 in Pauline Eschatology". New Testament 
Studies (1960) Vol. 6j No. 31 pp. 222 cf. 224; 
Scholars who interrret the "naked" as implying 
disembodied intermediate state are: A. Plu=er, 
2 Corinthians, in ICC, r. 147 ff; A. Schweitzer, 
The mystIcism of St. Paul. P-134; and most 
particularly, 0. Cullmann, Christ and Time (SC11 
paperback) pp. 238-9. citing some quotations from 
Pauline letters, su, )ports the same view; Idem. 
Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the 
Deady Loncion (1955) "P. 52-7; J. A. T. Robinson., 
The Body, p: 1.29,77; J. N. Sevenster, "So=e 
Remarks on the yvgv6c in 2 Cor. 5.3". 
Studia Paulinap H, -., rlem (1953) np. 206-7 and 210-11--and Paul and Seneca, Leidon (1,061) pp. 
238-91 whore he advocates an interim state. He 
suggests that St. P-iul rrobably believed that 
soul in the futurc life "U'. )UIC c-)ntlnue t-ý live --. )n 
separately .... for the Tcriod that elarses between the death of the individual and the 
resurrection of the dead and the last Judgement". The Individual does not lose his identity, but he 
exists in the intervening period in a state of 
nakedness (2 Car- 5-3). "which probably means in the Soul detached from the body". He furth. )r 
accepts the fact that the Apostle does not 
elaborate on the point; F. Prat, The Theology o 8t- P321, Vol. 2p PO-356-9. remarks that "the A-t Os t;! -e-- -says nothing on the subject"., nonetheless 
231. 
Itimaginary hypothesis". 
He goes on to observe on the same point the 
following, which is worth quoting: ITWe do not 
attribute to the Apostle any theory of a slecT) of the 
(Contd. from page 230). lie is of the orinion that 
'the bare facts demand such a view. It must be 
further noted that Dr. Ellis, op. cit. ' pp. 219-21., 
interprets the adjective "naked" in a different 
way. lie firstly believe'that "the Greek trail 
has been a false detour". Next ho attempts an 
exposition of the 'Inaked" on the basis of Old 
Testament eschatoldgy and not on the Greek 
anthropology. His suggested excecSisamounts to 
this equation: in the Old Testament, late Judaism 
and in the Now Testament "nakedness (or being 
stripped) and shame often denote the guilty under 
the glaring light of God's judgement and are 
virtually equivalent terms". Thus naked does 
not refer to a disembodied'soul, but to judgement 
and simply means guilty It .... without the garment1l.; Prof. C. D. F. Moule, "St. 'Paul and Dualism"., op. 





or of a meditative condition of calm waiting 
in -preparation for afuller bliss ... Nor may 
It 2 infer any notion of semi-consciousness or the like 9 
G, )udge is another scholar who rejects, without 
any hesitation, the idea of a Hellenistic influcnce 
on 2 Corinthians 5.1-10, and offers a solution on 
the lines of Kennedy more or less. 
Since quite a few writers have adopted his 
exposition in recent years., we regard. it necessary 
to summarise it very briefly. 
0. Cullmann, Immortality of-the Soul or 
Resurrection of the Dead, " pp. 4b-57 cf. 51-57, 
prociuces thd'startling view that interim state 
for the soul implies "sleep of the soultI., in 
other words the verb koigagnai-koin. onai 
could be said to have two meanings: the meaning 
of death and the meaning of unconsciousness. 
His exposition, though attractive and interesting 
at first sight., is rather unconvincing and it 
does not do justice to his arguments. After all 
nothing is new in his short book. Other's have 
dealt with the matter briefly or in detail 
before him. The great attraction and the real 
contribution to theology is that he draws, with 
his customary clarity and weight of scholarship, 
a clear distinction between the Greek doctrine 
of immortality and the Christian doctrine of 
resurrection of the dead; Ch. Masson, "Immort- 
alite do l1ame ou resurrection des morts? " Revue 
de Theologie et de Philosorhie (1958) Vol. ' 9-- 
., 
T) . 2b5., is of the opinion that Cullmannys'ideas on 
the resurrection of the body and the*intermediato 
state are irreconcilable with the teaching of the 
Apostle Paul; D. E. H. Whiteley, The Theologv of 
St. Paul, pp. 262-71, reaches a like conclusion 
by a different way. 
II. A. A. Kennedy, op. cit. p. 268. 
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Goudge's argument very briefly runs somewhat as 
f ollows: 
1. Vvs. 2 Cor. 5.1-2 arc related to 1 Cor. 
15-38., 47., 52Y 53-54 and refer to the hope of the 
resurrection body to be reccived'at the Parousia. 1 
2. Vvs. 2 Cor. 5.3-4 are paralleled to 1 Cor. 
15-53) 54 and express the Apostle's apDrehensivenoss, 
of dying before the 
'Parousia and so 
experiencing a term of incompleteness (nakedness) 
instead of an immediate transition from the state of 
mortality to that of the resurrection. 
2 
3. Trom vv. 5-10 Paul speaks about the victory 
over this apparent fear with confidence on the 
grounds that God has given us His Spirit as a pledge 
and the tribunai of Christ,, before which we will stand 
at the Lord's return. 3 
H. L. Goudge, 2 Corinthians, London (19282) in WC, 
pp. 45-7 and 52-3- 
2. Ibid. PP-47-8 and 52-3- 
Ibid. pp. 48-9 and 51. 
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4. There is no inconsistency whatsoever 
between the teaching of the 1 Cor. 15 4nd 2 Cor. 
5.1-10. (? 'The second epistle was written but a few 
moJaths after the first., and the teaching of. the 
first Epistle about the body of the future is the 
chief doctrinal teaching to be found in it"). 
1 
What shall we say to this divergence of 
opinions concerning the relation of 2 Cor. 5.1-10 
to 1 Cor. 15? 
H. L. Goudge., op. cit. pp. 45 and 52. Other writers 
who support the same view are: A. Plummer, 
2 Corinthians in ICC, p. 161; James Denney, 
2 Corinthians in Ex. B. London (1694) pp. 1 8-84.0. 
F. V. Filson, 2 Corinthians., New'York (1953ý in IB, 
PP: 326-32; 0. Cullmann, Christ and Time., SCM, 
pp 238-9; R. Hanson, 2 Corinthians, Torch 
Cbmmentary, p. 47; A. M. Ramsey,, The Resurrection 
of Christ (in Fontana Books) pp. 9-10; L. S. 
Thornton, The Common Life in the Body of Christ,, London (19442)'pp. 284-6, in a brief but excellent 
additional note., "St. Paul on the Resurrection of the Body", shares'also Goud els interpretation. 
Points of interest are: (15 2 Cor. 5.1 corresronds to I Cor. 15-38 and 2 Cor. 2-4 correspondingly"to 1 Cor. 15.53., 54 and (2) '? both passages em1phasize the continuity which connects the two forms. In 
1 Cor. 15 this is effected by the analogy from 
nature. In 2 Cor. 5-p. it is effected by 
reference to the &Ppa v of the Spirit". 
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Not much really, for we dealt with the matter 
of the two sections of the two Corinthi"-ns in a 
sketchy way and it lies outside the main scope of the 
present chapter, which is, as it is understood, to 
discover the true meaning of Resurrection body. 
Then, we should be too naive if we should claim 
that we can offer a new reconciliatory soliltioný 
since "great scholars, past and present, have 
confess ed. to bewilderment? 
" 
and "Paul is talking 
about things that no one really knows anything about. 
He is not talking about verifiable matters of fact, 
but about matters of faith. He Is trying to exTress 
the inexpressible and to describe tho indescribable 
0 ... .. Paul is again dealing with things which defy 
language and which baffle ex-rres'sion't. 2 
C. F. D. M-oule, "St. Paul and Dualism etc. ", Now 
o66) vol. 12 p. Testament Studies (1, lo6., 
2. W. Barclay, The Letters to the Corinthians, 
pp-175) l7d. 
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However this may be, we simply say this: in 
the main we agree with and endorse Kennedyls and 
Goudgets interpretation as well-founded and 
convincing, for reasons given adjoc. and on the 
ground that it invo-Ives no departure from the 
teaching of 1 Cor. 15. Since this is so, we may 
safely say that both pass., ges express a coherent 
teaching about the resurrection body to be received 
at the Parousia. 
Consequently., an assumption which detects a 
Hellenizatioh of 2 Cor. 5.1-10., a difference, a 
conflict, between tha two texts, and a development 
In St. Paulls mind must be ruled out. 
The former supposition of Hellenistic influences 
on tho passage has skilfully been refuted, by Davies) 
the latter of the radical transformation does not 
stand logical scrutiny, or as Stevens would put it., 
is "an assumption wholly destitute of Proof and in 
W. D. Davies,, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism) PP-311-14. 
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1 
itself quite unnaturalt'. 
It is impossible to believe that ýt. Paul 
changed his views in such a short time on a subject 
on which he believed so firmly and passionately and 
concerning which he wrote "If we live, we live to 
the Lord, and If we die., we die to the Lord; so then 
whether we live or whether we die, we are the LordIs" 
(Rom. 14.8 RSV trans. ). 
There is not a single Dassage in the Pauline 
letters, as far as we know, which nalludes to such an 
alteration. The alleged 2 Cor. 1.8-9 does not 
really suggest that this terrifying experience Paul 
had gone through could alter his views on 
Comp. with the much quoted Wernle's dictum: "The 
man who wrote the great Resurrection chapter in 
1 Corinthians,, did not possess the capacity for 
altering his opinions which belongs to the 
modern theologian". qtd.. by H. A. A. Kennedy, St. 
Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things, p. 271; 
also-with L. S. Thornton's words, The Common Life 
in the Body of Christ, p. 286, whých point to the' 
same effect: 11... if the teaching of 2 Cor. 5. 
1-10 were in radical conflict with that of 1 Cor. 
15 and were meant to sunercede it., then the 
solemn rrotest of 2 Cor 2.17 would be a vain 
and empty boast". 
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Resurrection in general. The emphasis here is on 
his unshaken trust and confidence in God. 
Lot us bring this discussion of the rresent 
chapter to an end. What has finally emerged from 
it? 
As we have already said., and we re-7eat here, for 
St. Paul the Resurrection body is neither the 
disembodied soul or sririt, nor the embodied spirit 
or soul, but the inherent org--nic continuumý a 
psycho-physic organism., C -rsycho-somatic union, a 
unified person, fit and suitable for the ncw, 
glorious and perfect life in the world to come. In 
more modern terms when St. P-. iul sreaks of resurrection 
body, he is concerned with the wholr-., ness of man, with 
the entire man, with the individual., with the real 
person, the personality, the self., the "Ill., the flegot', 
who will be raised, not because of his natural right, 
but because of Our Lord Jesus Christ's Resurrection. 
Our own resurrection in full consciousness and 
intelligence is not our natural possession, but the 
royal gift of God to us through our Risen Lord and 
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Saviour. 1 
C. D. F. Moule, orl. cit. , ). -Ll6, 
finds the 
individnLrs identity maintained throughout the 
Pauline writings. JpsjLsjjý; ý* verba do not 
readily admit of summary and are quoted as they 
stand: "It is not that the soul escapes from 
the body"s prison .... but that an entire -person, 
a dies., and the same person is 
raised to life. It is not the same form: 
there is a radical tra-isfor., ziation. He dies 
mortal and corru, -)tible and is raised a glorious 
body; he dies animal and is raised spiritual. 
But always it is the same individual". 
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An assessment - conclusion: 
We have been dealing so far in Parts Two and Three 
with the reflections of Plato and St. Paul on the human 
soul and its immortality and have arrived at some 
conclusions. In the present. chapter we bring 
together all our findings and attempt an assessment, with 
the sole purpose in mind of detecting similarities or 
dissimilarities, resemblances or differences6 
Methodolooical considerations compel us to treat the 
comparison and contrast in the same pattern-division as 
In the previous parts, 
The scope of the present chapter allows us only to 
make a general observation on this comparison and contrast, 
before we embark on it, 
Neither Plato nor St. Paul can be regarded as 
scientific psychologists in the strictest modern sense of 
the word, 
Neither the former, writing in dialogue style, nor 
the latter, writing in epistolary form, ever succeeded in 
fashioning their scattered ideas of the soul in a 
uniform, systematically elaborated and consistent corpus 
of dogma. They do not give us a scientific analysis of 
the theory (doctrine) of the soul. Neither sets out an 
ordered system, but both deal with problems concerning the 
soul and its immortality as and when they occur in the 
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course of the discussionp making use of terms, (moro 
particularly St. Paul) not accurately and precisely, but 
with a certain degree of approximation4 
However this nay be, it does not prevent us from 
saying that they have contributed a great deal towards the 
understanding of inner conflict of man and his perplexed 
problems and made some valuable and acute psychological 
observations which have found their place in the history of 
psychology, anthropology, philosophy and theology in 
general. It would be a grave nistalcot and we should be 
unjust critics of both, if we did not point out horo that 
their theories of the immortality of the soul and of tho 
resurrection of the body are in a more prociseq logical; 
coherent and dialectic waye 
2'rom the above general remarks we pass 'on to anothor 
concornina the view of man in both writers. 
Plato views nan in dualistic fashion with accent on 
the superiority of the soul. 
For him man is a compound structure, consistina of 
two clearly distinct entities; body which is mortal, a 
tool, and instrument of the soul and which in time pneses 
away, and soul 
I 
which is a senior and permanent ontityp 
ror tbo difference between the body and soul we sball 
see more later. 
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inmortal, the real Mang in short, the man, as we have 
already seen. 
Such a dualistic description is absent from our 
Pauline writings. St. Paul thinks of man along monistic 
lines. Ilan is not conceived by Paul in the Platonic dual 
fashion, but in the Hebraic one. Man is neither soul, 
spirit nor body alone, but an essential unity# a unitary 
organism, a psycho-physical organism, the entire man, what 
we call personality under different functions. Man is a 
living and indissoluble unity; bodyp soul and spirit 
togother. These component parts have meaning only in 
connection with the totality of hie being. Man is viewod 
as a unityq an ensouled body, rather than an embodied soul, 
Perhaps we may give Bultmann's Ipsessima verbal as well 
stating the conception of man: "Man does not consist of 
two partso much loss of three; nor are psyche and pnouma 
special faculties or principles (within the soma) of a 
montal life higher than his aniraal life. Rathor man is a 
living unity. He is a person who becomes an object to 
himself. He is a person having a relationship to 
himself (soma). IIe is a person who lives in his 
intentionality, his pursuit of sone purpose, his willing 
and Imowing (psyche, pneuma). This state of livinG toward 
some goal, having sorie attitude, willing something and 
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knowing something belongs to man's very nature and 
in itself is neither good nor bad. " 
1 
41 
R, Bultmann, Theolony of the 1.1, T, Vol. X., p. 209; 
S. Laenchli, "Monism and Dualism in Pauline 
Anthropology", Biblical Research (PnUra of the, 
Chicago Society of Biblical Research) 3, (1958-Tt 
15 - 27, protests against those who interpret Paul's 
view of rian along monistic Nobraistic lines. NO r 
for his part, urges that, man in Pauline letters must 
be examined in pluralistic terms, though "this 
pluralism' within Paults view of the nan is not his 
basic concern. His central drive is theological, 
the nowness of the man in Christ as the break-in in 
to the old sarx. 
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Since the real man, the true self is soul for Plato, 
and he gives it such prominence, it follows that there must 
be clear-cut and distinct differences between the Platonic 
conception of soul and the Pauline one. 
In the philosophy of Plato the soul is a pure 
spiritual principle, a rational distinct entity, the 
subject of thought and intelligence; it is the self mover 
and the source and first principle of all other things that 
are moved, the source of lifeg the origin of life, the life 
itselft and as such it is bound to be immortal, divine, 
indestructible and ungenerated. 
TvIbereas the platonic soul is portrayed in such a 
colourful way - still in a general manner - in Paul's 
Epistles it does not hold the same exceptionally prominent 
position. Its infrequent use denotes the vame ar, the 
of the Old Testament and ýIJXJ of the LXX, that is 
breathing, the vital principle, the principle of animal 
and human life involving a state of consciousness, of will 
and feeling, which disappears with death. 
The soul retires, as is well knowng into the 
background and its place is taken by the infinitely 
important word 'spirit'. a term far richer in meaning than 
tsoult. 
Though the term spirit is of paramount importance 
for Paults theology and anthropology and very 
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indeed, we are not to think of it in a platonic sense. 
It cannot be described as a distinct pure spiritual or 
intellectual entity of the human constitution. Such a 
view is hardly plausible in the Pauline letters. We are 
safe, if we interpret spirit in a psychological sense as 
signifying the source of human consciousness, intelligence, 
the seat of feeling and will; spirit is the ruling inner 
power of our entire human existence. It is this power of 
our spirit which directs all our intellectual activities, 
thoughts, emotions, etc, What is more important "In 
Paul the human spirit nay perhaps be described as the God-- 
conscious element in man, which is dormant or dead until 
it is stirred into life by the Spirit of God. Or it may 
be thought of 'as the Christian personality' of men who, 
if we nay put it so, are not only alivep but 'Christianly? 
alive, " 
1. 
So far we have compared and contrasted the definition 
of man and human soul in both writers. 
Now we go on to compare and contrast the Pauline and 
Platonic body- relationship 9 division of 
the soul and the immortality of the soul and the 
resurrection of the body. 
F. P. Brucel Ronans in T. N. T. C., p. 48; see also 
supra pe ; al. 2o in W. Barclay, Flesh and 
STirit, p. 14ý Seta)5-v g'uf f'CL F1 6 5) 'n. 4 . 
1 
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With reference to the soul's origint Plato seems as 
if he were in two minds - and using two different 
languages: sometimes he speaks of the soul as uncreated, 
ungenerated and absolutely without bedinningl (Phaedrus), 
At other times he refers to It either as being created 
Demiurge (Timexis: A =ythical view) or as being produced 
firstj as the first born of all things and prior to the 
body (Laws)*. These antithetibal viewsq as we have said 
in the preceding pages combined and interpreted in an 
appropriate manner lead to the conclusion that Plato har-ý. -2 
envisaged any creation of the human soul in time. 
However this may be, we feel with Proclusq Chernisst 
Hackforth and Rankin that the human soul is a 11process119 
not necessarily, of courset a physical onel'but an 
intermediate one between the true and eternal principles 
and ultimate realitiess the Form and the Universe. 
It may then be said that the human soul is a derivative 
existence like the physical world. 9 depending on something 
more ultimate, more'transcendent indeedg upon the real 
being of ideas, and more particularly upon the Idea of 
Good, which is not only the source of knowledge and trut1A 
and of the very being, but it is beyond beingp 
surpassing it in dignity and power. 
Though St. Paul has not dealt with. the matter at 
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length, he is more explicit about it. 
He ascribes the soui's_, origin to God, He teaches 
nothing new about the creation of the soult for he repeats 
what the Old Testament (Gene 2-7! ) teaches. There it is 
categorically stated that mants, creation as a wholej as 
one unit, as a psycho-somatic organismt is due to a distinct 
divine creative not, by which it was drawn into being from 
sheer nothingnessi As a consequence of this the soul. was 
created directly and immediately by God out of nothing. 
Therefore the soul's creation is the result of God's 
personal intervention and special act of creation in time. 
In speaking of the soults creation we must not understand, 
as we have already saidg, the infusion of breath God 
into the nostrils of man in terms of an independent element 
and distinct spirituall divinep immortal part of nant as 
with Platop but simply as denoting the animal lifeg the 
vital power which gives life to the body and cannot exist 
outside nnd without it. 
With regard to the soul's relation to the bodyp Plato 
treats the whole question in dualistic fashion*,. Soul and 
body are treated as belonging to two different worlds and 
as being separateg distinct and independent entities. The 
soulg as we have seen, in every way resembles the invisible 
and belongs to the divine, immaterial and eternal realm: 
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The body is related to the visible world and belongs to 
the material and sensible world. It is mortal, subject t'D 
corruption and will decay after the moment of physical 
death* But what is more important is this: While the 
psyche is the reviving force of the bodyq confines itself 
in it during life on earth and is likened, by Plato to a 
sailor in a boat or to a prisoner in a jails body# 
according to Platots estimation is nothing but a prison- 
house, a tombs an encumbrancei a hindrance to the soul; 
it acts as a perpetual impediment to the higher activition 
of the soul and on the whole is the source of evil, 
disorder and corruption* 
We hnrdly meet a similar view in Pauline writingsq 
for St. Paul scarcely thinks of man's make-up in dualist:!, - 
terms. For him the body is not a detachableg separate 
part of man which is distinguished in dualistic fashion 
from the soul. 
Paul does not regard the body as evil, responsible Cz. -:. 
the sins of man, and in a word identical with the flesh, 
though he seems to do sol at least in some passages; 
nevertheless other passages spe.; dc against this 
identification and mark the difference between sarx and 
som, as has boon already shown. 
The human body is neither despised nor condemned in 
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the Pauline letters, on the contrary it is given a 
prominent and an honourable place in Pauline Theology 
and anthropology, 
He writes that for the Christian the body is Godls 
shrine, the temple of the Holy Spirits Further the bod_ 
can be redeemed; transformed and recroatedo can be taken 
and offered as a living sacrifice to God, and with it an, -* 
in it every man must honour and glorify God. 
It can be said then, that in Paul's thought the body 
is not basically bad, but is accessible to God or evil an!: f. 
its fate "depends on which force controls it for good or 
evil . 11 
ýL * 
We hardly need to look for a parallelism or at lens'. 
for an analogy on the division of the soul. 
Both views differ widely and contradict each other 
in content and form, 
The obvious big difference between the two views Is 
this in general: Plato is concerned with the throefoIC. 
division of tho soul and Paul is concerned with the , 
trichotomy of the entire man, if there is any, We say 
"if there is any", because our investigation has shown 
that neither writer holds such views. 
11 W. Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, P- 17- 
2-50* 
Plato, on the one hands assumes an incompositeg 
uncompounded and simple soul withq so to speak, mental 
impulses, aspects, spiritual facultiesq transitory and 
temporary manifestationsq modes or phases, owing their 
existence to the soul's connection with the body, and not 
with the three real and distinct parts or elements. 
St. Paul, on the other hands does not sot out a 
scientific trichotomic theory of man in a single passage, 
be simply speahs of the preservation and sanctification 
of man in his completenessg in his totality, in a loose, 
rhetorical traditional language, 
The noteworthy sharp distinction/and main difference 
between the Platonic immortality of the soul and the 
Pauline resurrection is the following. Plato teaches 
that the soul as a purely spirituals rationalp simple and 
indestructible entity will continue in unending and 
eternal existence, apart from the body. The soul for 
Plato is inherently and intrinsically immortal, viz. in 
Its own right and in virtue of its nature as soul, by its 
inherent deathlessness, 
St. Paul neither teaches such a view nor does he mako 
any claim to do so. 
There is no room in St, Paulls'teaching for an 
"inherently disembodied soul or spirit. 
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The Apostle is not concerned with the immortality 
of the psyche or spirit as separated and distinct parts, 
but with the resurrection of the whole complex soul-spir.. - 
body of man, of the whole manis make up as the consequon--o 
of Christ'-s Resurrectiono 
Paulfs conception of the resurrection-body has noth:., - 
to do with the resuscitation of dead bodies in the graven: 
His conception of resurrection body may be better 
expressed as the transformation, ro-creation# reconsti-'.. 
and resurrection by the power of Godq of the whole man 
unity, of the same person, of the personality, of the t=uo 
self, of the psycho-somatic organismg of the human psyche- 
physical individual. 
Our future resurrection will take place not as our 
own natural possession, but as the royal gift of God. 
Thus St. Paul conceives of the resurrection of 
believers as an act and gift of God through our risen Lor-' 
and Saviour Jesus Christ, and not as an inherent right 
of their very being. 
Arriving at the end of our enquiry we draw the 
following general conclusion: 
It is aburAantly clear throughout our research thcvý-V 
Plato has not oxercised any influence upon St. Paul 
directly or indirectly concerning the nature of the h=-- 
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soul and its ýmzziortality, 
There is neither similarilty nor any affinity 
whatsoever botWeen the two on the matter undor discussion. 
'"hare is not oven any comunity of mind or real I 
"C1.1 .ý1. kinship of t1iougj. %, between. those two giants of human 
spirit who have changed the course of history and tho 
pattern of European thought and of human life as a whole 
with their teachings. 
Prof. E. J. pr_lcot "'ptlul and Plato", The Hibbert 
Journal$ (Oct. 1917 - July 1918) (1-918-F'Vol. 16, TpF. ---2-6"-3-2S2, in an interestin,, article has brought 
together some passages and carried out a survey in 
order ko point out the affinities bot-., Ieon the two, 
, 
His whole attempt amounts to this: 'I'Mis survey 
of the teaching of Paul and Plato reveals not a 
little affinity between those two great minds. I 
do not suggest that P--U1 was Platonist or borrowad 
his leadins ideas from the founder of the Academy, 
Many of tlie coincidenecs which I have brought 
forward may appear superficial; very often, no 
doubt, they can be explained as merely accidental 
approximations of Greek and Hebrow thoughte stiut 
'-he indiroct should be that t the genoral result 
inflUel-10-0 of Greek thought on the mind of Par-" 
greater than is o-Z'-Zlen sur- her po.! Iod; and fur4 
'I'Me rolig-ious a'fJ. n-; tios bot-Ween Paul, the oo*eI 
theolodian of the primitive Church. a-nd Plato. 
theologian of the Greoic Schools ...... . )ecauso of 
the =_real affinities tho thought of Plato vqi)6. 
the Ne-, Ir Tostcmient-, 11 Though his'articlo is a 
praiseworthy and valuable attempt, nevertheless; and 
with all duo respect to his ý learning, iL, seems to uc 
unconvincing. 11-. ýs arGizic-ats on "psycholoCyO 
pp. 274-77) and ta. ', Iao w%-*c11 
concerns us, do not, 3trictly speakingt stand logical 
scrut: Uiy and strict scianIbIfic criticisii. His 
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We then ma: Lntain that 
1) We cannot speak loosely and lightly about 
similarities or parallisms in whatever form between the 
two great thinkers on the theory of the. human psyche and 
its destiny after death. There is no affinity or 
'fro 
utterances are more speculations and conjectures, 
(a)744 
generalisations, incidental reflections and 
conclusions drawn out of endless, continual, 
ceaseless offortl passionate love and keen desire 
to relate the teaching of the Apostle with the 
Greek philosophy and detect its influence on him 
and the similarities between them; An effort and 
interest so lively even to-day, when Biblical 
studies are highly developed with a tremendous 
accent on the Hebrew and Rabbinic background of 
the New Testament and St. Paul in general in 
almost all respects; Prof. Price is followed in 
his view also by W. Pairweatherp Jesus and the, 
ax:! ýeksp,, Edinburgh, 1,924, pp, 289-295 cf. pp, 
2-- 1 -Q. 5 PftXTT,, q"IIXCLTwv- HaMor, ' rlXd=v; l 
.f. 19609970C 129 23/249 Athens, pp. 162-68; 
R, R. Hartford, "St. Paul, Plato and Thmortality" 
Hermathena, 194 , No. LXV, pp. C. Ace- -5 
ý4-79; 
: rrnnn, The Christian Element in Plato and the 
Platonic Philosophy, Edinburgh, 1860, point in 
the same direction. 
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cimilari-! 7 .7 whatsoever 
bet-weer. thcm either in ideaso 
language, form, cont -ent, points of doctrine or 
phraseology. The difference between them in what we 
have discussed is sharply distinct and real. 
2) St. Paul's borrowings directly from the Old 
Testament, to which he gives new menningg are only those 
which concern immediately the human soul, that is, Jts 
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and ps cholo ical basisq lexicol2rical and lInguistic 0 -2 
4M 
ne would fail. Such'an attempt, apart 
from Christ and in isolation, would not produce the 
expected logical results, 
the Bible. If we can understand what Paul Cal) 
PVT'2ý4)said 
about man in relation to Godq we shall have 
gained now light on the meaning and purpose of 
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